ART OF WAR. The art of war may be conveniently subdivided into the following sec tions: (a) The organization of armies; (b) logistics; (c) strategy; (d) engineering; (e) tactics. The organization of armies is the build ing up necessary for the application of the prin ciples of strategy to them. Logistics is the art of moving and supplying armies. Strategy is the art of directing armies upon the theatre of war. Engineering is the art of disposing troops and making arrangements of obstacles by means of which an inferior force may successfully resist the attacks of a superior force; and also the art of overcoming and removing all ob stacles placed in the way by an opposing force. The following are the duties of engineers of an army: the construction and maintenance of field-telegraphs, the construction of fortifica tions, the conduct of engineering operations at sieges, mining, bridging, surveying, reconnoiter ing, opening and making roads, choosing posi tions, sketching ground, etc. Tactics is the art of putting into execution the projects of strategy. An intimate knowledge of all these branches is absolutely necessary in order to be a great and successful general. The forma tion of a plan, that is, deciding the nature of the war that will be waged; determining the objects to be attained, and the best manner and means of attaining them; or, in other words, outlining the general features of a campaign, belongs to strategy. The execution of the plan decided upon belongs to tactics. The country in which the opposing armies can come into col lision is the province of battle. The principles of war cannot be violated with impunity. These principles are fixed and are determined from the narrative of operations conducted by suc cessful generals. A study of military history is then necessary for a proper understanding of the principles of war; and as in all other professions, so in war, he . who is most pro ficient in the lessons as taught by the masters of the art will be most successful.
The duties of each arm of the service over lap and blend into one another, and the higher the grade an officer attains, the more requisite it is that he should be acquainted generally with the duties of those arms of the service to which he himself does not belong. By this means
alone can we hope to obtain that intelligent co operation, that harmonious working of all branches of the service together, which makes a perfect machine out of the various elements comprising an army, and at the same time gives the surest guarantee of success. In armies, as elsewhere, there is a tendency for every one to think his own branch, that which he has studied most and knows best, the most important. Such feelings are very natural and in the lower grades often do much good; but as men rise in the service it is desirable that they should know Something of the duties of other branches, and the difficulties others have to contend with. Such knowledge tends to produce cordiality and forbearance. Cavalry officers falling into command of mixed forces will not then expect their infantry to gallop; infantry officers will not seek to bind the cavalry to pace of their infantry. A knowledge of capabilities of other arms will enable officers to use those arms to the best advantage as occasion offers. It should, however, be borne in mind that it is impossible to lay down fixed rules of action. Nearly every military regulation should be followed by the words ((according to the ground and according to the circumstances?) Practice and experience alone can decide many points; practice and ex perience alone can give the power of applying rules; but theory, by which is really meant the experience obtained by others, is not the less important and valuable. Principles are but guides, which must be revised, examined and verified after each war, after each discovery that may be brought to bear on the military art. See ARMY ADMINISTRATION; ARMY REGU LATIONS ; ARMY TRANSPORTATIONS ; ARTILLERY ; BALLISTICS ; CAVALRY ; ENGINEERING, MILITARY ; GUNNERY ; MILITARY EDUCATION ; TACTICS.