Among the stories of British air heroes they remembered that of Lient R. A. J. Warneford, V.C., who was killed so long ago as 17 June 1915, 10 days after he had destroyed a great German Zeppelin raider near London. It would be a cheap folly to attempt to belittle either the skill or the courage of the German flying serv ice, which ag-ainst the best efforts 'of French, British, Belgian, Russian, Italian and American airmen maintained a hard struggle for tile mas tery of the air for more than four years. They met unexpected efficiency and strength in the first days of the war from the few but de voted airmen of Belgium, whose skilful recon naissance did much to rob the early German at tacks of their °surprise° value. Russia, like Germany, had for two years before the war kept strictly secret her aerial development and when the storm broke the tsar's armies were surprisingly well equipped with both men and machines.
The German air service in addition to excel lent mechanical equipment had the advantage of a superior co-operation on the part of other branches of the military service. The British and especially the American airmen have de manded a complete separation from bureau cratic army control. The Americans have been almost a unit in declaring that they were pre vented from becoming a factor in the war un til in France they practically escaped from the paralyzing influence of their own War Depart ment and general staff. It appears to be an undeniable fact that we had never achieved even in the last days of the war any such sys tem of co-operation between our artillery and our air service as that which distinguished the enemy. The German anti-aircraft guns were able by a well-understood system of shell sig nals to warn their airmen while far up the skies of the approach of an enemy and to indi cate the altitude at which the foe was flying. Two black puffs characteristic of the German archies breaking in front of one of von Richt hofen's men were a notice that the observers on the ground had something to say. If that signal were followed by another puff 2,000 feet higher the Gertnan airman knew that an enemy had been detected flying at an altitude 2,000 feet higher than his own level. Titus warned, the man in the Fokker could choose fight or flight while there w-as still time to make a choice. When the various branches of an army maintain a liason as close and efficient as that, all are glad to belong to the team. Our army theoretically is all one team entirely committed to teamwork, but in the World War the air service at least seemed like a poor relation de, pendent entirely upon its own mitiative and re sources.
In considering the development of aviation in connection with the war we may begin with the estimate that before the war the warring nations had spent about $100,000,000 on air equipment and possessed at the outbreak of hostilities in the aggregate 5,000 aeroplanes and 100 dirigibles. In the autumn of 1914 various
European powers sought aeroplanes, and more especially equipment in the American market with the result that by the end of that year the factories were running to capacity.
At that time military opinion maintained that in view of limited production the air ma thines were too valuable to be used in actual fighting and were far more useful for recon naissance and range-finding. A. noticeable im provement in the duration of flight indicated in creased control and greater reliability and en durance on the part of the newer models. In 1915 the sales of aeroplanes and parts in the United States were estimated at ;5,000,000, and large factories were operating in the United States and Canada, including the Curtiss Com pany in Buffalo; Wright Aeroplane Company, Dayton, Ohio; Glenn L lvfartin Company, Los Angjes, Cal; Sturtevant Aeroplane Company of assachusetts; Burgess Crompany, Marble head, Mass.; Thomas Cnmpany, Ithaca, N. Y., besides many smaller concerns.
In the field of war, biplanes and triplaries were being used and milit.lry aeroplanes had been so far improved that it was possible for the aviator to talce hands and feet from the controls long enough to use a camera, drop a bomb, consult a map or aira and fire a weapon.
Congress in 1915 appropriated the small sum of $300,000 for army. aeronautics and al though American factones were producing much aeroplane materiel very little progress was made in developing personnel. In that year air battles began to be fought between squadrons operating as organized units and there were many. duels between single oppo nents. The opinion began to gain ground that the best way to dispose of an enemy aeroplane was by attack in the air with another plane. Experience had shown that a machine might be hit by many bullets fired from the ground and yet not disabled. The French organized aero squadrons (escadrilles) with bombing planes, gun planes and chasers. France at that time was using Bleriot two-seaters with Gnome motors— Clement-Bayard, Caudron, Henry, Maurice Farman, Morane-Saulnier and Voisin machines. A political-military scandal had led to an early war prohibition of the use of Ble riot, Deperdussin, Nieuport and R. E. P. mono planes. Later the Nieuport came into very gen eral use, although its wings proved unreliable when subjected to the terrific strain of piques, vrilles and other sudden strains which resulted from the new tactics of air fighting. In 1917 and 1918 American flying cadets were trained large! on Nieuports, and our aviators did their first ting in these machines. In the sum mer o 1918 they were first equipped with the much superior Spad.