The march to the sea began on the morning of 15 November. As General Sherman wrote: "It surely was a strange event — two armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and con clusive result in a great war Hood's army, which had required the active work of three armies from May until September to push it back to Atlanta, had crossed the Tennessee at Decatur, strengthened by Forrest's cavalry and aiming for Nashville and the Ohio River. The situation at Nashville was thus described by Sherman: "General Thomas was at Nashville, with Wilson's dismounted cavalry and a mass of new troops and quartermaster's employees amply sufficient to defend the place. The Fourth and Twenty-third corps, under Gen erals Stanley and Schofield, were posted at Pulaski, Tennessee, and the cavalry of Hatch, Croxton and Capron, were about Florence, watching Hood. Smith's (A.J.) two divisions of the Sixteenth corps were still in Missouri, but were reported as ready to embark at Lex ington for the Cumberland River and Nash ville. Of course, General Thomas saw that on him would likely fall the real blow, and was naturally Sherman started with 62,204 officers and men. Of his army he wrote: "The most extraordinary efforts had been made to purge this army of non-combatants and of sick men, for we knew well that there was to be no place of safety save with the army itself ; our wagons were loaded with ammunition, provisions and forage, and we could ill afford to haul even sick men in the ambulances, so that all on this ex hibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experienced soldiers, well armed, well equipped and provided, as far as human foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength and vigorous action.° The artillery, wagon and ambulance trains were perfect. Each gun, caisson and forge was drawn by eight horses. There were 2,500 wagons with six mules to each, and the am bulances each had two horses. Each soldier carried 40 rounds, and in the ammunition wagons were 200 rounds for men and artillery.
The right wing, Gen. O. O. Howisd, was composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps; the left wing, Gen. H. W. Slocum, of the Fourteenth and the Twentieth.
The war had not produced a more thor oughly organized and equipped army, or one in which more men had passed a thorough physical inspection. As it started for the sea, General Sherman in his thus describes the feelings of the men, and his own "There was a devil-may-care feeling pervading officers and men, that made me feel the full load of respon sibility, for success would be accepted as a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this (march) would be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool.' This question was to be de cided at Nashville, as General Sherman wrote the day after he entered Savannah: "Thomas' complete success is necessary to vindicate my plans for this The march to the sea cannot, therefore, be fully understood with out considering the Nashville campaign as one of its essential parts. See NASHVILLE, CAM PAIGN AND BATTLE OF.
Sherman's army was composed of 55,329 in fantry, 5,063 cavalry, and 1,812 artillery. There were two corps, 13 infantry divisions, one cav alry division, 36 brigades of infantry, two of cavalry and 16 batteries. There was no Con
federate army between Atlanta and Savannah. Wheeler's cavalry was active on the flanks guarded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, and a consid erable force of militia was encountered at Gris woldville.
The order for this historic march clearly presents its organization, its order of daily movement, its methods of living upon the coun try, the restrictions placed on its dealings with citizens, in short, the whole military machinery of the campaign. It, therefore, deserves a place in every history of the March to the Sea, General Sherman himself holding that no ac count of that event could be perfect without it. It was as follows: (Special Field No. 120).
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi. In the Field, Kingston,Georgia, November 9, 1864.
1. For the purpose of military onenniolls, this army divided into two wings, viz.: The right wing. Major-General O. O. Howard command ing, composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps; the leftwing Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, com posed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps.
2. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practi cable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, win receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.
3. 'There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition-train and provision-train, distributed habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order of march, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 A. )4, and make about fifteen miles per day. unless other wise fixed in orders.
4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organise a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabi tants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp. they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging-parties must be entrusted the gathering of provisions and forage, at any distance from the road S. To corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, holies, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.