In war, as in everything else, the secret of success lies in organization and preparation. It is interesting, then, to note how two separate and apparently independent conditions have been combined in the evolution of the modern army. The first of these in time, and, with reference to actual combat, in importance, is the creation of the army corps by Napoleon in 1805. What a long step forward this was may he inferred from the fact that Frederick the Great's army was not formed into even brigades and divi sions. Besides assuring unity of command, the creation of this strategic unit has led in modern times to the full recognition and definition of the of the three arms? All modern armies, therefore, whether they belong to mili tary or to unmilitary nations, on taking the field are formed into corps, and these corps are maintained as organic units in times of peace by the great military nations of the world for administrative as well as for purely military reasons.
Hardly less important as leading to a prin ciple of organization was the limitation imposed by Napoleon after Jena upon the size of the Prussian army. This was never to exceed 42,000 men, and, in fact, it never did; that is, at no time while the limitation was in force did Prussia keep more than that number of men under arms. But, thanks to Von Scharnhorst's foresight and intelligence, the members of this army were continually changing. As fast as trained, they were liberated to make room for new and untrained men. With the immediate results of this idea we are not here concerned: what we wish to bring out clearly is that this plan of organization, originally local in both time and circumstance, is to-day fundamental in the formation of the armies of all military states. Indeed, these, if the paradox be per missible, may be said not to have a regular army at all. Great Britain has one, as have the United States, but in all other important nations the condition of universal military service has made the distinction superfluous, if not mean ingless, by wiping out one of its terms. Hence, with the exceptions noted, a mold exists, so to say, a form, through which all citizens capable of bearing arms have to pass. From this comes the dictum, "The army is to-day the nation in arms,)) as distinguished from the purely profes sional army of the earlier part of the century. The application of the principle of universal service has resulted naturally in a classification of the male population with respect to service. Thus we find in Germany the active army made up of the men with the colors, the reserve of the active army, the Landwehr and the Land sturm (q.v.). Classes more or less similar exist in other countries under different names, the underlying principle being, however, substan tially the same in all. This principle further
leads directly to the distinction between peace footing and war footing, passage from the one to the other being effected by mobilization, an operation unknown at the opening of the cen tury. Since, moreover, the whole nation is the army, it results that the modern army has greatly increased in size, a result that would prove embarrassing but for the existence of the staff. It is clear that the formation, instruction, training, supply and administration of this army form a task of the greatest magnitude. Further more, when once formed, if it be not intelli gently led and accurately directed upon its ob jective, it runs the risk, from its mere size, of degenerating into an armed mob. Hence the conditions leading to the formation of the modern army have led, pari passe, to the forma tion of the modern staff. This simply means that by a natural evolution the functions of the staff have expanded until they now include duties not formerly contemplated. Thus the conception of a general staff, whose special business it is during times of peace to study and prepare for any campaign whatever on any theatre of war whatever, is distinctively modern. The existence of such an organization is evidently a necessity due partly at least to the great size of modern armies. This very con dition, by increasing the difficulties involved, has suggested the only cure of these difficulties —a body of specialists trained to weigh them in peace and to remove them in war. And so of the administrative staff under the same con ditions : the supply of an army, taking that term in its most comprehensive sense, is reduced to a continuously operating system. Obviously this particular question could not be left to look to chance for its answer.
The limits of this article forbid more than a mere mention of the influence of the railway, of the telegraph and of the telephone. The telephone is in current use upon the battlefield and wireless itself has been applied to military purposes both in action and in manoeuvres lead ing to action. Without the railway, rapid con centration and regular supply would be impos sible, a matter of capital importance in view of the great numbers enrolled. It would be hazardous to assert that it has been a prime factor in determining these numbers, but there can be no doubt that it has wielded a great influence in this direction. Other things being equal, it is logical and proper to have a large army, because the means of transporting and of supplying a large army are at hand.