SUBMARINE WARFARE. Of the many new instrumentalities of destruction employed during the recent World War the submarine torpedo boat proved the most effective. It differs from battleships and cruisers in that it operates for the most part beneath the surface of the ocean, it is slower of speed, frail of structure and possesses no facilities for the ac commodation of crews and passengers found on the vessels which it sinks. Its inability, there fore, to comply with the well-established rule of international law governing prize destruction, which requires a naval commander before destroying a merchant vessel to provide for the safety of all persons on board, raised the question as to whether such craft were entitled to a special immunity from the rule governing prize destruction by cruisers and battleships, in short whether the submarine may be employed for the destruction of merchant vessels without violating the law of nations as well as the principles of humanity. Soon after the out break of the war the German naval forces for the most part were driven from the ocean and compelled to take refuge in their home ports or in those of neutral countries. The Germans were, therefore, reduced to reliance upon submarine torpedo boats in their naval operations against the enemy and these were speedily built in large numbers and used on an extensive scale. By a decree of 4 Feb. 1915 the waters around the British Isles were declared to be a "war zone* within which, it was an nounced, all enemy merchant vessels would, if possible, be destroyed, notwithstanding the inability of the destroying submarines to pro vide for the safety of the crews and passengers found in such vessels. In pursuance of this decree scores of enemy merchant ships, includ ing great ocean liners like the Lusitania, the Falaba, the Arabic, the Persia and many others, were torpedoed and sunk, sometimes without any warning at all or after warning which was insufficient to permit the persons on board to take to the lifeboats. In consequence of this mode of warfare large numbers of non-com batants, men, women and children, of neutral as well as of enemy nationality, lost their lives. A considerable number of neutral vessels were also sunk, the excuse alleged by Germany in most cases being mistake, which was an in evitable result of a method of naval warfare in which visit and search are never practised.
In consequence of the protest of the American government and of its threat to hold the Ger man government to a strict accountability for the loss of American lives, the German govern ment in September 1915, while disclaiming all responsibility for the loss of more than a hun dred American lives on the Lusitania, gave the American government assurance that in the future "liners would not be sunk without warn ing and without providing for the safety of the persons on board, unless the vessels attempted to escape or unless they offered resistance.* The pledge, however, was not observed and on 5 October, in consequence of the American pro test against the torpedoing of the Arabic, the German Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that orders had been given submarine commanders which were so stringent that the recurrence of "incidents" like the torpedoing of the Arabic would not again be possible. But notwithstanding these assurances, German and Austrian submarines continued to sink merchant vessels, enemy and neutral alike, without warn ing and without making provision for the safety of the innocent persons on board: among the most flagrant instances being the torpedo ing of the Italian liner Ancona on 7 Nov. 1915, with the loss of more than 200 lives. It was true that this atrocity was committed by an Austrian submarine but it was understood in the United States that the German pledge bound the allies of Germany equally with her self and the Austrian government was fully aware of the American position in regard to the torpedoing of merchant vessels without making provision for the safety of their crews and passengers, and it was fully cognizant of the pledges given by Germany to refrain from the practice in the future. The action of the submarine commanders in continuing to fire upon the passengers while they were endeavor ing to take to the lifeboats was characterized by the American government in a note to Austria as "wanton slaughter of defenceless non-combatants" and a demand was made upon the Austrian government that the officer guilty of the act be punished and that an indemnity be promptly paid for the loss of American lives.