12. AERIAL OPERATIONS. The his tory of what was accomplished by American aviators in the last months of the World War contributes a glorious chapter to the annals of the army. It must, however, be admitted that the credit belongs to the aviators and the race which produced such splendid youth full of the intelligence, courage and hardillood de manded by this branch of the service. The ((Army)) as a parent body can claim little credit for the work that was done between August and November 191& French and British Allies supplied both die materiel and the training without which our most brilliant flyers must have ,remained on the ground. From 1966 to 1916 striation in the United States army re Ceived little assistance from the general staff. In April 1917, the United States had two avia tion fields and 55 airplanes. The National Advisory Comniittee on Aeronautics having ac quired a scientific knowledge of some of the air problems declared 51 of these machines to be obsolete and the other four obsolescent. In the spring of 1917 when the United States entered the World War that great conflict had been in progress some 32 months. It is humiliating to American pride to admit that our professional military establishment appears to have learned almost nothing from the con flict abroad that could be made use of When America joined the Allies in April 1917. The army possessed a general staff and under the direction of that corps of selected experts the service schools were teaching officers the tac tics and strategy of the Ci7i1 War. The artil lery bran& of the service believed its three inch field piece to be equal to any light artillery weapcni ever iwiented. The potential value of tanks had been demonstrated by an officer of die National Guard more than a dozen years before, but the value of the model then built was recognized by France and ignored at home. The Wright Brothers had been expe.rimenting with heavier-than-air flying machines far a long time bat the United States army had less than 100 qualified flyers when war ',vas de.
dared. It is doubtful whether there was any one in the military establishment who realized. that not one of these fiyers was competent to meet in an air duel a war-trained pilot. Aa aviator able to fly a plane would have been atr easy victim of an opponent skilled in the tactics of air fighting whkh required an ability to execute a variety of manceuvres which were quite UOIMOSVO in the United States. Air flghting had made more progress between 1914 and 1917 than any other technical service.
At the outbreak of the war the chief use of aeroplanes was in reconnoitring enemy posi tions and correcting artillery ranges. Soule raids were made and some explosives dropped but little more than moral effect was expected from these exploits. But by the time the United States entered the war a much wider program had been evolved for the air forces. Great air souadrons operated in offensive undertakings with well-planned tedmique. It was a common airactice of the enemy to set an aerial tmp by dispatching at a comparatively low ahitude several large slow machines such as were used for photographing or bombing which offered an inviting target for Allied attack. When half a dozen Allied planes flew to the apparently easy conquest of an incau tious enemy they were liable to fall victints to an unexpected assault by very fast enemy Fok kers which had been flying much higher and waiting for the opportunity to dive down and deliver a raking fire frorre the rear upon the unsuspecting Allied squadron. The plain flying man woukl have been the most helpless of, victims in such a combat Only the skilled fighter could hope to convert defeat into vic tory by the instant execution of the urenverse mene and a °zoom* which would put him on, the enemy tail and in possession of all the ad vantage of position which a few seconds be-, fore had threatened death and destruction.