Shortly after the Restoration, the Parliament, filled with, the idea of how important as well as how trustworthy the militia was, passed a bill organizing it. A horseman was required to be provided, equipped and paid for by every one having an income of f500 a year derived from lands or i6,000 of personal property. And every one whose income or possession was one tenth of those amounts was charged with the equipment and pay of a pikeman or musketeer, and those of less estate were obliged to com bine in furnishing horse or foot soldiers. The size of the body of soldiery thus created was estimated at 130,000 men. For a time, this force became a useful and serviceable body, but the influence of the Crown was not lent to perfecting it. The king's desires were rather to obtain possession of any army that could be used to do his bidding. James II was met by the jealousy of Parliament just as Charles had been. Of a religion that was hated by the mass of the .people, and repeatedly thrusting men who were tools of the Crown into office, James II awakened a sense of distrust and opposition; his attempts to raise a regular army, by demands for the necessary appropria tions from Parliament, were the occasions of debate upon what the military establishment of the country was and should be. These argu ments were renewed pro and contra on differ ent occasions, but the king's wishes were dis regarded when, at the very height of his power, the dangers of a standing army were empha sized by Parliament; and a bill to make a militia more efficient was passed at the same time that supplies for the army were granted. The popular feeling was embodied in what was said in Parliament at this time in answer to what the courtiers had to urge in favor of regular troops. Sir Edward Seymour, Sir William Twisden, Sir Richard Temple and Sir John Maynard, the most learned lawyer of this time, gave vent to these utterances. Said the first of these: ((The militia might not be in a satisfactory state, but it might be remodeled, and he would rather give up a million to keep up a force from which he had nothing to fear than half a million to keep up a force of which he must ever be afraid.° The troops enrolled in the regular service, however, continued to increase in number, made necessary through the foreign relations of the English government, but the people accepted the increase always holding fast to the idea of a militia as their real protector. The force of circumstances, when the House of Orange was called to the throne, changed to an extent the feeling of the country in this regard, and danger from foreign foes made soldiers a necessity which the people reluctantly recognized, without such fear for their domestic content as they had before en tertained. The sentiment of the country was again shown when the House of Hanover came to the throne of England, although at this time the regular army had become a permanency, having been continuously provided for on the theory that a standing army was a necessity ((for better preserving the balance of power in Europe.° In 1757 the militia of England was again reorganized, the impelling motive being that which had always been uppermost in the minds of Englishmen, namely, to take away the pretext for a standing army, and a quota was fixed for each county. The provisions were for five years' service, the position of an officer was made important by proper qualifications and it was provided that without the exigency of service the companies should not be marched out of their counties. It was believed that the possession of the offices by gentlemen of es tates would, although under the authority of the Crown, always ensure the services of the militia to the good of the people. This force gradu ally became, by reason of the limited size, the right given to furnish substitutes and a pro gressive necessity to supply pay, clothing and all other expenses, a feeder for the regular establishment, a distinct species of reserve, and in consequence the free, patriotic and military spirit of the country began to manifest itself by the creation of volunteer organizations. Prior to that time the °militia had enjoyed for many years as compared with the regular forces, a social, as well as a constitutional superiority.' The volunteers so called into ex istence now replaced, to an extent, that ancient power and continued until the events of the Boer War when they ceased to exist and the Territorial Army was created. The control of the militia of Great Britain was taken from the country and lodged in the Crown in 1871, and since then the militia has been a part of the regular force and has constituted the army that shared in the defeat of Germany.
The foregoing brief reference to the militia of Great Britain is of greater interest than an account of the militia of Greece, of Switzer land, of South Africa, of Argentina or of any other country, because it is the foundation of our military policy. In all free or republican countries the embodiment of the military spirit is shown by the willingness and ability to bear arms and to organize for war. The transition of nations from a condition of popular military education, discipline and strength, to military powers, possessing large armies, devoted to war for defense or conquest, involves an un derstanding of the great World War begun in 1914.
American Militia.— The peculiar life of the colonies in America rendered it necessary that the colonists should keep themselves armed and experienced in the use of weapons of defense; inheriting the institutions of the mother country, the existence of a militia was an as sumed matter in their organization. The adop tion of the Constitution of the United States, above quoted, in 1789 was the subject of innu merable debates and political views and proph ecies, and the proceedings of the constitu tional conventions concerning the adoption of the clauses relating to the militia are most in teresting as a matter of political history; space, however, will not permit an account of them. Singularly enough, South Carolina and Vir ginia were on the side of giving the govern ment greater power, while Massachusetts and Connecticut were opposed to curtailing the State control. Propositions were successively voted down in attempts to frame the Constitu tion in this regard, among others as follows: (a) To make laws regulating and disciplin ing the militia, not exceeding one-tenth part in any one year.
(b) To establish a uniform and general system of discipline for the militia of the States and to make laws for arming and dis ciplining and governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.
(c) To establish a uniformity of arms, ex ercise and organization for the militia and to provide for the government of them when called into the service of the United States.
(d) To add to the clause reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the offi cers, the words eunder the rank of General Officers?) We have to bear in mind that the majority tried in many instances to yield to the general government the minimum of the powers deemed essential to that government, and this fact explains the fragmentary character of the provisions as to the militia. But the convic tion was general that the militia must be trained with uniformity and be so organized as to become a defense to the nation, and that the only authority to provide therefor was the general government. Hamilton in the Feder alist fully defended the Constitutional plan. Patrick Henry in Virginia was convinced that ruin would follow the adoption of the law. So much concern was felt regarding the militia that among the 10 amendments which were promptly made and declared to be in force 15 Dec. 1791 was that (No. 2), providing °a well regulated militia being necessary to the secu rity of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed' The State constitutions and the State laws have from time to time, and invariably, dealt with the militia of the respective States and are held by the courts to be controlling, so far as not inconsistent with the Federal laws, but they have not been uniform as to service, duty or organization. It has been demonstrated that Congress by the Act of 1792 made an ineffec tive law, by merely prescribing uniform duties for the entire male population composing the militia, and though thereafter for over 100 years the law was retained with slight amendment upon the statute book, it was not enforced and was the subject of repeated efforts at modification. The Presidents of the United States, notably Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Adams, Jack son and Van Buren in their messages to Con gress, urged further legislation to create an ef ficient militia. Elaborate reports were made from committees in Congress, but nothing was accomplished except that in 1808 an annual ap propriation of $200,000 was begun, which was increased in 1887 to $400,000 and in 1900 to $1,000,000. Between 1819 and 1825 various bills and propositions were advanced for a classifi cation of the militia, so that only a small part of it would have duty to perform in time of peace; then a board was convened by The Sec retary of War, which made a report that was transmitted to Congress recommending the in struction of officers in camps of instruction 10 days each year. Jackson urged encouraging volunteer organizations. The Secretary of War of President Van Buren's Cabinet, in 1840, proposed that 100,000 men apportioned to the States be maintained, by draft or other wise, to serve four years, one-fourth to go out each year and to form the reserve, continuing as such four years more, the President.to order the active portion on duty 30 days each year and defray all charges for pay, subsistence, etc. It is said that no subject, except finance, was more discussed prior to the Civil War than the militia. The debates in Congress are full of it, reports and bills are numerous, both from the War Office and the committees of the Senate and House, but as stated, they were un acceptable, until after the war with Spain. The language of the Constitution "reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the of ficers, and the authority of training the i according to the discipline prescribed by Con gress,' was always considered to be an nsur mountable obstacle to Federal control of the militia in time of peace. As indicated, the army and Congress long endeavored to secure the adoption of a plan to limit the organized militia to a practicable number.