INTERPRETATION, in law, the art of determining the meaning of a speaker or writer or of the parties to a written instru ment, as a contract, deed or the like. Courts of equity, in their interpretation and construction of instruments, follow the same rules as courts of law. The terms interpretation and construc tion, while frequently used interchangeably by some writers, should be differentiated according to others. In interpretation, they contend, the court decides simply the meaning of words and sentences, whereas in construction the court decides what is their legal effect. Interpreta tion is merely logiCal reasoning, while construc tion is legal reasoning, these writers insist. The two terms, nevertheless, in practice at least, are generally used with identical meaning. The rules for interpretation vary to some extent with the particular class of instrument in dis pute. For instance, wills are liberally con strued, as the testator is not presumed to know the legal signification of all the terms he em ploys, but is held to use such in their popular meaning. On the other band, a deed, is gen, erally construed strictly and against the maker when there is ambiguity. A contract must not be strictly nor liberally construed, but the in tention must be drawn in the light of surround ing circumstances, as customs of the place or time, social condition's, ekc.. Stattites abregating the common law, as well as penal statutes, must be strictly construed. The same rule is applied to statutes affecting private rights. On the other hancl, statutes designed to prevent fraud are liberally construed, and statutes must gen erally not be construed so as to operate ret rospectively.
Some general rules of interpretation are as follows: (1) The meaning of a word, clause or other part of an instrument must be con strued in the light of the whole instrument. Such disputed part may have its ordinary mean ing entirely changed by this rule. (2) The meaning of the maker of an instrument is to be taken from what is therein contained and also from what may be fairly implied by custom or the like. (3) Due weight must be given to the construction placed upon the instrument by the parties themselves. (4) Words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning unless the writing or the attending Circumstances indicate a contrary intention. (5) Where two interpre tations are possible, that is to be preferred which is fair and reasonable. (6) Usually am biguous language is to be construed against the maker of a private writing, as a contract or a fired. (7)' When the language of nuinstrtunent
is clear and unambiguous, interpretation is not needed. In other words, a court will not read into an instrument a meaning it does, not ex press, even if the court does not believe the language expresses the meaning of the maker. (8) As between two interpretations, one of which follows the law and the other does not, the former is to be preferred. (9) A writer cannot be allowed to :vary, contradict or add to an instrument by oral to show his act ual intention.
In addition to the foregoing list, which is not complete, a large number of special rules have been framed • to fit particular cases.
Sometimes the interpretation of an instrument is left to a jury, but the usual' rule is that the court decides. For instance, a jury may decide the signification of a written word which has a local or a trade meaning, and similarily a. jury may decide the meaning of an oral contract or other oral declaration. criminal libel cases in the United States, and in all cases of libel and slander in England, the jury like wise decides the meaning of the language en ployed by the defendant. This forms an im portant exception to the rule above, enumerated Interpretation is particularly important in four classes of instruments: deeds, wills, con tracts and statutes.
A highly technical classification of different methods of interpretation has been recognized by some authorities, such as liberal, close, re strictive, extravagant, strict, etc., but the first and last are the ones generally used, An int doctrine, known as that of cy fryer, in the interpretation or construction of wills and statutes. Under this doctrine so much of the writing will be given effect as is possible. For instance, if an illegal direction is given in a will, so much of the will must be given effect 'as is legal, if this part is separable, and the remainder ignored. This doctrine is in effect both in Great Britain and in most of the States in this couirtry.
In the interpretation of constitutions, the courts endeavor to- harmonise different parts that stein to conflict, and .should lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather' than one which may make some idle and nugatory. (8 W. Va. 320). The rule for the construction of Federal and State constitutions is radically different: Consult 102 Tex. 11; 9 Wheat (U. S.) 1.