STOICISM, the Stoic system of philosophy and practical attitude toward life. The Stoic school of philosophy was founded at Athens, about 300 a.c. by Zeno, a native of Citium, in Cyprus. It received its name from the Stoa Pcecile, or mottled porch, where its meetings were held. Zeno had been a pupil of the Cynic Crates, and in its essential principle Stoicism may be regarded as the continuation and sci entific development of Cynicism (q.v.). The successor of Zeno in the leadership of the school was Cleanthes, the author of the hymn to Zeus, who died 251 B.C. He was followed by Chrysippus who, on account of his great activity as a teacher and writer, is sometimes called the second founder of the school. The leadership, at Athens then passed the order to Zeno of Tarsus, "Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus. Of the numerous writ ings of these men and their contemporaries only a few fragments have come down to us.
Panxtius of Rhodes (180-110 a.c.) and his contemporary, Boethius of Sidon, introduced new elements into Stoicism, bringing it into closer relations with the systems of Plato and Aristotle. It was mainly through the influence of the former that Stoicism was introduced into Rome. Panwtius was the friend of Scipio Africanus and of Lxlius, and the teacher in philosophy of many Roman youths of dis tinguished families. Cato, the younger, is per haps the most famous Roman Stoic of the time of the republic. By the time of the empire, the original form of Stoicism had been greatly modified by the prevailing eclecticism of the age, and may almost be said to have ceased to exist as a scientific system. It still survived, however, as a popular moral philosophy, and in this form gave expression to many of the noblest ethical and religious convictions of the ancient world. Its chief representatives at this time whose works are still extant were Seneca, Epictetus and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.
Stoicism, like all the later systems of Greek thought, was primarily practical in character. The end and object of philosophy for the stoic was to teach virture as the art of right living. But, in order to act rightly, it is necessary to be able to reason correctly and to understand the nature of the universe of which man is a part. Hence, logic and physics were regarded as indispensable preliminary studies for ethics, but not as possessing an independent value of their own. The extensive logical investigations undertaken by the Stoics contributed little of permanent value for the development of the science. In physics, their general view of the universe may be described as pantheistic materialism. Whatever exists is for the Stoics a material body. Not only do they maintain that all substances—including the soul and God-- are corporeal, but they go on to du scribe as material all properties and relations of things, and even virtues and vices. Their view of the world was, however, essentially dynamic: all is process and movement. More over, the world-process forms a single whole, whose unitary principle is sometimes de scribed in material terms, similar to those of Heraclitus (q.v.), as fire of warm breath, some times in spiritual terms as God, Providence, the Logos or Universal Reason, or Universal Law. In spite of the variety of terms, these names all have for the Stoics the same meaning, and de scribe at once both the essential substances of the world, and. the ordering power and prin ciple according to which it is regulated. There is no distinction to be made between God and the world, between matter and force. Further, these statements imply that every part of the world is ruled by the same unchanging laws, and is thus subjected to strict necessity. There is no chance or contingency anywhere; every thing is ruled and governed by unvarying laws.
Man only differs from the other parts of the universe in that, as possessing consciousness and reason, he is able to learn the laws of nature and to follow them consciously and voluntarily. Hence we find that the fundamen
tal doctrine of the Stoic ethics is contained in the injunction to ((follow nature,'" to lead a according to nature.'" This general prin ciple was made more specific, however, it was pointed out (it is said by Chrysippus) that the laws of nature with which man is most directly and intimately concerned are those of human nature, and that he must there fore obey the fundamental laws which are found within himself. This implies that rea son, the fundamental principle of human nature, shall govern action. Between the reason and the life of feeling and emotion there is the sharpest opposition. The highest good is not pleasure, or any object of desire, but virtue, the end which reason shows to be in harmony with our true nature. This sharp antithesis between virtue and pleasure was doubtless made more emphatic by the rivalry between the Stoic and the Epicurean schools. To regard pleasure as the good is, they maintain, to lose sight of the true nature of virtue, to base it upon the feel ings and emotions, which are subject to ex ternal circumstances, and thus to deprive a man of his moral freedom and independence. The ideal of the wise man plays a very im portant part in the Stoic ethics. The wise man is completely free and independent, com pletely Independent of external circumstances, and entirely emancipated from the bondage of the desires and emotions. For him virtue is the only good and vice the only evil: all ex ternal circumstances are indifferent; health, power, riches, even life itself are not real goods, nor is pain, poverty, contempt, or death evils. He has completely mastered his posses sions through the insight of reason and the resulting strength of will, and has attained to a state of apathy, or freedom from the sway of the emotions. This ideal has been realized at best by very few men; the Stoics refer only to Socrates and Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic school, as examples of its complete ful filment The wise man recognizes the necessity of all events, and welcomes whatever takes place as a part of the divine order of the universe.
The fundamental Stoic virtues are thus strength of will and resignation based on rational insight. These enable a man to bear cheerfully whatever lot fortune may apportion to him. Even when external circumstances make endurance no longer possible, but would compel a man to unworthy action, he may still triumph by voluntarily withdrawing from life by suicide. The Stoic gives up life, as he gives up external goods, as a means of preserving his own freedom and independence; and many of the most famous members of the school com mitted suicide in this spirit. In spite of the emphasis on the necessity of independence, the Stoics recognize that a life of reason implies social relations with one's fellow-men, and they give an important place in their system to the social duties and virtues, especially to the im portance of justice, mercy and friendship. As reason is the essential basis of society, being the common element that unites a man with his fellows, they attach slight importance to citizenship in a particular country, and em phasize the cosmopolitan idea of social unity with all rational beings of every society and of every country. In this and in other doctrines, Stoicism, especially in its later form, goes be yond the conceptions usually prevailing in Greek ethics, and approaches the Christian idea of the universal brotherhood of man.
Seneca, 'Dialogues' (tran. by A. Stewart in Bohn Library) ; Epictetus, 'Discourses and Encheiridion) (tran. by G. Long in Bohn Library); Aurelius, Marcus, (tran. by G. Long in Bohn Li brary) ; Capes, 'Stoicism' (1880) ; Zeller, E., 'Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics' (tran. from Ger. by 0. K. Reichel, 1892) ; Brown, J. B., 'Stoics and Saints' (1893) ; Davis, 'Greek and Roman Stoicism' (1903) ; Bevan, E. R., 'Sto ics and Skeptics' (Oxford 1913).