The character of relations has also been changed by the development of many new points of contact since 1898, and especially since 1905. Relations were especially affected by the completion of the Isthmian Canal which placed the United States nearer than Japan to the western coasts of Mexico and South America, and closer to Japanese doctrine in regard to the control of Asia. The overflow of surplus land less Japanese population, which after 1905 found an outlet in Korea, has started a migratory movement across the Pacific to undeveloped Latin America — especially to Mexico, also to Peru and Chile, and even to Brazil — which will doubtless increase greatly in volume, and may in time provoke agitation and alarm among the native populations, and possibly result in condi tions inducing the Japanese government to threaten the use of force to protect its subjects, and thus compel the Latin American govern ments to appeal to the United States for protec tion under the Monroe doctrine. In 191Z ap prehension of Japanese plans to purchase Mag dalina Bay on Mexican territory of Lower Cali fornia for a harbor and a Japanese colony caused the proposal of a new corollary of the Monroe doctrine known as the Lodge resolu tion, which passed the Senate by a vote of 51 to 4 but was not accepted by President Taft.
Restriction on Japanese emigration to the western coast of the Pacific will impel them toward the islands and coasts of the Far East. Their desire for islands was indicated by their recent demand (in November 1918) for reten tide of the Caroline, Ladrone and Marshall groups, in which they supplanted Germany at the opening of the recent World War. Toward Hawaii, in which there is a large Japanese pop ulation, Japanese jingoes, disappointed by the American annexation of 1898, still entertain ambitions not reconcilable with American in terests — although there is no evidence that their irrepressible chauvinism is shared by re sponsible statesmen at Tokio. Toward the nearer but tropical, thickly settled Philippines, in which there is no large Japanese population, but a discordant population possibly of distant kin, Japanese imperialists and ardent expansion ists after the close of the Russo-Japanese war turned their awakened thought in favor of trop ical colonies, and perhaps they may be the ad vance guard of future Japanese policy on a question possibly not yet completely settled in American policy. Probably Japan does not at present covet the Philippines, but wants there only economic privileges such as she has en joyed equally with all nations.
Toward China, concerning which before 1905 there was complete harmony of American Japanese interests and policy, Japanese policy since 1905 has changed, in accord with a claim of "natural liberators and protectors of China from servitude to Europeans," and as a result of increasing American-Japanese commercial competition in the Pacific and Far East. After the close of the war against Russia, fought single-handed, and professedly in support of an open door policy, Japan, confronted by a re sumption of the Russia policy of encroachment on China, fearing the failure of any further contest to secure more decisive results, and especially apprehensive of German designs, sur prised the United States and the world by nego tiating a friendly agreement of alliance with Russia in 1916 as a means of security in the development of Japanese enterprise in Man churia. By this significant convention each party
agreed not to "become a party to any arrange ment or political combination)) directed against the other, and to "act in concert on the meas ures to be taken)) in case of menace to the terri torial rights Or special interests of either in the Far East.
Japanese statesmen claim that the "guiding factor" of the foreign policy of Japan—a coun try over crowded and endowed with scant re sources — is the "instinct of self-preservation;' directed against menaces both from within and from without, and primarily expressed in plans for the solution of the Chinese question ("the molding of Asia's destiny))) but also in plans for conversion into a great commercial nation.
In the recent controversies between Japan and China, the United States did not become directly involved. Following the Japanese de mands on China, which were granted in large part by the China-Japanese treaty of 25 May 1915, the American government announced that it could not agree to any action which might impair American-Chinese treaty obligations, or the open door, or Chinese integrity. In 1917 it reached an agreement with Japan on Questions relating to Japanese policy in China. Late in August 1917 a special Japanese mission armed with full power, headed by Viscount Kikujire Ishii arrived at San Francisco en route to Washington to secure better understanding between the two countries, and to - silence mischievous reports By an agreement of 2 November between Secretary. Lansing and Viscount Ishii, the United States government, consistent with the. principle of the Monroe doctrine, recognized that Japan by territorial propinquity had special interests in China, and obtained from Japan a recognition of the prin ciple of the open door and a denial of any pur pose to infringe in any way on the independ ence or territorial integrity of China. Although the recognition of special Japanese interests conceded no right or authority over the destinies of the Chinese peoples and was joined with the guarantee of China's independence and integrity, and although the pact was justified by China's feeble condition as a sovereign state, the Chi nese government made a formal protest stating that it "will not allow itself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations" in which it had no part. The Chinese were too much engrossed in civil strife to see •that the American recognition of Japanese special inter ests was really a recognition of an Asiatic Monroe doctrine — an American recognition of a real Japanese analogue to the Monroe doc trine.
Callahan, J. M.,