Boundaries and Territorial Growth.— The diplomatic processes which have built up our present limits, out of a country bounded west by the Mississippi and void of Florida, are lengthy and important. But the barest outline can be given here. They consist of (1) bound ary adjustment ; (2) territorial acquisition; the two often mingled. The first stretch of line, the Saint Croix River, was in dispute as early as 1783, but definitely identified in 1798. The next piece was to run north to certain which we placed near the Saint Lawrence, but Great Britain laid down across the heart of Maine. Much disturbance arose in this vast wild regiob, the scene in 1839 of what is known as the Aroostook War. In 1842 it was divided by the Ashburton Compromise, on the line of the Saint John River, the Saint Fran cis and a range of hills. From the source of the Connecticut to the Lake of the Woods, the differences have not been serious. West of the Lake of the Woods, after the Louisiana Pur chase, the line ran along the 49th degree but halted at the Stony Mountains until 1846, when if was carried forward to the Gulf of Georgia, studded with islands. There are two ship channels through this archipelago, one of which (the Canal de Haro) after more long years of controversy was designated as the treaty channel, by the emperor of Germany, arbitrator, in 1873. This whole northern bound ary, from ocean to ocean, was relocated in 1908 by treaty. Meanwhile Alaska had been purchased from Russia in 1867, and here, too, were disputed boundaries. The Canadians de sired a harbor on that coast, and interpreted the treaty so as to draw the line 10 leagues back from the coast, crossing some fjords, not going around their heads. But this was denied by the commission which decided the boundary in 1903. (See ALASKAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION). The Mexican boundary is partly an artificial, partly a riverine one. The Rio Grande is a shifting stream and the Arizona boundary marks have a way of disappearing, so that to this day oc casional diplomatic adjustments of the line are necessary. The chief acquisitions of territory prior to 1899 have been by the purchase of Louisiana, 1803; of Florida, 1819; of Alaska, 1867, and by the annexation of that vast region southwest of Louisiana which the Mexican War brought. Each of these events should be stud ied under its own title. Of their diplomatic aspects but the slightest review can be given here. A long controversy with Spain over the free navigation of the Mississippi to the Gulf, with the right to transship, made it perfectly clear that our West would insist upon these privileges. French ownership of Louisiana, 1800, was far more dangerous than Spain's could be. The sale of Louisiana, 1803, though earnestly desired by the United States, was effected by Napoleon's naval and financial weak ness and change of plans. (See LOUISIANA PURCHASE). Louisiana was a terribly ill-de fined region and naturally capable of being stretched. In the far Northwest this process was aided by Gray's discovery of the Columbia, 1793; Lewis and Clark's exploration in 1804-05; Astor's trading-post at its mouth, 1810, and by the Spanish cession of rights on the Pacific (Art. III, treaty of 1819). But the rights so derived were vague at best; the title to the Oregon country was left by treaty for many years in abeyance, and that splendid region finally won by the influx of settlers. Spain, in Florida, for years kept the inevitable at bay with the sole weapon of delay. Finally, in 1819, upon the assumption of our citizens' claims against Spain, up to $5,000,000, the cession of Florida was agreed to. (See FLORIDA). The territory gained by the Mexican War was partly seized, partly paid for. That war was necessitated by the annexation of Texas, to which Mexico still laid claim and with which she was still at war. (See MEXICAN WAR). The Gadsden Treaty of 1853, by purchase, en larged this territory.
The Monroe Doctrine and Its Develop This policy was based on the right of self-defense. It has never given the United States rights not otherwise existent. With much of truth it has joined much of indefinite ness; to the genuine principle of self-defense it has joined this paradox, that the stronger the nation grew and the less it had to fear, so much the broader grew the doctrine in its application. Throughout the diplomacy of the past 80 years this doctrine runs like a thread. Toward Cuba and Hawaii, as well as toward South and central America, it was the determining factor in the national attitude. No native politician can live without accepting it; our foreign neigh bors, at one time or another, have for the most part grudgingly submitted to it. Originally it
announced three things : that no colonization on this continent by a foreign power would be suffered; that the United States would take no part in European politics; that European inter vention, to control the form of government of an American State against its will, would not be tolerated, because it was dangerous to our peace and safety. The first principle was aimed at Russia; the last at the Holy Alliance. This Monroe Doctrine was enforced on its original lines as late as 1865, against French interven tion in Mexico. (See MExico). In and out of Congress it was deemed applicable in a broader way, to limit French control of De Lessep's Panama Canal, in the period subse quent to 1880. With a scope still further en larged, it was used by President Cleveland in 1895, to curb Great Britain in her boundary dispute with Venezuela. And now it is within bounds to say that the old policy tends to be come a new one, "America for Americans,* the freedom of this continent from European sovereignty and control. As an evidence of this tendency may be cited Convention 2, signed at The Hague 1907, which forbids the use of force for the recovery of contract debts be tween states until arbitration has been tried. To many of the American states even this seemed to fall short, they wishing force never to be legalized for the recovery of debts, public or private. See MONROE DOCTRINE.
Relations with States.
— Our diplomacy in this direction has been con cerned mainly with such matters as (1) protec tion from foreign aggression, as of Venezuela from her creditors, in 1903; (2) pressing pri vate claims; (3) exercising an indefinite kind of police power to keep order; (4) trying to bring about unity of feeling and action in vari ous directions, as in the Pan-American and ear lier congresses. This sense of a common inter est and desire for unity of action have grown markedly in the past 10 years. The various fac tors which complicate the situation are chronic revolutions, lack of security to the persons and property of foreigners resulting, defaulted na tional debts, redress claimed by other powers, jealousy of the United States, lack of consider ation and of understanding on the part of the United States, a theoretical but not very active republican tie of sympathy. The natural desire of foreign powers is to collect debts or secure redress by force, and if this is prevented by the United States, to make this country responsible. Our problem is to exercise the control which our position on the continent demands, with no assumption of responsibility for the acts of our neighbors. Somewhere between these positions there must be a line drawn; to find it requires a nice diplomacy.
The Slave Trade and the Right of Search.
— For nearly 70 years the right of search was a burning question with England in one form or another. The key to the difficulty was the pain ful recollection of British impressment practice. That was an attempt to enforce a municipal law on a foreign ship on the high seas, that is, within another state s jurisdiction. It was not formally surrendered; it was disused. Early in the 19th century began the anti-slave trade agitation in England, perhaps a unique example of national altruism. To be made effective this movement needed a universal right of search on suspicion of slave trading, to be exercised by the war ships of one or more states. By treaty with several powers, Great Britain gained this right, but in the case of the United States the memory of impressment made this later exer cise of search too unpalatable. Hence, of course, slavers would try to screen themselves by a false use of our flag. To meet this Great Britain set up two new theories. One was, 1810, that since American statutes forbade our citizens to trade in slaves, English ships and courts might enforce this prohibition — an ab surdity. The other, about 1840, claimed a right of visit (of a foreign ship at sea in time of peace) as distinct from a right of search, which was denied by Mr. Webster and surrendered by Lord Aberdeen in 1859, after years of exas perating controversy. (See INTERNATIONAL LAW). In 1842, by treaty, the two powers agreed to maintain separate squadrons for slave trade prevention, acting in concert when feas ible; in 1862, the reciprocal right of search was at last conceded to ships specially authorized. To stamp out the slave trade on land and on sea, as relates to Africa, many states, the United States amongst them, united in the act of 1892, hut here too a reciprocal right of search existed only when otherwise granted by treaty.