6. Dissatisfaction in Serbia over a. The oppression of millions of Serbs by Austria-Hungary; b. Lack of outlet to the sea.
7. Dissatisfaction in Rumania over a. The oppression by Hungary of mil lions of Rumanians.
8. Dissatisfaction in Bulgaria over a. The boundaries laid down by the Treaty of Bucharest, 10 Aug. 1913.
9. Dissatisfaction in Greece over a. Turkish rule of millions of Greeks.
10. Dissatisfaction of the Poles over the fact a. That Poland does not appear upon the map of Europe, but has been divided among and incorporated with the three partitioning powers of the 18th century, Russia, sia and Austria.
11. Dissatisfaction in Russia on the part a. Of the Poles; b. Of the people of Finland, etc." To these, obviously, should be added the dis satisfaction felt by the Irish nationalists, who, in spite of the eloquent appeals of O'Connell and Redmond and the sympathy they aroused in Gladstone and the English Liberals, were denied their aspiration for °home rule.* Joined to these sources of friction and unrest produced by the imperfect realization of pa triotic aspirations among oppressed national groups, there were deep-seated and ominous rivalries among the great national states of Europe over purely European national prob lems. From 1870 to 1914 France was mourn ing over her °lost provinces," draping the Strassburg Statue and pating the cere monials of °revanche," we Bismarck alleged that Germany was maintaining and increasing her great armament solely as a protection against the contemplated French war of Ire vanche," so fiercely urged by Deroulede and his fellow patriots. In spite of a formal alli ance, Austria and Italy were fundamentally at odds over the solution of the problem of Irredenta." The °Mittel-Europa* plan of Germany and Austria was diametrically op posed to the Pan-Slavic scheme of Russia as well as to the national aspirations of the Bal kan states. Finally, England's jealousy over Russian longing for Constantinople, which had led her into an aggressive and costly war in 1854-55, was never removed until the mutual loot and partition of Persia was consummated in 1907.
But ominous and troublesome as were the rivalries of national states in Europe over con tinental problems, these were as nothing com pared with those which arose from the struggle over the opening up of backward countries for investment and the planting of colonies in lands beyond the sea. From the period of the close of the Napoleonic wars to 1870 there had been a decided *cline in imperialistic enter prises. Under the reign of °economic liberal ism" European countries even went so far as to discuss the very desirability of colonies, and Richard Cobden and his followers believed that the British Empire was quite as much an Eng lish liability as an asset. But the results of the Industrial Revolution put an end to this amiable °cosmopolitan dream" of the Cobden ites and produced the revival of the old Mer cantilistic policy in the shape of a new scramble for the remaining unappropriated parts of the earth, which could be utilized as colo nies and markets for the greatly increased volume of manufactured products. The re lation between the great increase of pro duction, caused by the various phases of the Industrial Revolution, and the new national imperialism has been admirably stated by Pro fessor Schapiro in the following passage: °Toward the end of the 19th century there took place a new Industrial Revolution, the results of which were almost as startling as those of its predecessor a century before. The application of science to industry through the extraordinary development of the chemical and physical sciences, the better organization of business enterprise through combination, the larger use of capital and the opening up of new sources of raw material in Asia and Africa increased many fold the production of goods. Gigantic plants, equipped with scientific labora tories, worked by armies of laborers, and capi talized by millions of dollars, brought together in syndicates and 'trusts,' displaced the small factories, or as they were still called. It is estimated that the average increase in the commerce of all the countries of Europe during the 19th century was over 1,200 per cent. . . . The Industrial Revolution at the beginning of the 19th century transformed the economic life of Western Europe only; the new Industrial Revolution at the end of the century caused Europe to burst her indus trial bonds and to encompass the entire world in its influences. The new industrialism mul tiplied production so enormously that markets had to be sought outside the limits of the home country. As competition for the home market within the leading industrial countries became very keen, the eyes of the captains of industry were naturally turned to the many regions that were at the same time densely populated and industrially undeveloped. The vast populations of Asia and Africa were so many potential customers for the business men of Europe. What fabulous profits awaited those who got the opportunity of clothing and shoeing the teeming millions of Chinese and Hindus!" This process of national expansion overseas, in its second or recent phase, set in about 1870, when the effects of the Industrial Revolution had been felt in England and France and were beginning to be experienced to an ever greater degree by Germany. France turned to Africa and Asia, and in Tunis, north central Africa, Morocco and Indo-China sought compensation for the territorial loss of Alsace-Lorraine and investment opportunities for her growing body of capitalists. To obtain a more complete con trol over the routes leading to India, Disraeli bought the large block of Suez Canal stock in 1875 and started Great Britain on her second experiment in empire building, which added to her already extensive territorial possessions, Egypt, the Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, south ern Persia and Tibet. Russia extended her sphere of political and economic control in the Far East in the region of Manchuria, and also in the district about the Caspian Sea, including the northern half of Persia. Germany sought her 'place in the imperialistic sun' by coloniza tion in Africa and in the islands of Oceania and the Pacific, and by an attempt at the eco nomic control of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia through her Berlin-Bagdad railroad project. Italy, after an unsuccessful attempt to get con trol of Abyssinia, was compelled to remain con tent with Somaliland and Eritrea until she was able, 15 years later, to wrest Tripoli and Cyrenaica from Turkey. Finally, nearly all of the above-mentioned states participated in the economic, if not the political, partition of China. The conflict of ambitions in this process of European expansion created many centres of international friction. Germany and England clashed over the distribution of territory in South Africa and over the control of the Per sian Gulf. France and Germany precipitated three European crises over their disputes con cerning Morocco. France and England nearly
went to war over the territory surrounding the source of the Nile. Russia went to war with Japan over Manchuria and Port Arthur, and came to an agreement with England concerning Persia only by a mutual division of spoil in the agreement of 1907. In addition, this new imperialism served to stimulate national pride and aggressiveness on the part of the great national states of Europe through the develop ment of the imapitis° psychosis, namely, the enthusiasm or chagrin felt by the citizens over the success or failure of their respective states in covering the map of the world with the brilliant colors designating their colonial possessions. Finally, the struggle for markets and the desire to protect national trade and economic interests led to the practical institution of a neo-Mercantilistic era of protective tariffs. Beginning with the Bismarckian tariff bill of 1879 there ensued a general European move ment toward nationalistic protective tariffs so high that they would have caused even Fred erick List to gasp with astonishment if not with dismay. Only England escaped from this tendency to introduce what practically meant an economic war between the various conti nental European states. In this manner were economic and political events in and out of Europe contributing to the stimulation of jingo ism and international distrust and suspicion in the generation preceding the coming of the calamity of 1914. The writings or speeches of Peters, Reventlow, Rohrbach, Tannenberg, Del casse, Barres, Rhodes, Kipling, Maxse, Lea, D'Annunzio, Crispi, Sonnino, Pobiedonostsev, Von Plehve, Berchtold and Tisza presented to the world evidence of the various grandiose pro grams of national expansion and served to stir up mutual suspicion and antagonism. That this dangerous state of mind in Europe was most marked in Germany was probably due more than anything else to the delayed nature and the forcible methods of her national unification, to her rapid and unprecedented economic de velopment since 1870 and its resulting impulse toward imperialistic expansion, and to the fact that the "stigmatic' discrepancy between rela tive European prestige and relative extent of colonial possessions was most marked in the case of Germany. The diplomacy of the latter part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th was very poorly adapted to meeting this difficult task, of reaching a peaceful adjust ment of conflicting international claims. While there can be no doubt. that diplomatic theory and practice made great strides in advance dur ing the last century, it is equally certain that it was still essentially Machiavellian, and, as Mr. Weyl has well expressed it, was still con trolled by "the approved diplomatic type, the aged, beinedaled, chilly, narrow and conser vative, Excellency, very gentlemanly, very as tute, fundamentally stupid.' The prospect of a peaceful settlement of the disputes between the European states over Euro pean and imperialistic problems was greatly di minished by the vast armaments which were cre ated and increased, ostensibly in the interest of preserving peace, but actually, as subsequent events have proved, to encourage an aggressive nationalistic policy of expansion and annexation. In its origin this militaristic movement dates hack to the French Revolution. In 1793 France first introduced the policy of conscription on a general scale and confirmed this practice by law five years later. To prepare for the War of Liberation and to evade Napoleon's arbitrary limitation of the Prussian army to 42,000 men, the Prussian military leaders, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyne, Groltnann and Clausewitz, introduced into Prussia the system of universal liability to military service in the years follow ing 1808. Austria, in the attempt to cope with Napoleon, tended in the same direction under Archduke Charles and Count Stadion. After 1815 there was a decided slump in military senti ment and activity, associated to some degree with the prevalence of 'economic liberalism' and its cosmopolitan tenets. The first military revival was the work of Napoleon III, who assured France and Europe that "the Empire meant peace,' but gave practical proof that it meant a restoration of the military traditions of his illustrious uncle. But the Napoleonic restoration of the militarism of a half century earlier was much less consequential for the world than the contemporaneous developments across the Rhine. To revenge Olmiitz and humble Austria, King Witham I of Prussia planned to reorganize the Prussian army as it had been in the great struggle against the first Napoleon. Calling to his aid, in 1862, the most sinister figure in the history of modern mili tarism, Otto von Bismarck, he was able to carry out not only his army plans, bat also his fond ambition to defeat Austria. Extending the new system to the North German Confederation, Bismarck was able to crush France and bring about the long desired unification of Germany. Having "vindicated' the policy of (Cblood and iron' by three victorious wars Bismarck fas tened militarism upon Germany with a deadly grip by a Series of laws passed between 1873 and 1887, and the military octopus grew until it culminated in the preposterous act of 1913. The Prussian system, with its great prestige, set the military pace and example for the rest of con tinental Europe. France adopted the Prussian System in 1872, and most of the other Great Powers, as well as the lesser Balkan states, did the same in the decade of the "seventies.* Even Turkey, in 1883, invited Von der Goltz to reor ganize the army of the Sultan on the German plan. Nor was the increase in armament lim ited to land forces; the great extension of the new colonial enterprises and the development of a larger merchant marine seemed to demand new and larger navies. In view of Great Brit ain's greater colonial possessions and trade it was but natural that she should begin the move ment for larger sea forces. In 1889, Great Britain passed an act providing for a vast in crease in her fleet and initiated that policy of keeping her naval strength far in advance of any rival state. Not until 1898 did Germany's interest in °Weltpolitik* lead her to attempt to rival Britain on the seas, but in that year there was passed the first great German naval act, which was supplemented by other more preten tious increases in acts of 1900, 1906 and 1912, which served to arouse British alarm and en mity and to make an Anglo-German concord extremely improbable. Nor were England and Germany alone in this process. All the leading powers, but especially France and Russia, fol lowed their lead. With these great war ma chines at hand, the European states were little inclined to submit their conflicts and disputes to what were regarded by the jingoistic patriots and imperialists as the pusillanimous and igno ble methods of diplomacy and arbitration.