Verdun vias important to the rrench for three reasons: (1) Its successful defense so far had made holding it a point of honor; (2) as long as it was held it was an effective bar against German operations in the upper Marne Valley, that much contested avenue of approach to Parts; (3) it protected the Argonne, another important obstacle to German progress in this region. If Verdun were talcen, therefore, it would be necessary for the French to malce extensive readjustments in their lines of defense, and it might well happen that they could not make them safely in the face of such heavy pressure as Germany could now bring to bear.
In the beginning of the war, Verdtm, one of the main forts of the eastern defense, had been dianged into a fortified area to comply with the progress of the science of siege operations. Its steel and concrete forte no longer constituted the chief features of the defense, _but outlying, trenches had been dug, and as the war pro gressed these trenches had been improved and supplied with dugouts and wire entanglements of the strongest lcind. It was by this means that the place was able to meet the strong bombardment that was about to come upon it. Verdun„ however, had one weakness and it may well have been a reason why the 'Germans decided to make their grand attack at this place. One standard gauge railroad led into the place, from Sainte-Menehould, but it passed within five miles of the German guns at Van quois and its use was subject to interruptions. There was a narrow-gauge railroad from Bar le-Duc to Verdun, but to use it meant great delay in =loading and reloading at the junction point The Germans believed it would be impos sible for the defenders to obtain the munitions over these roads to withstand the attack they proposed to make. The French, however, had provided an excellent tnotor-transport service from the main railroads into Verdun, and It proved sufficient for their battle needs.
The German line in front of Verdun ran from Etain, east of the town and in the Plain of the Woevre, to Ornes, where it rose to the heights of the Meuse and crossed them to Bra bant on the Meuse. Thence it crossed the river to Forges and Malancourt and reached the edge of the Argonne four miles west of Vau quois. South of Etain it continued across the Woevre Plain in a southerly direction, climbing the heights of the Meuse just east of Les Eparges and passing thence to the western environs of Saint Mihiel. The whole line, from Saint Mihiel to the Argonne, was 60 miles around the loop, whereas straight across country from end to end it would have been only 28. The section of the line selected for attack was on the north, along. the heights on the east, or right, bank of the nver from Ornes to Brabant in the first phase of the battle and across the hills on the west bank from Forges to Avocourt in the second phase. From Omes to Brabant is
eight miles and thence to Avocourt it is nine. The Heights of the Meuse are from five to eight miles wide in this region. In trying to advance along their crest from the nor6, the Germans showed that they preferred that way of ap proach to an attack against Etain and across the Woevre Plain, which would have brought them to the foot of the Heights at Eix, only five miles from Verdun. They perhaps chose wisely; for to have climbed the escarpment at Eix the face of French defense would have been very difficult.
Their reliance was massed artillery with which they expected to repeat the experience of Dunajec. On the eight-mile stretch from Ornes to Brabant they concentrated an unheard of number of guns, from four-inch calibre to 13-inch howitzers. Airmen flying over the woods in which these guns were assembled re ported that they lay like apples in a basket The plan was to pulverize one section after another of the French lines so that the infantry could go forward without serious opposition. To support the artillery the Germans brought up new troops until there were 14 divisions, at least 230,000 rifles, in the sector from Ornes to Brabant, and there were ampk numbers in the other sections.
The French are said to have anticipated the attack at Verdun. If the statement is true they were gravely responsible for carelessness in failing to make better preparations. In the critical sector they had three divisions of Ter ritorial troops, by this tinie inured to warfare and dependable for good results, but not equal to the best troops. It was for them to hold the lines until reinforcements arrived. General Herr was in conunand of the sector, which was in the eastern area under General Dubail until the middle of December, when it was trans ferred to the central area under Gen. De Langle de Cary. The northern defenses of the town were in a weak condition. Having given up the policy of manning the forts, the authorities had removed the guns from those positions for use elsewhere. The lines had been indicated and the strong positions had been occupied, but through the frightful barrage to the supporting lines. At noon the enemy advanced without opposition, took the first line unopposed, and most of the first line of support. In the after noon the French won back the support lines in the Woods of Caure, but those in the Woods of Hatunent were not recovered. Hurried efforts were made to construct strong rallying lines in the rear, and the troops were ordered to resist until the last in order to permit these lines to be finished.