INTEREST, as employed in psychology and pedagogy, is a term conveying at least two or three distinct ideas. The word also, in the vulgar sense, applies loosely to what is meant by personal advantage; as, for example, it is a man's interest* to obtain this or that.
Etymologically, interest conveys the idea of a condition of being concerned about, or having a share in anything, in which sense also we find it used as a legal term. Perhaps its most defi nite meaning is that of the psychological law of interest, the law or principle that those elements of a past experience the most effective for recall are those which at the time of the experience received the greatest share of atten tion or aroused the highest degree of interest. Thus the great French psychologist, T. Ribot, uses the term. He remarks that ((the influence of emotional states must be stated as a prin ciple, but not as an exclusive cause. It is summed up in what Shadworth Hodgson has called the Law of Interest.'" (Psychology of the Emotions'). The word interest, derived from the Latin interesse, literally *to go be tween,* to make a difference, to concern, to be of importance, yielded in the course of a long evolution all the meanings of interest, both legal and psychological, as used in English.
Psychologically, interest may be broadly de fined as the °consciousness which accompanies mental tendencies of any sort, so far as they terminate upon mental objects or stimulate to construction of them." (Baldwin). It is also from another point of view a phase of feeling, an intellectual feeling. It is always manifested by voluntary attention. Its opposite is the feeling of alienation and repulsion that accom panies a presentation of matter that is foreign to the experience of a student, or other person. By attention one understands the activity of the mind.'" Thus psychologically, interest and attention are closely allied events. Baldwin remarks that interest may be con sidered either as a stimulus or as a result of voluntary attention. Perhaps it is more pre cise to say that interest and attention are the subjective and objective aspects, respectively, of the same mental activity. This amounts to say ing that the effective assimilation of new ma terial into the course of experience is interest when viewed from the standpoint of the mental affections,— the emotion and personal attitude that accompany it. It is attention when viewed as the active outgoing of mental habits in grasp ing and in mastering the subject matter before one. All views of the relation subsisting be tween interest and attention acknowledge, at least, the intimate connection of the two; and it is precisely this connection which becomes significant in pedagogy. Like attention, inter est as a state of the mind depends upon the proper balance of the old and new in experi ence. Neither interest nor mental activity ap pears to be the conditions of attention. Interest is either a general name for the subjective conditions of attention when ascribed to the object or it is used to designate a mood which accompanies all attention. Mental activity is really also bodily activity — a mass of sensa tions that comes from the contraction of muscles in different parts of the body. The contractions result from motor innervations wEich accompany attention. The interest of curiosity, the desire to know, may be defined as a primary form of interest, as distinguished from custom and habit and preference. Bald win. regards the former as being> more of the nature of a stimulation to the intellectual func tion; the latter be regards as the resultant of a frequent performance of the function. This latter aspect, he tells us, is that which also underlies the popular use of the term in the plural, (interests* meaning one's prevailing and permanent disposition.
Where the material is almost entirely novel, there is an excess of stimulation if there is interest at all. The responsive power of the mind under such conditions is not infrequently overwhelmed and confused, and as a result we have sometimes discouragement or aversion. These truths have their importance for peda gogy, as well as for the psydiologist. As a feeling we may well remind ourselves that interest is the feeling that something, the object of the feeling, concerns one. As the word aversion implies, on the other hand, there is in it a strong tendency of the mind to turn away and devote itself to a more congenial and rewarding object than the one which should concern it. Even when this tendency is over come in part, it means divided, and conse quently wasted, energy, as compared with uni fied, whole-hearted activity, where interest is naturally and directly sustained. On the other hand, what is thoroughly familiar denotes the mastered, the habitual. This state of affairs awakens tendencies that work automatically and mechanically. If there is also a new factor about which habits may play, these habitual tendencies will furnish a foundation for intense and concentrated interest. But, it is a matter of common knowledge, if there is no stimula tion beyond that evoking the established habits, the result will be ennui, monotony, routine; the effect is that of walking in a treadmill where nothing new is achieved. A certain degree of
difficulty, a certain amount of obstacle to over come, enough to set the problem of a readjust ment of habit, is necessary for sustained interest. The self must be allowed to proceed with thoroughly awakened powers; and this is impossible without a challenging difficulty. The fact just stated throws light upon the relatioe between desire, or interest, and effort, and helps to place the relation of the doctrine of interest to that of discipline. The doctrine itself is in pedagogy a sort of expression for a number of different motives. As long as a child lives in the mere present he is absorbed in his im mediate concerns only. All its powers are directed and discharged upon the immediately present stimulus. There are for the child few if any ends, or conceived results, to be reached, after an intervening time, through the controlled adaptation of conditions as means. And when ever there is an end it usually lies in such a near future that but little thought has to be given to the management of the intermediate conditions. The state of immediate interest characterizes the play activities. In this sense only can one look upon interest as a form df amusement a stimulus through the play-instinct i to induce intellectual effort. When, however, more remote ends are to be reached by con, sistent and sustained maintenance of a series of acts that, of themselves lack immediate interest, but that are of interest because of their importance for the remoter end in view, we have mediate interest. Mediate interest being dependent on an idea, a purpose, a con scions aim, involves an intellectual interest in a way in which the emotional element accom panying direct absorption does not. The medi ate interest is dependent upon the persistence of an idea, a conscious aim,-- and this involves the thought of the bearing of the immediately present upon the attainment of this end. Con trol of the activity and the source of interest, reside in what is conceived — a thing always physically absent when it is a thing and not in perception when non-physical. The remote ness of the end in time means of course the in crease in the number of difficulties to be dealt with, one after another. Therefore we may be certain that the seriousness, the depth of the interest of the self in its objective — its aim -. is continually confronted with tests. Under these conditions, while physical effort will go to the means for reaching the end, the moral and the inellectual effort will be directed to sus taining the idea of a purpose in such force as to give it motive power. All the elements of apparent conflict of interest and effort, with im mediate attractiveness, immediate agreeableness. immediate pleasurableness, on the side of inter est, while serious and important values are all on the side of effort —is what disturbs some well-meaning educators. Hence the situation has been completely misinterpreted in theories of education, with respect to both its moral and other higher implications. In this way interest has been regarded by some as inherently un worthy, objectionable as a factor; some appear to assume that it operates only as a temptation away from the objectively important. Identified thus with the attractive and swerving power of the immediately pleasurable and placed over against what reason shows to lie really worth while, it has been the source of much misery to both pupil and teacher. Its logicsis bid; and its results are worse. Logically, it implies that the ,objectively valuable end is totally devoid of interest, so that sheer effort of the will has to be relied upon as the sole motive for keeping the self in its right course— for keeping it struggling against the seductions of interest. The previous analysis it is to be hoped will re veal the fault of this conception. For in truth what sustains effort is not sheer appeal to will power, but interest in an end an interest, both indirect, intelligent, and at times, even moral, as distinguished from that which is immediate; purely personal, emotional, sensuous. We do not mean to imply that some ends should be im moral; it is intended above to take cognizance of the fact that there is. a realm of the mor ally indifferent. The genuine educational need is therefore not to eliminate interest, but to foster indirect interest, the interest that is not immediate but mediate. Yet it would be well to remember that immediate interest also has its claims: it remains a fundamental trait of all zsthetic and artistic life. In either case whenever a pupil becomes intensely and sin cerely interested in an end which reflection holds up, the sense of separation between means and end tends to disappear from consciousness. Consult Arnold, F., Attention and Interest, a Study in Psychology and Education' (New York 1910) ; Boggs, S. P., John Dewey's Theorie des Interesses and seiner Anwendung in der Pfidagogik) (Halle 1901) ; Dewey, J, as related to the Will) (Bloomington, Ill., 1896) ; De Garmo, C., and Educa (New York 1902); Osterrnann, W., 'In terest and its Relation to Pedagogy' (Trans. by E. R. Shaw, New York 1899).