LAW (M.E., lawe; A.S., lagu). The An glo-Saxon form is of rare occurrence, except in compounds; but from these, and from the cognate Icelandic log, pl. lag—i.e., °things ly ing in due place," like strata of slate, for in stance — the original meaning of lagu as, *that which lies in order," is inferable. The transi tion of the idea to sheets of parchment or other material, upon which an order is in scribed, and, ultimately, to that which had been written, ordered or ordained, could not have been difficult. The derivation of the English word 'gm" from the French loi (Norm. Fr. lay) or from the Latin lex, lego, is incorrect. But the Latin and Teutonic words evidently come from the same Aryan root (lagh, to lie). The oldest meaning of lex was *a bill"— prob ably so called because it was laid before the people in comitia for approval (cf. Ger. vor loge, a bill). When a lex, or bill, had been agreed to it was still called a lex, just as we speak of a °McKinley Bill" or a °Hepburn Bill," even when it has become an act of Con gress and been a law for many years. This word-history shows that the term "law" is used in its original and proper sense only when it is used as the generic name for that which has been ordered and made applicable to the conduct of human beings. In medieval times animals were regularly tried and condemned for their defaults and we still speak of trivial and defective evidence as *insufficient to hang a dog." This practice of trying and passing judgment on dumb creatures, however, was an aberration. When ancient law declared for feited an animal or inanimate object, which had caused the death of a person, it was a liability of the human owner of the offending thing that was enforced. When a well was filled up because a child had been drowned therein, this was a penalty enforced upon the owner of the well; when an ox was made to furnish forth funeral baked meats for the rela tives of the man whom the animal had gored, it was at the cost of the owner of the ox— the owner, not the thing that had caused a mis chief, was responsible to the law. In admiralty
practice ships are made defendants in actions for debt and are libelled in suits for damages, just as if they were persons, but the liability enforced in every case is that of the master or owner of the vessel. A law, therefore, is a rule of human conduct. This being so the in appropriateness of the term, *laws of na ture," in its modern sense, becames apparent. Records of natural phenomena and their se quences, though set down with mathematical preciseness and logical perfection, are not rules of conduct at all; they are descriptions. The statement that "an apple falls to the ground from a height of 15 feet in one second," is not a "law" of gravitation, but a fact — just as if one should say "he stole," one would merely be describing an act. The commandment, "thou shalt not steal," however, is a law. The distinction is obvious. Mathematical laws are rules of quantity, not of conduct. In the do main of esthetics such terms as the °law of beauty" or the *law of harmony" are familiar expressions; but these, like all the others men tioned, are "laws" merely in figure of speech. Terms like "Grimm's law," the °laws of pho netics," or the °laws of metre," are justified, because they are rules of human conduct in the use of language, having their origin in cus tom. The commandment *thou shalt not covet" is a rule of ethics, a moral precept and also a law; but the science of ethics is concerned with resolutions and operations of the human will, or with states of mind, which have not found expression in action. The rules of this science, therefore, are not, properly speaking, laws. Covetousness is a sin and invites no legal penalty until it has manifested itself by the infraction of some legal right, Law is a rule of conduct governing external human acts. Speaking and writing are actions, but thinking is not an external act and a mere inclination to do is not an act at all.