IV. Modern Doctrines (1901-19).— So far as the relation of Great Britain to Ameri can affairs was concerned the Olney Doctrine was successful, for Great Britain took the les son to heart, accepted the arbitration with Venezuela which was thrust upon her, cheer fully accepted the finding of the arbitrators (which were almost entirely in her favor) and prepared to give up that joint control of the Canal which was embodied in the Clayton Bulwer Treaty of 1850. During the Spanish War of 1898, Great Britain made it clear that other European powers must not interfere with the American policy of the United States. The next step was for Great Britain in the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 190D freely and without consideration to give up the joint control over isthmus transit. The Senate in sisted that there should be a formal abrogation of the Claytom-Bulwer Treaty and Great Britain gave way and accepted the second Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, by which the United States was left free to control any isthmus canal that might be constructed and to "neutralize' it in her own way.
When England was fairly out of the way, Germany loomed up on the horizon. That power for some years had been looking about the world for an opportunity to plant colonies, and was supposed to have a special interest in South America. President Roosevelt took up this question and in 1902 faced the issue of in tervention by European powers in Venezuela. This was one of the Latin-American states which objected to foreigners coining in and occupying a privileged status superior to that of natives, by calling on their home govern ments to press claims for the fulfilment of con tract and for damages for personal injuries.
A combination was made between Germany, Great Britain and Italy which prepared to land forces on the Venezuelan coast and hold part of the country till the claims of the subjects of those countries. were satisfied. The great Brazilian jurist, Calvo, had laid down what was known as the Calvo Doctrine, to the effect that foreign governments ought not to use even diplomatic methods in behalf of private claims. Drago, Foreign Minister of the Argen tine Republic, during the Venezuelan crisis pro posed a modification, commonly called the Drago Doctrine (q.v.), which was to the effect that no intervention ought to be allowed to enforce the obligation of contracts, whether made by individuals or by the government. This principle was accepted by President Roose velt as reasonable and was afterward incor porated into The Hague Conventions of 1907.
When it came to the actual dispatch of the fleets, President Roosevelt demanded from the German government a point blank statement that they would not land or occupy Venezuelan territory. The promise was reluctantly given and was kept. The squadron therefore con tented itself with blockades and captures of vessels on the coast and mild bombardments.
The Venezuelans finally agreed to arbitrate and the fleets were withdrawn.
The episode led the mind of President Roosevelt to consider what ought to be done in cases where Latin-American countries went beyond the negative refusal to execute con tracts and advanced to attacks on the persons, property or diplomatic representatives of a foreign country. He, therefore, in various public speeches and messages declared that the Monroe Doctrine was intended to be one of peace, and that to keep the peace the United States might be forced in flagrant cases "to the exercise of an international police power." This is the so-called "policy of the Big Stick," and President Roosevelt and his successors proceeded to apply it in various cases.
(1) In 1902, Cuba which had been released from Spain by the Spanish War, was obliged to consent to the Platt Amendment, to the effect that the nominally independent state must not incur any obligations to foreign countries which would interfere with the interests of the United States. This virtually made Cuba a protectorate of the United States. (2) In 1903 the infant republic of Panama ceded the canal strip to the United States and entered into a treaty which left it also a dependency. (3) In 1905 President Roosevelt made an agreement with the government of the Dominican Republic to administer its customs, setting apart a portion of the proceeds for the public debt service. Santo Domingo thus ceased to be a really in dependent country. (4) In 1911 President Taft made a similar arrangement with Nicaragua. (5) In 1915 Haiti entered into a financial arrangement which virtually placed it under United States control and provided for an American receivership of customs.
In every instance the reason for this as sumption or acceptance of authority over Latin American republics was based upon the belief that otherwise some foreign country would come in and interfere with American interests and threaten the future of the country affected. That is, the United States acquired six pro tectorates lest some European power might have cause to descend upon them by armed force. A supposed attempt of Japan in 1912 to secure a footing at Magdalena Bay on the west coast of Mexico led to the adoption by the Senate of a resolution introduced by Sena tor Lodge against such occupation for naval or military purposes. Ex-Secretary Root in 1914 attempted to show that the Monroe Doctrine did not require the United States to exercise a domination over its neighbors. President Wilson also in public statements and addresses in 1913 disclaimed any ambition of the United States to extend its territory in America. The only way to reconcile these statements with the facts of our protectorates is to admit that the Monroe Doctrine is a check to the territorial greed of European powers but does not re strain the United States from bringing portions of Latin America under her influence.