The hauling of the large guns and how itzers is a difficult operation. Two of the Krupp 42-cm. guns need no fewer than 26 trac tion engines. Each is in four pieces (i.e. loads) and each piece is drawn by three traction en gines, the spare engines going on ahead to be used as helpers up hills. The 11.2-inch Krupp howitzer travels on a special wagon, the cradle is converted into a carriage by putting a pair of wheels on the cradle trunnions, which are central; and the trail and wheels for a third carriage, girdles, weighing one-half ton each, travel when not in use, on a girdle wagon, weighing four tons gross. The high elevation, namely of which this howitzer is capable is intended to allow it to be fired with full charge at short ranges, so as to obtain a high remaining velocity and steep angle of descent.
Recent increase in range and power of guns is more in favor of an attacking fleet than of the fixed defenses ashore, for several reasons. First, it gives the attack a greater choice of positions from which to attack, not only be cause the area over which the attack can oper ate naturally increases with the length of range at which they can attack, but also because, when restricted to short ranges, ships would also in all probability he confined to certain channels, on account of shoals and banks lying near shore, and these channels — possibly nar row and intricate of navigation — could also be mined. Thus, a fleet armed with modern guns has a greater choice of positions; it could, for instance, take up an enfilading position from which perhaps only one gun of a shore battery could bear, and could more easily brink the concentrated fire of several ships on to one work. This relative advantage of attack over defense would hold good even if the increase in power and range of the defense guns had kept pace with that of naval guns; but it never has and never will.
Again, the increased protection given to modern ships, and the possibilities of observa tion of fire conferred on them by the introduc tion of airships, very largely detracts from the advantage hitherto enjoyed by shore defenses of being less vulnerable and of possessing greater facilities for observation of fire than their adversaries.
Also the good effect of increased range in the gun is limited at night by the effective radius of illumination of electric lights, and may be limited by day by atmospheric condi tions; and this neutralized the advantages of long-range guns to the defense in certain forms of attack, as, for instance, in the case of a mine-layer laying mines in a channel of ap proach beyond efficient electric light limit. Long range guns would be powerless to prevent this. Again, under cover of a fog a ship or squad ron might approach to within medium range; the defense would lose all the advantage of long range by being unable to attack during the approach, while at a medium range the greater number of guns probably carried by the attack would enable it to overwhelm and smother the defense. But great as has been the development of guns, the development of torpedoes in speed, range and accuracy has been as great, if not greater. The advent and
development of the submarine has done still more to increase the power of the torpedo as an offensive weapon, and on the whole this de velopment of the torpedo is in favor of the defense.
It would, therefore, seem probable that the future development of coast defense would lie in increasing the number and efficiency of de fense flotillas of torpedo boats and submarines, rather than in the size and number of the guns on fixed mountings ashore. The gun cannot altogether disappear, there must always be a last entrenchment —a keep; and that keep will be the shore batteries.
One of the greatest lessons learned in the European War is the increased importance of heavy mobile artillery, and the necessity for devising plans to use effectively sea-coast arma ment and designing mounts for howitzers and mortars to permit them to be easily transported and quickly mounted. Whatever the design, it should fulfil the following requirements: (1) It should be mobile and capable of being trans ported quickly either- by railroad on flat cars or by gasoline tractors over ordinary roads. (2) It should be capable of being mounted quickly on a concrete emplacement of simple design. (3) It should be more powerful than any similar weapon that can be brought against it. (4) In addition to being equipped with the ordinary telescopic sight, it should be prac ticable to lay it in azimuth and range as is done with the present type of sea-coast mortars. In drawing up a project for the defense of a locality on the sea-coast, sites for mobile how itzer batteries should be selected for defense against attack from the land side. The em placements for these batteries might be con structed in time of peace or upon the outbreak of war. Each coast defense should be equipped permanently with one or more of these bat teries to supplement the fixed armament and for the purpose of training coast artillery companies in their use. See AMMUNITION; ARMOR PLATE; COAST DEFENSE; FORTIFICA TIONS ; GUNNERY ; HORSE ARTILLERY ; LIGHT AR TILLERY; MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY; ORDNANCE; and PROJECTILES.
Bethel,