SKY-KORSOKOFF ; RUBINSTEIN ; ARENSK I ; TA NEVEM?. For Poland see CHOPIN ; MOSZ KOW SK I ; PADEREWSKL For Bohemia see SMETANA ; Dvolili .
Panslavism.— This name was originally given to the agitation carried on by a great party in Russia with the object of uniting the Slav peoples of Europe under Russian rule or influence. The movement originated about 1830, when the Polish revolution aroused Slavic national consciousness; it received increased strength from the second Polish revolt in 1863. Congresses of Slav representatives from the different European countries were held at Prague in 1848 and Moscow in 1867. Outside of Russia the ideals of Panslavism were favor ably received by the Slays in Bohemia, Silesia and Croatia-Slavonia, where the members of that race felt their national existence threatened by the repressive policy of the government, Austrian, Hungarian or German as the case might be. Panslavism was largely responsible for the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, when Russia entered the lists as the champion of the Balkan Slays who suffered under the tyranny of Turkish rule. Russia defeated the Turks with the assistance of Ru mania (non-Slav) ; Bulgaria, Serbia and Mon tenegro, Slav nations. Though the Berlin Congress demolished the Treaty of San Ste fano, the four nations were made practically independent of Turkey, and Russia became the recognized protector of the Balkan Slays. It must be added, however, that this broth erly)) policy was not unconnected with the old Russian ideal of paving the road to Constanti nople. Moreover, this Balkan policy of Russia ran counter to the interests of the Austro-Hun garian monarchy, also a great Slav power. This antagonism rendered impossible any rap prochement between Russia and Germany, the latter being Austria's ally. In this may be recognized the seeds of the European War. Nothing short of an absolute renunciation by Russia of her Panslav policy in the Balkans could remove the possibility of an ultimate rup ture with Austria. In course of time, Pan slavism broke out in a direction that was per haps not anticipated by Russia. As the Balkan states grew stronger under the stimulus of national consciousness, fostered by the crea tion of national armies and more or less demo cratic institutions, they gradually realized their ability to shape their own destinies. While fully willing to accept all the advantages which the protection of Russia offered, they were not prepared to fall under Russian dominion. Stambuloff, in Bulgaria, pursued a strong anti Russian policy, and the Serbs cast longing eyes upon the vision of an independent Greater Serbia including the Austrian provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their nationals in Macedonia — then still Turkish territory. Not improbably, they also counted on the inclusion of Croatia, Slavonia and the Dalmatian coast line after the long-prophesied break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Bulgaria likewise had designs on Macedonia; Bohemia clamored for her ancient rights as a kingdom, and the Poles sought the restoration of their country, partitioned between Russia, Germany and Aus tria — an ambition at all times rigorously sup pressed by those three powers. Russia stood to
lose comparatively little by an all-round fulfil ment of these national aspirations; to Austria Hungary it meant a dissolution of the mon archy. Hence the general principle may be accepted that Austro-Russian rivalry, plus the conflicting aims of Austria and Serbia, pro vided fully one-half of the direct causes of the European War, and that Germany contributed the other moiety by utilizing this antagonism to further her own ambitions. The situation was thus summarized by President Wilson on 14 June 1917: °The war was begun by the mili tary masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. • • The demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single step in a plan which com passed Europe and Asia. . . . It contem plated binding together . . . Czechs, Mag yars, Croats, Serbs, Rumanians . . . Bo hemia . . . the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans. . . . These people do not wish to be united. . . . They ardently de sired to direct their own affairs, would be sat isfied only by undisputed independence By the summer of 1918 the Panslav move ment had attained gigantic proportions. Though entirely diverted from its original aims of uni fication into a revolutionary scheme of inde pendent separatism, based on nationality, no more appropriate title could be applied to it. A powerful impetus to the cause was the offi cial sympathy extended to its representatives in France, America, Italy and Great Britain. On 22 Jan. 1917 President Wilson declared in favor of an autonomous Poland; the Czecho Slovak and Jugo-Slav agitation in the Aus trian Parliament spread throughout the mon archy and was enthusiastically supported by their nationals scattered throughout the allied countries. Already at the beginning of the war thousands of Austrian Slays—whole regi ments — had gone over to the Russians. Large numbers escaped from the country and joined the Allies in France and Italy. On 6 Jan. 1918 a congress of Czech deputies reasserted their claims at Prague; in April a similar gathering was held at Rome; disorders spread through out Bohemia and other districts of the mon archy leading to a state of siege around Prague and the establishment of martial law among the Slovenes and Slovaks. On 4 May 1918 the Austrian Reichsrat was abruptly closed by the emperor. Anti-German demonstrations were severely suppressed and thousands interned. Barracks and public buildings were set on fire and German newspaper offices sacked. A Slo vene regiment mutinied and killed its German officers. Czecho-Slovak regiments fought in the Italian army and in Russia against the Bol sheviki. In New York, Kossovo Day was commemorated on 16 June 1918, attended by thousands of American Slays.