Monroe Doctrine

american, united, powers, european, nations, america, latin and special

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V. Present The war of 1898, in cluding the annexation of the Philippine Islands by the United States, was a frank ad mission that there were no longer two spheres in modern world politics. Eastern Asia is honeycombed with European settlements and interests, and the occupation by the United States, of the Philippine Islands, near China, makes us near neighbors of Russia, France and Great Britain. On the other side, at the con ference of Algeciras in 1906, the United States accepted membership on the pressing in vitation of the German emperor and had the determining voice in the result. It was there fore, no longer possible for our government to insist that European powers must keep out of America because we keep out of European affairs. The Japanese have been thought to have some designs on the western coast of North or South America which would be con trary to the Monroe Doctrine. At the other extreme was the danger, which for a time was feared, of German occupation of a part of Brazil or other South American countries. Should either danger ever occur the Monroe Doctrine would presumably become active.

As respects the, Latin Americans themselves, they have always welcomed whatever protec tion the declarations and influence of their powerful neighbor might give against foreign aggression; but many of them fear that the United States will eventually seek extensive an nexations to the southward. The taking over of the six protectorates and the great interest of the United States in the Mexican question heighten that apprehension. The growth and steadiness of the ABC powers — Argentine, Brazil and Chile,—with about half the twat Latin-American population, give a more positive basis for permanent alliances and relations. It has been suggested that the Monroe Doctrine will naturally develop into some kind of Pan American Union (q.v.) in which the United States will be the most populous and strongest member of a great American federation. The difficulties in the way of a permanent union between a country of 100,000,000 and 20 other countries which together aggregate 75,000,000 are hard to surmount.

The question of the right of a nation to exercise special authority over its neighbor hood was raised in another form by the steady growth of Japanese power in Eastern Asia. On 30 Nov. 1908, by the Root-Takahira agree ment, the United States recognized this special interest; and in November 1917, in the Lansing Ishii agreement, went still farther in approving practically the doctrine of special interest, it being tacitly understood that Japan would in like manner respect the American Monroe Doctrine.

The negotiations of 1919 at the end of the Great War seemed for a time likely to weaken the Monroe Doctrine by substituting a system of world peace organization which would take the place of the earlier method, inasmuch as the League of Peace provided a machinery for hearing complaints and settling controversies such as were likely to arise between Latin American and European powers. A strong pro test was made in public discussions on the sub ject in the United States. In the final form the covenant of the League of Nations included the following limitation : "The covenant does not affect the validity of international engage ments, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." This clause would seem to be a guarantee of the special relation of the United States to Latin America; and so far as ratified by those States would bind them to accept the doctrine as a "regional understanding,' it is likewise a reaffirmation of the Japanese Monroe Doe trine, and is likely to be claimed in support of spheres of interest' in the Mediterranean, Asia and Africa. Acceptance of the treaty by most world nations is therefore an assertion of the right of powerful nations in various parts of the earth to exercise a general protection over groups of small or weak powers. and at the same time to exclude external powers from in terfering with the leadership of the strongest power in such a combination.

Adams, J. Q.,

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