Meanwhile the operations known as the battle of Loos were under way on a line of four miles, between La Bass& and Lens. The country was flat and was littered with mining villages and slag heaps, out of which the Ger mans had constructed excellent defenses. The British artillery was very strong and made sad *ork with many of these positions. It could not however, destroy all the machine guns, which the Germans used in greater numbers in each succeeding battle, and there was work to do in all parts of the field. It was well done; for when the assault was delivered at 6:30 on the morning of the 25th the first and second German lines were taken along their whole front. Before Loos the attack was especially brilliant. The 15th division, all Scottish, com posed of New Army men, here faced the enemy. Told to take Loos and Hill 70 the high slope beyond it, they streamed forward, subduing whatever resistance was offered until they ad vanced four miles from their starting point and passed beyond the last of the German de fenses. One of their sergeants cried to his' men, as they raced forward: ((Hold your swear ing, lads, and keep your breath. The next stop's Potsdam)) At the end of the day the victors, exhausted by their efforts but deter mined, were fortifying their positions and pre paring for the enemy's counterattack. Hill 70 commanded Lens and in that town tite Germane were malting hasty efforts to remove the heavy guns while it was time. The Highlanders hung on to the hill but in diminished numbers.
At this point, during the afternoon of 25 September the cause of the Entente Allies stood at a crisis. If the charge of the High landers had been supported in force, the hole they knocked in the German defense could not have been mended. If a great British and French army had been sent through to the rear of the German lines, the most serious con sequences would have ensued. The failure was a keen disappointment to all Britons. The cause of failure was the bad arrangements for reserves. The battle began with no other British reserves than the brigade each division kept in support. At 9:30 on the morning of the 25th, when the Highlanders were in L,00s, General French placed two newly arrived divi sions, under the orders of General Haig, who was in command on the field of battle. They were then eight miles from the scene of action and did not arrive at the front until late in the night. Next morning they broke before the Gennan counterthrusts. From that time the battle consisted of a series of vain attempts to hold what had been taken. At last the area of British operations was narrowed by turn ing over the southern part of the line to the French on 28 September-2 October. The bat tle, so nearly a great victory, yielded the British an advance of two miles on a four-mile front The enemy's line was bent back but it was not seriously altered. The British lost 45,000 killed and wounded, a heavy toll, but probably equaled by the losses of the Germans. One of the results of the battle was the resignation of General French on 15 December and the promotion of General Haig to the chief com mand of the British forces in France.
Thus the threefold offensive—in Cham pagne, at Vimy and at Loos—came to its end without achieving its objective but with substantial advances toward it. Within the en suing month came several reacting assaults by the Germans, bnt none of them made notable gains. The best of their armies were en gaged on the eastern front, and the counter attacks were no more than local affars, un dertaken to keep up the spirits of the soldiers. They fell away with the coming of winter and the two armies settled clown to the weary fight against cold and wet. The next action of note was the German attack at Verdun.
5. The Battle of Verdun.— The end of November 1915, saw the German army at the height of its success in the eastern azeit. Rus sia had been driven back to the eastern borders of Poland, Riga was all but taken, Serbia. was ovemm and rendered a conquered provinee, Bulgaria and Turkey were active and com plaisant allies, Austria-Hungary was converted Into a willinu tool, and the dream of a 4Berlin to-Bagdad) line of connnunication seemed to be an actuality. To the German High Command it seemed only necessary to wage a defensive war in this region and turn with concentrated energy to the western area in order to make the cause of Germany triumphant over all opposition. The decision was quickly taken and preparations made with great care and energy. A great breaking-through movement agahist the French line of defense was proposed, to be follosved lby the same kind of turning strategy against the severed wings that had characterized the plans that went awry at the first battle of the Marne. The point selected for the blow was Verdun. Why was this place selected? Several reasons can be given: (1) The Verdun angle was a spear-head thrust far into the German defenses.; for their lines on the east ran south from it to Saint Mffiiel, a distance of 25 miles, and on the west sloped off to Vauquois, about the same distance, the rounded point of the angle between Etain and Maucourt being about five miles wide; (2) Verdun in French hands held the Briey coal fields under long range fire, and it was considered important to free these fields from that menace, since the ore was needed in the manufacture of munitions essential to the conduct of the war; (3) the Germans had ample railroad facilities In front of Verdun, enabling them to bring up troops and supplies as freely as wcre needed; (4) here the crown prince commanded, he had not been very successful in previous Anovetnents, and for dynastic reasons it was desirable that he should have the honor of winning a great victory; (5) Germans had a strong sentiment for Verdun, partly through feelings that 'had endured from the 16th century when as one of the three bishoprics it vas the boqe of con tenticm between France and Germany and partly because several attempts to talce it during the course of the war had been thwarted by the def enders.