Peace Notes and America's Entry into the War.— On 9 Dec. 1915 Chancellor von Beth mann-Hollweg announced that Germany was ready for peace. This was .accepted by the belligerent powers as an invitation to a gen eral discussion of peace terms. and in fact it was followed by- a series of speeches and de bates by the statesmen on both. sides, but so profound was the distrust that in the end the discussion came to nothing. Exactly a year after his first suggestion the chancellor again announced to the Reichstag that the Central Powers were ready to enter into peace negotia tions. The emperor, he said. in a deep moral and religious sense of duty toward his nation and, beyond it, toward humamty, considered that the moment had come for official action toward peace. The official Gerznan note, which followed on 12 Dec,ember, spoke of the war as having been forced on the Central Powers, boasted of their soccess in recent military opera tions and the impregnable situation they then occupied. Yet they made the proposal to enter forthwith into peace negotiations. Their aims theY declared were not to shatter or to annihi late their adversaries.
This proposal was received with coldness in all the Allied countries. It was generally re garded as an attempt to reap the benefit of successes that had reached their climax and to come to terms before the tide of war turned. Premier Briand spoke of the proposal as a °crude trap.° In every Allied country speeches by responsible men revealed the conviction that no good could come from overtures that made no guarantee against a repetition of aggression, that contained no hint of reparation. Lloyd George stated that Great Britain would con tinue the struggle until she could secure °com plete restitution, full reparation, effectual guar antees.° It was in the midst of this unpromising situ ation that President Wilson, on 18 December, presented his peace proposal. Identical notes were telegraphed to each of the belligerent capitals suggesting that clan early occasion be sought to call out front all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be con cluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future, as would make it possible frankly to compare them.° The President pointed out that the °objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world,* and that tin the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally snd as directly interested as the Governments now at war.° It was stated that the President °has long had it in mind to offer° the suggestion for peace, which was in no way associated with the recent overtures of the Central Powers.
Three days later Secretary Lansing, in ex plaining the reasons for sending the note, said: aIt is not our material interest we had in mind when the note was sent, but more and more our own rights are becoming involved by the bel ligerents on both sides, so that the situation is becoming increasingly critical.
, °I mean that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves and, therefore, we are entitled to know exacsly what each bellige_rent seeks in order that we may regulate our conduct in the future.° The Central Powers replied in practically identical notes on 26 December. They failed to
state their peace terms, but proposed °an imme diate meeting of the delegates of the belligerent States at a neutral place.° Before answering President Wilson's proposals, the Allies, 30 Dec. 1916, presented a jomt reply to the German offer of the 12th. The German note, it said, contained only a °sham offer,° an attempt *to justify in advance a new series of crimes,* it was °empty and insincere?) a mere *war ma nceuvre.° 40nce again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not se cured reparation of violated rights and liber ties, recognition of the principle of nationali ties, and of the free existence of small states, so long as they have not brought about a settle ment calculated to end, once and for all, causes of long-standing menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantees for the future security of the world.° The Central Powers defended their case in notes addressed to the neutrals, issued by Ger many and Austria-Htmgary 11 Jan. 1917. The motives of the Central Powers in issuing their proposal of peace were set forth, and the moral pretensions of the Allies ridiculed. *The sin cerity which our enemies deny to the proposal of the four allied powers cannot be allowed by the world to these demands if it recalls the fate of the Irish people, the destruction of the freedom and independence of the Boer Repub lics, the subjection of Northern Africa by Eng land, France and Italy, the suppression of for eign nationalities in Russia, and, finally, the oppression of Greece, which is tmexampled in history.° The schemes of the Allies, (according to the statements of their responsible states men, are directed, among other things, toward the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several Prussian provinces, the humiliation and diminu tion of Austria-Hungary, the disintegration of Turkey, and the dismemberment of Bulgaria. In view of such war-aims, the demand for repa ration, restitution and guarantees in the mouth of our enemies sounds strange.° On 10 Jan. 1917, the Allies gave a joint re ply to the note of President Wilson, supple mented by a separate note from Belgium. Their war-aiins had been formulated on many occa sions by the chiefs of their divers govern ments. *The civilized world knows that they imply, in all necessity and in the first instance the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Mon tenegro with indemnities; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, Russia and Ru mania, with just reparation; restitution of prov inces or temtories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations; liberation from foreign domination of Italians, Slays, Rumanians and Czecho Slovaks ,• enfranchisement of populations sub ject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks and the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire; the creation of a free Poland from Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian territory; a reorganization of Europe founded upon respect of nationalities, and full security and liberty of ecimontic development for all nations; interna tional agreements to guarantee territorial and raaritime frontiers against unjustified attacks.x' On 22 Jan. 1917, President Wilson unex pectedly appeared before the Senate and de livered an address which caused a profound sensation in Europe. First of all, he said, there must be peace without victory. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms forced upon the vanquished.