Siege An examination of the German formations for sieges indicates that their organization is based on the theories aggressiveness, quick resolution and celerity of movement. A character of their formations is the great abundance of means provided, and especially of transportation, with a view to promptly re-enforcing any field unit charged with a siege with a large number of medium calibre batteries, completely provided with everything necessary for their separate organi zation, so as to make possible prompt and effi cient action on their part.
Thus, many battalions of fortress artillery have a complete equipment of draught animals; the 6-inch howitzers and the &2-inch mor tars, for example, are organized as heavy field artillery and assigned in considerable numbers to army corps. Each corps has a battalion of four four-gun batteries — either of 6-inch howitzer battalions, organized as above or else a battalion of two four-gun 8.2-inch mortar batteries.
To each battalion of fortress artillery there is assigned an ammunition company, which provides not only ammunition but also spare supplies and, to assist in furnishing the same, has as part of its equipment a narrow-gauge railway 4.7 miles long, using animal traction. Each such ammunition company has, in addi tion, a detachment of mechanics who relieve the batteries of much work; and, besides, it has been found that by keeping the same men constantly busy at the same kind of work, they become more proficient and render better serv ice than do men temporarily employed on sev eral different kinds of work.
The commandant of the field unit is the commandant of the sector, and commands not only his own troops, but all special troops as signed to the sectors. For though there is an artillery commander for the siege artillery to assist the commander-in-chief, yet, after mak ing the necessary reconnaissances, he is charged only with advising as to the general distribution of the siege artillery among the various sectors. The employment of medium calibre batteries is left entirely to the sector commandants, through their own artillery com manders, and the commander for siege artillery limits himself during the attack to re-enforcing the local sector artillery, as may be required, by drawing on units in reserve, or newly ar rived, or by transferring artillery found to be in excess in one sector to another section.
The French regulations differ from the Ger man in that the control of their medium-calibre artillery is directly exercised by the commander of the siege artillery, the sector commandants controlling all troops in their sectors other than the siege artillery.
As all the incidents of the siege from the very commencement of the investment, such as the laying out of lines of communication, un loading the siege material, etc., depend directly on the selection made for the point of attack, it is evident that it is of the greatest impor tance to decide this point as soon as possible. It is quite practicable to do this, when we con sider that the studies made and data required in time of peace concerning fortresses which might become objectives for various armies, usually contain information of great impor tance, and that in addition preliminary recon naissances can be undertaken by selected offi cers sent ahead with the advance troops, inde pendent cavalry, advance guard, etc., who can to a certain extent complete this information in such manner as to enable the siege com mander to come to a proper decision.
A decision as to the selection of the point to be attacked must be based not only on the defensive powers of the various faces of the fortress and the conformation of the terrain in their fronts, which should be such as to admit of proper deployment of the siege artillery, but should be based also on the influence which the fall of the face attacked will have on the ultimate fate of the fortress. Moreover, con sideration must be given to the strategical sit uation and to the means of communication, which should be such as to facilitate the pro vision of all necessary supplies and accessories. The state of the defensive works will, of course, not be completely revealed until the attack has actually commenced and often not until it has been pushed well forward.
The general plan of the siege and the points of attack having been determined on, the va rious available forces and material are assigned and a general scheme of is decided on. It is unnecessary to determine every small de tail, it being better to leave liberty in such mat ters to commandants of sectors, so that they may conform to the changing circumstances incidents ncidents of the attack, as they successively develop; for the relations of the attack to the defense are constantly changing, requiring ad justment of plans for the employment of troops and siege materiel.