ARABIC, The. A steamship of the White Star line, torpedoed without by a German submarine about 60 miles off Fastnet (not far from the scene of the Lusitania wreck), on the morning of 19 Aug. 1915, one day out from Liverpool. Bound for New York, the Arabic was unarmed and carried 180 pas sengers (29 Americans) and 243 in crew. She sank in 11 minutes; 44 lives were lost — 19 passengers and 25 of the crew. Two Ameri can citizens were drowned, Dr. Edmund F. Woods of Janesville, Wis., and Mrs. Josephine L. Bruguiere of New York. The effect of the sinking of the vessel was to aggravate the strained diplomatic relations between the United States government and Germany creat ed by the sinking of the Lusitania (q.v.) three months earlier. On 21 July the American gov ernment had informed Germany that a repeti tion of such °illegal and inhuman acts" as the sinking of the Lusitania would be regarded by the United States as "deliberately unfriend ly" when American citizens were affected. Nevertheless, the Arabic was sunk; none saw the submarine and no attempt had been made to search the vessel or to warn the captain. Five days later (24 August) the German Am bassador in Washington informed the Depart ment of State that the German government trusted that the American government would snot take a definite stand at hearing only the reports of one side, which, in the opinion of the Imperial government, cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance will be given to Germany to be heard equally." Although the German government °does not doubt the good faith" of the eye-witnesses of the disas ter, sit should be borne in mind that these statements are naturally made under excite ment which might easily produce wrong im pressions." This somewhat naive communi cation overlooked the central and indisputable fact that the vessel had actually been torpedoed and sunk; it wound up with the declaration that •if Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions"; that the German govern ment "would deeply regret the fact," and ten dered °sincerest sympathies to the American government." On 25 August the German Chancellor did "not even know whether the sinking of the ship was caused by a mine or by a torpedo fired from a German submarine," nor did he know whether "the Arabic herself may not by her actions, perhaps, have justified the proceedings of the commander of the sub marine." On 1 September the German Am bassador wrote Mr. Lansing to the effect that his government had already accepted the American declaration on the submarine war fare before the sinking of the Arabic, and he produced the following extract from a pro posed reply to the hitherto unanswered Ameri can note of 21 July: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and with out safety of the lives of non-combatants, pro vided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." Seven days after the wreck of the Arabic a dispatch from Berlin an nounced °on the best authority that the Arabic incident may be considered as eliminated as a source of discord between Germany and Amer ica; or at least is regarded by the German government in that light." Furthermore, "in its desire to continue its friendly relations with the United States," Germany shad adopted before the sinking of the Arabic a policy de signed to settle completely the whole subma rine problem as affecting America, on the basis of goodwill and mutual understanding." The
German report on the Arabic case, dated 7 Sept. 1915, was cabled to Washington by Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador in Berlin, on 9 September. It stated that on 19 August a German submarine stopped the English steam erDunsley south of Kinsale and was on the point of sinking her by gunfire after the crew had abandoned the ship. °At this moment the commander (of the submarine) saw a large steamer making directly toward him. This steamer, as developed later, was the Arabic. She was recognized as an enemy vessel, as she did. not fly any flag and bore no neutral mark ings. When she approached she altered her original course but then again pointed directly toward the submarine. From this the com mander became convinced that the steamer had the intention of attacking and ramming her. In order to anticipate this attack he gave or ders for the submarine to dive and fired a torpedo at the steamer. After firing, he con vinced himself that the people on board were being rescued in 15 boats." The commander's conclusion, the report continued, was Call the more obvious as he had been fired upon at a great distance in the Irish Sea on 14 August — that is, a few days before—by a large pas senger steamer apparently belonging to the British Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which he had neither attacked nor stopped?' While regretting that lives had been lost, the German government was °unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive inten tions of the Arabic." Against this presenta tion of the case must be placed the statement of Captain Finch of the Arabic: °I did not see a single sign of a submarine, and, as far as I am aware, nobody else saw a submarine, either before or after the occurrence." In case a harmonious opinion on the point could not be reached, the German government °would be prepared to submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration. . . ." Hav ing collected all the available evidence of the ship's officers and passengers, the United States government demanded a disavowal of the act and reparation for the American lives, lost. While the arbitration proposal was rejected— the principle involving the safety of American lives — the German assurance of 1 September was accepted. On the question as to the amount of indemnity, arbitration would be agreed to. The unalterable determination of the American government led to the desired result, for on 5 Oct. 1915 the German Am bassador in Washington presented to Mr. Lan sing the German government's disavowal of the submarine commander's act and expressions of regret for the incident. The Ambassador was also authorized to accept liability for all damages caused to American citizens through the sinking of the Arabic, and to negotiate the amounts of the claims. See ANCONA; FALABA; LUSITANIA; ORDUNA; SUSSEX; WILLIAM P. FRYE.