National Ideals in the Conduct of the The national temper was revealed not only in the decision which brought America into the war, but no less clearly in the measures adopted to secure its effective prosecution, es pecially when these measures involved a radical departure from normal American practice. It was seen from the outset that American partici pation in the war must involve co-operation with the allied governments, to an extent be yond precedent since the days of the American Revolution. To make such co-operation cordial and effective, it was necessary to use every pos sible means to remove antiquated prejudices and promote a better mutual understanding between the United States and its European associates. This new spirit of international co-operation was promoted by the exchange of special missions between the United States and the allied govern ments,— notably the French Mission of Marshal Joffre and M. Viviani and the British Mission headed by Mr. Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary. The first thought of many Ameri cans was that the part of this country would be chiefly financial and naval. Such co-operation was indeed given at once and on a large scale. It soon became evident, however, that the rais ing of a great American army for service abroad was also an urgent necessity. How was such an army to be raised? Notwithstanding the previous national tradition in favor of the volunteer system, public opinion rapidly took shape in support of the selective draft as the most democratic method of enlisting the citi zenship of the country for the national defense. No less important were the measures adopted to secure the necessary economic support for the armies in the field. Funds for the use of the United States and the Allies had to be secured through national loans, unprecedented in amount and requiring the co-operation of millions of people who had never before in vested in government bonds. The success of the Liberty Loans was a striking example of what may be accomplished through the co-oper ation of volunteer service with governmental agencies. The effect on the national morale was no less important than the financial return. Never before had so large a number of citizens become conscious partners in a great national enterprise.
In earlier wars, notably in the Revolution, the War of 1812 and the Civil War, the govern ment, fearing the effect of heavy taxes on public opinion, had depended too largely on loans and paper money, weakening the national credit and depreciating the currency. As to the precise proportion of war costs in the Great War, to be raised respectively by taxes and loans, there were sharp differences of opinion; but there can be no doubt in any case that the Americans of 1917-18 set a new national record of willing ness to carry the necessary burden of war taxes.
The successful prosecution of the war re quired not only the financial co-operation of governments, but acceptance by the American people of a new responsibility for the food supply of the allied nations which the sub marine warfare had brought dangerously low. To secure this result it was found necessary to organize through the Food Administration a governmental control of commerce in food products, as for instance by fixing the price of wheat which went squarely against traditional American ideas. On the other hand, the gov ernment depended largely on appeals to the patriotism of producers, middlemen and con sumers to stimulate production and lessen un necessary consumption. The result was seen not only in an increase of food exports to the Allies, but again, as in the case of the Liberty Loans, in the awakening of a new sense of civic responsibility.
The spirit of civic co-operation was shown also in the support of various auxiliary agen cies, such as the Red Cross, the Y. M. C. A., the Knights of Columbus and various other or ganizations, religious and philanthropic. All of these agencies required and secured for their operations voluntary gifts on a scale which be fore the war would have been thought improb able. It is in these various forms of voluntary co-operation even more than in any formal votes that the future historian will find the best evidence of national solidarity in support of the war aims of the United States.
No honest historian of national ideals can leave out of the record the darker shades of the picture. War unquestionably develops the spirit of self-sacrifice, but it also gives new opportunities to those who are willing to profit by the necessities of the nation. The problem of the profiteer is as old as war itself and is writ large in the record of earlier wars. In the present war this danger to the national morale was perhaps more clearly foreseen than ever before and appropriate safeguards were carefully considered; it was hardly reasonable to expect that it would be avoided altogether.
It soon became apparent that the necessities of war reconciled public opinion to extraordi nary extensions of governmental authority. Step by step Congress authorized the taking over by the Federal government of various kinds of business — the railroads, the telegraph and tele phone service, and to a large extent the shipping business. Through the War Industries Board and the Food and Fuel Administrations the gov ernment controlled to a large extent the produc tion and distribution of products, directly or in directly related to the efficient prosecution of the war. In the exercise of all these functions, the government did not escape criticism, some just and some unjust ; but whim opinion accepted these radical changes with surprising composure. This comparative unanimity was partly due to the conviction that the measures in question were intended to meet a temporary emergency. None the less, they were in line with certain tendencies existing before the war began, and may have a permanent influence on the political philosophy of the American people. As in the period of the Civil War, the stress of a great national crisis had not only developed the authority of the national government as a whole; it had also immensely expanded the au thority of the President as the chief agent of the national will. The people and their repre sentatives in Congress had in large measure accepted his judgment on the main issues of international policy, and American confidence in this leadership was strengthened by the Presi dent's new position as the most generally ap proved spokesman of the Allied nations. In the carrying out of national policies also an extraordinary concentration of authority in the President was necessary in order to secure united and efficient action. Not only was he the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, but he directed through officials responsible to him the immense powers of the Food, Fuel, Railroad and Wire Administrations and the War Industries Board. To the statesmen of 1789 the concentration of such power in an American President would have been unthink able; yet it is, in the main, only the application to new conditions of the war powers, whose la tent possibilities were revealed in Lincoln's ad ministration during the Civil War. Then as now they were accepted, not as desirable in them selves, but because concentration for executive purposes is in time of war one of the necessary measures by which the National Democracy is to achieve its ends. It must not be forgotten, however, that while the sentiment of nationality has been greatly strengthened, it is a national ism increasingly conscious of international re sponsibilities, and ready to sacrifice not only material resources, but even those points of prestige which often prevent effective co-opera tion among allies. Striking examples of this spirit of international comity are the decision to allow American troops to be brigaded with those of the Allies, and the active part taken by the United States in securing the final ac ceptance of a unified military command. These were decisions of the President as commander in-chief but they were cordially supported by public opinion.
Finally in the background of American thought during the war were the great problems of reconstruction, the growing recognition among thoughtful men of new problems, politi cal, industrial, educational and ethical, which cannot be met by routine methods and purely emotional modes of thought — which demand on the contrary the effective use of all our intellectual and spiritual resources.
Bibliographical Note.-- President Wilson's