MARCH TO THE SEA. There were two plans for a march to the sea by Sherman's army, the first General Grant's, the second General Sherman's, modifying the first. A campaign to the sea to divide the Confederacy was decided upon by General Grant in January 1864, when he was in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, with headquarters at Nash ville. His objectives on Me coast were first Mobile, second, Savannah, Atlanta being the in termediate objeotive for both. Sherman's army was then in the vicinity of Chattanooga, Tenn., and Ringgold, Ga.
In a letter to General Halleck, dated at Nashville, 15 Jan. 1864, General Grant wrote: aI look upon the next line for me to secure, to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile, Montgom ery and Atlanta being the important interme diate points." This he repeated on 19 January to General Thomas, then in command of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, and this officer immediately began to gather infor mation, which General Grant desired, of the number of troops necessary to guard die roads and bridges from Nashville to Atlanta. These preparations were entrusted to General Thomas, as General Sherman was engaged with his Meridian campaign. In this connection, Gen eral Thomas expressed his confidence in being able with the Fourteenth and Fourth corps in advance, covered with a strong division of cav alry, and the Eleventh corps in reserve, to over come all opposition as far as Atlanta.
When Grant was made lieutenant-general and ordered east to command all the armies, he called Sherman to Nashville, and traveled together as far as Cincinnati. General Sher man was then made acquainted with the plans already set forth. As part of these plans, be fore leaving Nashville General Grant ordered Banks to concentrate at least 25,000 men to move against Mobile in the spring in co-oper ation with General Sherman.
In addition to letters to each• of the com manders interested — Halleck, Sherman, Thomas and Banks — General Grant, 26 Mardi 1864, sent all army commanders a map upon which was indicated by red lines the territory occupied by the Union forces at the beginning of the war, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864. The territory which it was proposed to occupy by the campaigns about to begin was indicated by the blue lines. This map reached General Sherman 4 April, and its receipt was acknowledged by him. This map is reproduced in the Atlas of the 'Official Records> of the war, being plate 135 A of that publication. For Sherman's proposed campaign the blue lines ex tend from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and from this latter point both to Mobile and Savannah.
General Sherman, in acknowledging the map, said; uThat map to me contains more information and ideas than a volume of printed matter. Keep your retained copies with infinite care, and if you have occasion to send out to other commanders any more I would advise a special courier. From that map I see all, and glad am I that there are minds now at Wash ington able to devise; and for my part, if we can keep our counsels, I believe I have the men and ability to march square up to the position assigned me, and to hold it? As the result' of the campaign for Atlanta General Slocum occupied that city 2 September. Meantime Farragut had taken possession of Mobile Bay 5 August. On 10 September Grant telegraphed Sherman from City Point as fol lows: (As soon as your men are properly rested, and preparations can be made, it is de sirable that another campaign should be com menced. We want to keep the enemy continu ally pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace while the war lasts, the end can not be far distant. Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know, but it will be the best move for Major-General Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, while you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, on this matter." To this Sherman telegraphed in reply: "If you can manage to take the Savannah River as high as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia, otherwise I would risk our • whole army by going too far from • In a letter from Atlanta, dated 20 Septem ber, Sherman gave Grant the conditions under which he could successfully co-operate in a movement on Savannah: "If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your centre, and let General Canby have com mand over the Mississippi River and the coun try west of it, I will send a force to the Ala bama and Appalachicola, provided you give me 100,000 of the drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a day to be in Savannah I will insure our possession of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta?' General Grant thereupon conferred by letter with General Hallede in regard to establishing a base on the coast for General Sherman and providing supplies, giving his own opinion that Savannah could be captured by troops from the East assisted by those in the Department of the South, and that the line of Augusta and Savannah would be a better one than Mont gomery, Selma and Mobile. Grant further said
in this letter 4 October : "Whichever way Sher man moves he will undoubtedly encounter Hood's army, and in crossing to the sea-coast will sever the connection between Lee's army and his section of the country." General Sherman fixes the day after his letter of 20 September as the date when his plan of a march to the sea came first into his mind. It differed from Grant's plan based upon first disposing of Hood's army, in that it in volved leaving Hood in his rear, to be taken care of by Thomas, and marching through to Savannah with no enemy in his front. Upon this plan a discussion arose with Grant, who for some time held to the necessity of first deal ing with Hood. This discussion between Grant and Sherman lasted for several weeks. While it was in progress Hood became active. On 20 September Forrest's cavalry began vigorous operations about Athens and Decatur, Ala., and Pulaski, Tenn. Sherman at once sent troops to Chattanooga and 28 September General Thomas was ordered to proceed to Nashville to or ganize a force to meet a possible northward move of Hood. The first attempt of the latter was to break Sherman's communications by heavy movements upon his railroad. These met with only temporary success, as Sherman promptly pursued. The fighting at Allatoona 5 October was the most prominent affair. Hood then moved to the westward, and occupied Gadsden, Ala. Sherman again followed as far as Gaylesville. Sherman, 10 October, again pro posed to Grant to leave Hood and march to the sea. Grant replied the same day. (