MILITARY SCIENCE, Development of. In tracing here the development of military science, we shall begin with the 19th century because everything relating to the military art before its opening may be regarded as taking on, if the expression be not too strong, an archaeological character. In a military point of view, this century divides itself naturally into certain well-marked periods. We have first the great era of the Napoleonic wars, closed by the battle of Waterloo. This is followed by long years of peace, broken at last by the Crimean War. The next period to come under notice is that of our own Civil War, in which, in reality, modern conditions of warfare may be said to have taken their rise. The use of independent cavalry, the proper organization of field artil lery, the entrenched battlefield, the influence of railways, to say nothing of other particulars now regarded as essential by all military nations, find their first formal expression, if not always their full development, in this great struggle. Recrossing the Atlantic, the next term in the military progress of the century is found in the rise of Prussia, through the defeat of Austria in 1866, as a power of the first rank, a position confirmed four years later by its com plete overthrow of France. Since that epoch, military development, where fostered, has con sisted almost wholly in an imitation, more or less close, of the German system of organiza tion. These last years are marked, moreover, by a hitherto unparalleled application of the arts and sciences to the improvement of the material of war.
It is clear, then; that the growth of the military art during the 19th century was in no Wise a direct function of the time. In some of its most notable aspects the art developed more rapidly during the past 40 years than it had in the preceding 100. So conspicuously is this true that we may not assert that its state at the opening of the century was even a transi tion state. In all countries, with the exception of France, the conditions of the 18th had over flowed almost unchanged into the 19th century. The era was that of the great Frederick. His example still bore undisputed sway, to such a degree, indeed, that the husk was mistaken for the kernel, the appearance substituted for the reality. The armies of the day were in all essentials hired armies, the soldiers mercenaries, in the sense that war was largely a trade. Organization, recruiting, mobilization, adminis tration, supply, transportation — all these, the life-blood of a modern army, were, if not un known, at least not understood as they are to-day. They had not as yet been generalized into a continuing system applicable to a state either of peace or of war.
Similarly of arms and of equipment: the flint-lock musket, found in the hands of the troops of all armies, had been for many years substantially a constant quantity, while gun powder, the only explosive and propelling agent employed, had an unbroken ancestry of centuries of continuous use. The great objective in the
training of men. France again possibly excepted, lay in the development of a machine-like pre cision of drill, and this rkidity was carried so far as to convert manceuynng, even under fire, into a sort of geometrical exercise. On the field, deep columns and serried ranks were the rule. Infantry opened fire at 200 yards with un certain, if not innocuous, results at superior ranges. Naturally, under these conditions, cavalry could and did intervene directly in the decision of affairs on the battlefield. The range of field artillery was limited, and, until Na poleon's appearance, its powers and possibilities were not, on the whole, well understood.
The picture changes when we turn to the 20th century. The army is now the "nation in armsp— that is, war is no longer a trade, but a duty, and preparation for war a personal obligation to the state. Upon a declaration of hostilities, at the present day, the effort is made to bring the full strength of the nation to bear, or in other words, mobilization takes place. But this implies a full degree of preparedness, and preparedness, in its turn, a thorough study and application of the principles of organization and training, of supply and administration. Here we touch upon a well-defined characteristic of final as contrasted with initial conditions ; prep aration for war goes on unceasingly, in times of the profoundest peace, although no possible cause for war can be discerned in any direction. On the material side, the transformation is equally complete. All the possible resources of modern science have been levied on to con. tribute their share not only toward the improve ment of weapons and of war material in gen eral, but toward supplying the means of placing and maintaining an army in the field. Where 100 years ago but one explosive was known, modern chemical science has supplied hundreds, and the end is not yet. Whereas, in the days of our grandfathers, any respectable foundry could turn out serviceable guns, to-day, the gun is the finest product of metallurgical science, and its construction necessarily limited to specialists. Instead of the flintlock, harmless beyond 200 yards, we have the magazine rifle, sighted up to 1,800 yards, and deadly two miles and more away. The muzzle-loading field-piece of limited range and accuracy has given way to the rapid fire, breech-loading field gun, delivering from 10 to 15 aimed rounds of shrapnel a minute upon a target so distant as to be practically invisible to the naked eye, with an accuracy so great in trained hands that exposure is suicide. Under these conditions in open combat, the masses of elder days have dissolved into thin lines of invisible skirmishers, and cavalry has all but disappeared from the field of actual conflict. In general, armies have increased vastly in size, and important battles last for days and even months.