The year 1917 was the high tide of war effort and success for the Central Powers, and they felt on the strength of their position at the end of it that the war was surely won. Germany held most of Belgium and northern France, and the most determined and costly at tacks had failed to dislodge her. Serbia over run was held by the Central Powers and most of Rumania was in their possession. From Berlin to Bagdad German influence was su preme. The collapse of Russia enabled them to put their agents in control of large portions of it as the Brest-Litovsk Treaty revealed. The defeat of Italy back to the Piave in the autumn nearly put that country out of the war. There was doubt for a time as to whether Italy could come back effectually, but she did. The hopes of the Allies were at their lowest ebb just as America entered the war and the U-boat sink ing of nearly 1,000,000 tons of shipping a month, unknown then, but now revealed, seemed to portend an enforced unfavorable peace. The situation grew worse in prospect rather than better during the spring of 1918, for German drives made disturbing progress. The appoint ment of General Foch as commander-in-chief of the Allied armies and the increase of Amer icans on the line in France gave renewed hope to the Allies. After Foch's counter-attack, be ginning 18 July, the Central Powers crumbled, no other word can describe the unexpectedness of their collapse, and the armistice was signed 11 November.
The importance of naval power was demon strated completely. The English fleet main tained its supremacy and protected England's commerce, so indispensable for the country. A single month's interruption of commercial in tercourse would have put England in severe straits; two months would, it is said, have compelled capitulation. Germany's commerce was completely interrupted, though when sub marine freighters came to the United States our genuine neutrality was shown by readiness to furnish supplies. This form of commercial re lations proved too difficult and Germany's seg regation from the world by sea more than any other single factor brought about German col lapse and the end of the war. A great naval engagement was looked for between the rival .fleets, but did not come. A portion of the German fleet met a strong detachment of the British (31 May 1916) but the engagement was hampered by mists and interrupted by darkness. The English lost about twice as many vessels and men as the Germans but their claim that the Germans escaped complete defeat only by retreat in the darkness was confirmed by the absence of any further attempt on the part of the German fleet to risk an engagement. After the armistice was signed the immense German fleet steamed across the North Sea and sur rendered at Scapa Flow, where a few months later it was sunk by its officers in violation of their parole.
In spite of England's command of the sur face of the seas the submarine warfare came very near proving the vital turning point of the war. Only the revelations made by Admiral i Sims make it clear how serious were England's affairs from this danger when America entered the war. If the German U-boat campaign had continued for even a few months to be as dis astrous as it had been, British authorities felt that the end of the war could not he far off. American naval aid proved as important a factor for ultimate victory as military assist ance on the Continent in the following year. American enterprise and ingenuity solved the problems of U-boat resistance and robbed this German naval arm, the real cause for the forcing of America into the conflict, of its power. Some 2,000,000 American troops were convoyed to Europe with a loss of scarcely a hundred, and communications which ensured the victualing and supply of our armies in Europe and of the English people were main tained in such a way as to prevent any serious interference with work or war.
Early in 1917 the Germans had finished enough submarines to make them confident of being able to put an end to English commerce. They declared a barred zone around the British Isles (1 Feb. 1917), offering a permit for one United States ship a week to reach Britain. Submarine warfare had already strained the relations with the United States; the sinking of the Lusitania (7 May 1915), with 1,200 men, women and children, over 100 American citizens, had created bitter feelings; other sinkings of American vessels were explained diplomati cally, but the bitter feelings grew. When un
restricted submarine warfare was declared dip lomatic relations were broken off and Count Von Bernstorff, whose connection with disturb ing machinations in this country made him unpopular, was sent home. Sinkings continued, hostile relations with Mexico against the United States were attempted by Germany, and on 6 April Congress approved the President's declaration that the United States had been forced into the war. The United States was totally unprepared, but the first troops, regu lars, reached France in July. It was not, how ever, until the beginning of 1918 that American troops in large numbers were sent to France. In the meantime peace negotiations had been suggested by Germany, and 8 Jan. 1918 Presi dent Wilson issued a program of world peace with 14 points, to be prominent on peace nego tiations. The Quadruple Alliance: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey nego tiated a peace with the Bolsheviki in control of the Russian government. • This Brest-Litovsk peace, so called from the town in Poland where representatives met, showed that the Germans were intent on dismembering Russia for the benefit of the Central Powers. March 21, 1918 the Germans began a great driven on the Western front to force the Allies to sue for peace. The British were driven back almost to Amiens, but with the French held firmly. April 9 the Germans attempted to break through the British between Arras and Ypres to reach Calais and the English Channel. The British command to die at their posts, ((backs to the wall," checked this. The third great Ger man thrust came on 27 May and was answered by a counter-attack by the Americans, who took Cantigny. A week later the second and third American divisions stopped the Germans at Chateau Thierry. The German armies pre pared for the fourth great drive, 15 July, and for three days seemed to be breaking through, but were held, and on 18 July Foch began the counter offensive. This was a complete sur prise and proved the beginning of the end. Colonel Sargent in The Strategy of the West ern Front) tells the reason : ((But it was per haps not so much the surprise due to the con cealment of his forces prior to attack that deserves mention, as it was the surprise caused by the rapidity of the blows which he struck and the unexpected places where they fell. Hardly had the Germans been driven from the Chateau Thierry salient when Rawlinson at tacked from the British front toward Chaulnes and Debeney from the Montdidier front to ward Lassigny and Roye. These attacks were soon followed by Mangin's attack toward Noyon and Byng's toward Bapaume. Then came Horne's great attack from Arras toward Cambria and Douai, followed shortly afterward by Pershing's double attack against the Saint Mihiel salient." The American capture of the Argonne Forest was one of the great events of history. Many an army in preceding gener ations had tried to take the Argonne Forest by direct attack when the ground was not so thoroughly fortified as at this time, but no army ever succeeded in taking it until the Americans overran it at the end of September. This broke the spirit of the German armies, for it was recognized that there were millions more Americans to come over and that resistance was hopeless. As a matter of fact, all the preparations had been made to have 5,000,000 of Americans in France during the following year. The British forces in France are in striking numerical contrast. Mrs. Humphrey Ward published (1919) the official chart of the British general staff. The actual fighting strength January 1916 was 470,000. The maxi mum was reached (April 1917) 760,000. The number continued to descend and in May 1918 was 540,000 with but 465,000 on armistice day. At that time America's total forces in France were nearly 2,000,000 and 1,390,000 (General March's figures) were on the firing line. The French figures were not available but the opinion of military authorities is that they had less than 1,000,000 of men in actual com bat on armistice day. The Americans had more than three times as many as the British and perhaps one and one-half times as many as the French. Nothing shows so clearly the factor that America was in ending the war as these figures.