INTROSPECTION, observation as ap plied to the 'phenomena of mind. While essentials it is like all other observation, it is especially interesting because of certain diffi culties which it encounters. Though these been minimized by the experimental psycholog ist, they certainly burden psychological research, with a very considerably greater degree of falli bility than that found within the natural sciences. As was pointed out by Kant, the chief obstacle to introspection is the fact that the phenomena forming the object of introspection are liable to profound modification by the act of introspection itself. It is indeed by no means inconceivable that objects within the mind may be as unmodified by the observation of an in dependent part of consciousness as non-mental objects. The difference between observation and introspection is thus in a sense merely one of degree. none the less it is not negligible. The crude introspection of common sense — which furnishes the only possible starting point, for the refined introspection of experimental• psy chology—indicates to us that experiences are actually changed by a change in the direction of our attention. If one thinks intensely of the tip of his forefinger he will experience pressure sensations, temperature sensations, etc., which seem different from the casually remem bered sensations experienced wiTh a different tflrecticin of. attention. If he listens to a par denier instrument in an orchestra he will hear it as distinctly louder than if he listens to the orchestra as a whole. Now while the experi ences which form the basis of our observation of nature are subect to change by our change of attention, in a manner not unlike our intro specnon, there is a fundamental distinction be tween the two cases. This distinction resides in the fact that whereas the apparatus of physical research reduces the experiences and phrases of experience involved to those which by their simplicity are not subject to much altera tion by a change in the attention, all the instru ments of the psychological laboratory cannot reduce by one iota the complexity and multa bilicy of the objects of introspection, for these constitute the, entire content of the mind.Be fore this content can be studied by fragments with the aid of the apparatus of the psy chological laboratory, it must be demonstrated by introspection that these fragments are really fragments of the more complex experi ences. Introspection, therefore, can never free itself from a subject matter that changes with the direction of the attention by a mere choice of its objects. Now, introspection is itself a change of attention from the natural object of the experience, to the experience itself. By its very nature, then, it may be expected to induce profound modifica tions in its objects. In order to avoid this, the psychologist trains himself to make intro spection a more or less automatic act, requiring a relatively slight diversion of attention. While this is unquestionably the only method to gather a large mass of introspective data with relatively slight modifications by the method by which they are recorded, it is subject to grave dangers of own. A prolonged training in laboratory introspection is likely to give one a somewhat narrow repertory of introspective terms bor rowed largely from the senses of vision and hearing, and possibly inadequate to the tasks of introspection which are likely to be under taken. The schematization of the process of
introspection may well be inseparable from a schematization of its dicta. That mental phe nomenon known as suggestibility makes it scarcely a matter of doubt that in many cases the introspection of one trained in the methods and doctrines of some special psychological school will contain, artifacts, not present in the actual mental occurrences.
Besides the difficulties dependent on the at tention and on suggestion, another obstacle to introspection is the privacy and inaccessibility of every experience. While no single obserea don in physical research can be repeated as such, or shared by several observers, the ob servation of several experimenters with re spect to a given • occurrence possess a certain equal weight and direct comparability, while the history of physics shows that it is possible to repeat many an experiment in 'practically all its significant details. While psychological ex periments can be repeated, and many times with valuable results, as soon as the more complex prOcesses — and particularly those of affection —are involved, the Variation. in the' mental content and background from time to time be comes an obstacle that can only partially'be.c.ir cumvented. Physical experiments in heat and electricity can only be repeated by virtue of the of thermal and electric inStslatOris_ Chemical experiments demand apparatus that is inert to the reagents. Now, there is no thor oughly satisfactory way of insulating an ex perience of any degree of complexity from its mental background, nor of enclosing it, as it were, in an inert container. Thus it is difficult to repeat an introspective situation in such a manner as to duplicate all the features which are important from a given standpoint. The impossibility of sharing an introspection needs no comment. It has been said that every intro spection is retrospection. This is true in a sense, for manifestly no complete view can be taken of a time-consuming experience — and all experiences, as far as we know, consume time—until the beginning of it is in the past. However, the knowledge of an occurrence in the immediate past need not be a matter of memory, for it appears that the direct cognitive relation can bridge brief intervals of time. This direct nature of immediate retrospection permits the psychologist to make many valuable introspections on chance states, the excitation of which in the laboratory would be difficult or impossible. The result of the foregoing dis cussion, then, is: Introspection is the funda mental method of psychology and is a valid type of observation but is subject to certain grave and peculiar difficulties which are at any rate less apparent in other types of observation. These are in part alleviated, in part aggravated, by the methods and practices of the psychological laboratory. These methods and practices have at best a limited scope and cannot be said to have supplanted the older method of introspec tion upon the psychological phenomena of daily life. (See Psve.HoLocv). Consult James, W., Principles of Psychology' (New York 1899) ; Klemm, 0., 'History of Psychology' (ib. 1914); Kulpe, 0., 'Outlines of Psychology' (tr., ib. 1901) ; Titchener, G. B. 'Text-Book of Psy chology) Ob. 1910) ; V/undt, (Leip zig 1906).