Neither Joffre nor French realized how many Germans were in Belgitun, and they both thought Namur could hold out a month, checicing the invaders. It was their plan, there fore, to drive back their opponents in this sec tion, swing the British and Lanzerac round to the north and re-establish the line the Belgians had been forced to relinquish. They soon learned their error. In fact, they were so badly outnumbered that von Kluck, on the Ger man right, was ever extending has line west ward, trying to get around the British position. In order to avoid being surrounded here, as Napoleon III had been surrounded at Sedan, it became necessary for the Allies to fall back continually.
The Germans got their heavy guns before Namur on the 20th, the day von Kluck en tered Brussels, and the place was occupied on the 23d, the last fort being silenced two days later. The air service of the British and French was as Food as that of the Germans, but it was relatively undeveloped. It did not reveal to the commanders the vast concentration of the enemy in Belgium. They did not know that in these critical days three great armies, more than 600,000 men, were moving on Lanze rac and French. Von Hausen was coming up just to the south of Namur, von Billow had enveloped it and was marching southward, and von Muck was moving with great rapidity on Mons and the region to the west.
Lanzerac was at Charleroi, which von Bil low's forces reached on the 22d. Furious at tacks occurred at once and the place changed hands several times on this day, the French at last standing their ground. But at this mo ment the news came that a part of von Hau sen's army had forced its way across the Meuse south of Namur and was threatening Lan zerac's communications. He decided that a withdrawal was necessary and made the move in good order. Next day, the 23d, the remain der of von Hausen's army in a hard battle forced the crossing of the same river at Dinant, eight miles south of his position in front of Charleroi, and he continued his retreat until his line rested on the forts at Maubenge and Givet.
Meanwhile the British at Mons were pre paring to receive the attadc of von Klucic, which they expected hourly. All through the day on the 22d they heard firing in the distance and thought it the guns before Namur, 30 mile_s away. Bk some strange chance Lanzerac failed to inform them of his withdrawal and they worlced hard on entrenchments, thinking it was for them to protect the western part of the Allied line. Late in the afternoon some of von Billow's men appeared on their right and tried to turn it. General French's two corps were holding a line 25 miles long, about 3,000 men to a mile. General French thought that only two Gentian corps were in front of him and felt that his own two corps were sufficient to deal with them. In the afternoon of the 23d
his line was strongly attacked throughout most of its length, but with especial severity at Mons and eastward. In this battle the British soldier showed great courage and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Although pushed back by a por tion of von Klucic's army on his extreme right, General French still held his position at night fall with great pressure on his entire front. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon he learned from Joffre that Lanzerac was in full retreat, that von Kluck had, not two, but three corps on the British front and another thrown out to die westward, trying to turn the British left. It the left flank to drive the British into the de fenses of the town, while Lanzerac had con tinued to retreat on the east General French decided that the only course left was to con tinue the retreat during the night, allowing only a few hours for rest Next day the German pressure was a little less and the army reached Le C,ateau, a march of 15 miles, die British line extending along a front of 25 miles. Here Gen eral French was joined by 11,000 fresh troops of the fourth division, drawn northward from the still unorganized third corps.
Le Cateau had been selected as a place for recuperation: it proved to be the scene of a fierce battle. As the first corps, under General Haig, was setding down to sleep behind its out was at once evident that the British position was perilous. The commander decided to fall back and ordered his heavy transport trains to move southward at once. He directed his army to hold their position until nightfall, then get what rest they could and begin to retreat at dawn the next day, the 24th. Thus began the celebrated retreat of the British army through northern France.
The 24th was a hard day, the Germans press ing strongly on the retreating colunins; but Al lenby's cavalry, riding from one point to an other, where danger was greatest, gave much relief, and the infantry turned now and again to fight off the enemy when he came too close for comfort. At nightfall the army had gone back 10 miles and stood at Maubeuge. Its posi tion was critical; for von Kluck was pressing posts near the village of Landrecies, a fresh German corps attadced suddenly in the dark ness, dunking to make short work of the ex hausted British soldiers. But the men stood to their arms and during three hours .beat off a strong assault along their whole line. They were materially helped by the arrival of two French divisions, who came up on their right flank, and at midnight the Germans gave up their battle.