Attempts to Secure Recognition from Other Powers.— Although Spain was in alli ance with France, the ally of the colonies, she added little weight to the coalition, was un friendly and tricky, feared the result of Amer ican independence upon her own possessions and made no treaty with the United States until 1795. Tuscany and Austria also refused a treaty on the plan voted by Congress and accepted by France, as did Prussia, whose timid king, without a navy, saw no chance of maffitaining intercourse should it be established. Congress was ready to accede to the principles of the armed neutrality of 1780, but was not permittted by Russia, its originator. The Netherlands joined this neutral league in spite of British threats. This, with the exposure of an incip ient negotiation with the colonies, led England to declare war against her in 1780.
The Establishing of Commercial Rela tions.— This was of the first importance to the new state. Its foreign trade was then relatively more important than now. The French treaty 'was the only commercial treaty existing until the very close of the Revolution. Decentraliza tion, under the Articles of Confederation, was a serious handicap in negotiating, for it weak ened the trade privileges to be offered. After sturdy persistence, John Adams had secured a treaty in 1782, from The Netherlands, much on the lines of the treaty with France. Both of these treaties, in the freedom of neutral trade, in the regulation of search, in the definition of contraband and the opposition to privateering, were liberal, and show the influence of Frank lin. He also shared in the negotiation of two other treaties of amity and commerce, with Sweden in 1783 and Prussia in 1785, both con taining much the same features as the earlier ones, and displaying the same enlightened char acteristics. Spain came into line in 1795, her treaty restraining our southern boundary also, and in 1799 the expired treaty with Prussia was revived with some changes, due to war time. Jay's Treaty with Great Britain in 1794 was very much more than a treaty of commerce. How it dodged and how it settled many out standing difficulties will be seen presently. But as a commercial agreement, its unlikeness to the others enumerated must be recognized. For in it, England, the foremost maritime state, did nut grant that free ships made free goods, did not like Prussia allow pre-emption of all contra band articles except provisions, but permitted trade without discrimination, admitted consuls and inserted the earliest of our extradition agreements. Upon the basis of these commer cial treaties this country's foreign trade was built up, and much of its prosperity was founded. This is too apt to be overlooked.
Treaties with the Barbary Powers 1787 1805.— This is a curious chapter in American diplomacy, but must necessarily be brief. Like every state trading along the Mediterranean, our own country was forced to pay tribute, to avoid the seizure of its ships and the enslave ment of its citizens by the African corsairs. The alternative was to convoy our vessels, to put them under foreign protection or to estab lish immunity by successful war. The treaties with France 1778 (Art. VIII), and with The Netherlands 1782 (Art. XXIII), promised us the diplomatic aid of those countries against the Barbary powers, while both Portugal and Spain on occasion helped our crews. In 1784 Congress authorized direct negotiation, the commissioners being Adams, Franklin and Jef ferson. Of these Jefferson preferred war, while Adams thought tribute the less expensive way. They tried to bring about concerted ac tion with other states but failed. Then-through an agent they dealt directly with Morocco in 1787. This treaty regulated commerce, forbade enslavement of prisoners and allowed partial consular jurisdiction. It promised no tribute' but seems to have needed occasional liberal to be operative. In the next decade treaties were made with Algiers, 1795, carrying 12,000 sequins annually; Tripoli, 1796, with a lump sum of tribute agreed to (Art. X) ; Tunis,
1797, $107,000; the three costing us for their execution some $2,000,000. They contained some curious and some very modern provisions, but were alike in forbidding the enslavement of Americans. There were disputes, armed clashes, but nevertheless tribute, until Decatur wiped out the system and the shame in 1815.
Neutrality and Its Difficulties, 1793-1812. — Except for the Civil War, this was perhaps the most critical period in the history of the re public. Gratitude to France, the surviving bit terness toward England, many grievances left by the war and still unsettled, all these inclined the United States toward the French side in the Wars of the Directory. Such aid upon the sea might well be of vital importance. To secure it Genet was sent by France as minister. But he found Washington resolved upon neu trality as the only safe course. Maritime war with England would have destroyed our com merce and thrown our affairs into fatal confu sion. Neutrality meant a breathing spell. Angered 'by this, Genet tried to compromise our performance of neutral duties in every way until withdrawn at the close of 1793. (See IN TERNATIONAL LAW). Opposition to Washing ton's course, shared by Jefferson and his fol lowers, gradually built up political parties. Be sides old grievances against Great Britain, there were newer ones, which the war with France led to, impressment of seamen from our ships, for instance (see IMPRESSMENT), and the ruin of our trade with the Continent in breadstuffs, by an order making them contraband. A com mercial treaty was also badly needed. In 1794 John Jay made the treaty which settled all these points, but only, by leaving some of them out. It contained our first extradition agreement. It admitted us to the East and West Indian trade under conditions. It framed a list of contraband. But in it Great Britain did not renounce impressment. Jay's treaty was ratified in spite of a storm of abuse and opposition and helped American trade immensely in the years to come. Our relations with England and France were like buckets in a well. As friend ship with one grew, with the other it waned. So now France began to seize vessels and prop erty, under any or no pretext. When Pinckney went to Paris to remonstrate in 17%, he was rebuffed. Humiliating negotiation went on nevertheless, in 1797, three commisioners being sent instead of one. A national loan and indi vidual bribes were demanded by Talleyrand as a condition of negotiation. It was then that the curious episode of the X. Y. Z. Correspond ence (q.v.) occurred. Thus this mission was as fruitless as the other had been. Yet a third one was sent, by Adams, to the dismay of the Federalists and was lucky enough to profit by the revolution of 18 Brumaire 1799, which made Napoleon first consul. For now France con templated a commercial league against England, and was ready to negotiate. The treaty of 1800 was the result. This did not pay for French spoliations (that was arranged in 1803), but relieved the United States of the various em barrassments of the 1778 treaties, while restat ing many of their provisions. This treaty was another valuable step forward. But after an interval of calm, impressment became again active. and various outrages were committed by British ships of war off our own coast. All this was dwarfed, however, by the extensive and illegal paper blockades (see INTERNATIONAL LAW) with which the combatants fought to the injury of the neutral. Our reply was an em bargo (see EMBARGO), and useless negotiations with both countries. England's obstinacy and Napoleon's duplicity, coupled with the ardor of our own South, forced us into the ill-judged War of 1812. In spite of all the hampering restrictions of this period, our foreign trade in creased largely. Neutrality as established by Washington meant national salvation.