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Spring Hill

cavalry, road, division, corps, river, columbia, franklin, hood, army and schofield

SPRING HILL, Engagement at. After General Sherman had started from Atlanta, on his march to the sea (q.v.), General Hood, commanding the Confederate Army of Tennes see, marched northward from Florence, Ala., 19 Nov. 1864, to drive General Thomas from Nashville and back to the Ohio River. Thomas, who proposed to concentrate his own army on the line of Duck River and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and to await expected reinforcements, withdrew his advance posts from Pulaski and other points to Columbia, on Duck River, where works were thrown up, covering the approaches from the south. He had there on the 26th about 23,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, only 3,500 of the cavalry being mounted. General Schofield was in com mand. His infantry consisted of two divi sions of the 23d corps and the three divisions of Stanley's Fourth corps. Gen. J. H. Wilson commanded the cavalry. General Hood, pre ceded by General Forrest with 6,000 cavalry, appeared before Columbia on the 26th and with the three corps of Gens. S. D. Lee, A. P. Stewart and B. F. Cheatham, about 40,000 men, and threatened a crossing of the river above and below. During the night of the 27th Schofield withdrew to the north bank of the river, where he remained on the 28th. The two divisions of the 23d corps were placed in position in front of Columbia, holding all the crossings of the river in the vicinity, with Stanley's Fourth corps in reserve on the Franklin pike, ready to move whenever Hood should attempt a crossing above or below the town. Wilson's cavalry held the crossings above those guarded by the infantry. Forrest succeeded in crossing one of his divi sions, above Columbia, before noon of the 28th, pushing Wilson's cavalry back on roads lead ing toward Spring Hill and Franklin, and Hood began crossing his infantry at daylight of the 29th at Huey's Mills, five miles above Columbia, from which a good road leads into the Columbia and Franklin pike, at Spring Hill, 15 miles north of Columbia, a road by which he could intercept Schofield's march to Franklin and strike him in flank. Wilson had dispatched Schofield at 1 A.M. of the 20th that Hood would undoubtedly cross the river at daylight and suggested an immediate with drawal to Franklin. At daybreak Schofield sent Colonel Post's brigade up the river to ascertain if Hood had really crossed, and ordered Gen eral Stanley, with the two divisions of Wagner and Kimball, the trains and the reserve artil lery, to Spring Hill, to cover that point and hold the road open for the passage of the entire army. At 8 A.M., Stanley was on the march. On reaching Rutherford's Creek, four miles from Columbia, Kimball's division was halted and faced east to cover the crossing against a possible attack, and remained in this position during the entire day. Stanley, with Wagner's division, pushed on, and it was near ing noon, when his head of column had ap proached to within two miles of Spring Hill, that he was informed that Buford's division of Forrest's cavalry was approaching from the east. The troops were quickly thrown forward and Bradley's brigade, deploying as it advanced, drove off Buford 's men, just as they had driven back a small force of cavalry and infantry and were about to occupy the village. As the other two brigades came up, they also were deployed from the railroad on the north to the pike on the south, covering the village in a semi-circle, in which was placed the train. Bradley's brigade was sent half a mile to the front and right to occupy a knoll commanding all the approaches from the cast. The greater part of the artillery was posted on a rise of ground south of the town. Scarcely had these dispositions been completed when Hood at tacked. It was before sunrise when Cheat ham's corps began crossing the river, Cle burne's division in advance. Hood accom panied Cleburne on the direct road to Spring Hill. Stewart's corps and Johnson's division of Lee's followed Cheatham, leaving Lee, with the remainder of his corps, in front of Colum bia. Cleburne approached Spring Hill about 3 P.M., just as Bradley's brigade was taking position and immediately attacked it, and at the same time an attack was made by For rest's cavalry at Thompson's Station, three miles north, on a small wagon-train pushing for Franklin, and a cavalry dash on the Spring Hill station northwest of the town. Cleburne's

assault on Bradley was twice repulsed, but in a third front and flank attack Bradley was se verely wounded and his brigade driven back to the edge of the village, where it was rallied and put in position to cover the wagon-train, part of which had reached Spring Hill. Cle burne endeavored to follow up his advantage, but was repulsed by the fire of eight pieces of artillery. Bradley's loss was about 150 killed and wounded; that of the Confederates was somewhat more. It was now sunset and the engagement ended. The result of it was that the Confederate infantry was checked when within 800 yards of the road, but their cavalry had gained the road both north and south of the town. Stanley, with his one division of not more than 4,000 men, was in a critical posi tion; his nearest support was Kimball, who was more than eight miles in his rear; the other divisions of the army were still at Duck River. But fortunately for Stanley and the whole of Schofield's army, Hood's efforts to press the attack and gain the road miscarried, and Cheatham's corps bivouacked not more than half a mile from, the road over which Schofield's army was obliged to pass from Columbia to Franklin. Stewart arrived after dark and formed on Cheatham's right; and by 8 P.M. two corps of Hood's army were in posi tion facing the road and not over half a mile from it. There has been much Confederate contention as to who was responsible for the failure to seize the road and prevent Schofield's escape. Hood says: "Nothing was done. The Federals, with immense wagon-trains, were per mitted to march by us the remainder of the night, within gunshot of our lines. I could not succeed in arousing the troops to action, when one' good division would have sufficed to do the work') General Schofield, who had remained dur ing the day at Columbia, started late in the afternoon, with Ruger's division and Whit taker's brigade, for Spring Hill, and when about three miles from the town, came upon the Confederate cavalry holding the road, which was driven off, after quite a skirmish. Leaving Whittaker to cover a cross-road a mile or two below the town, and to observe the Confederates, who could be seen standing around their camp-fires, Schofield continued his march with Ruger to Spring Hill, which he reached about 7 P.M., and two hours later moved on to force a passage at Thompson's Station. The Confederates withdrew on his approach, the road to Franklin was clear and Ruger took possession of the cross-roads. Schofield returned to Spring Hill, where, meanwhile, General Cox had arrived with his division of the 23d corps. Just be fore midnight Cox was ordered to start for Franklin, with instructions to take Ruger with him. He was fairly on the road by 1 A.M., of the 30th, at which hour the train of 800 wagons was started to follow Cox. At the very start the train was obliged to cross a bridge in single file, which made the movement so difficult and caused so much delay that Stanley was advised to abandon part of the train, to which he would not consent, and it was almost 5 A.M., before the rear of the train was fairly under way. As the head of the train passed Spring Hill it was attacked by cavalry and some wagons destroyed, but Wood's division, which had fol lowed Cox from Duck River, was thrown on the flank of the train and the enemy driven off. It was near daybreak when the last wagon left Spring Hill. Kimball's division followed Wood's and at 4 A.M. Wagner followed Kim ball, his skirmishers remaining until nearly day light. Opdyck's brigade was rear-guard, and although hard pressed by Confederate cavalry, not a man nor a wagon was left behind. When the rear of the column was leaving Spring Hill, the head of it was at Franklin. Seldom has an army made such a narrow es cape from destruction or capture. Consult