At dawn on the 26th the retreat was resumed. Haig's corps, stiff and sore from the previous marching and the night battle of the 25th, could only hobble along. Smith-Dorrien's and the fourth division were in better condition, but in the early dawn they were so fiercely attacked by the Germans at Le Cateau that they could not hope to move off safely. Hastily entrenching they prepared to resist to the end. Charge after charge was repulsed. At 3 Est. their po sition was critical, when General French ordered them to break off the battle and withdraw as safely as possible. Fortunately, the Germans had also suffered too much to continue the fight and did not pursue as vigorously as was expected. Falling on some of the last units that withdrew they inflicted great losses, but the corps got away, tired, thirsty and completely shaken. It marched through the night in front of the pursuing foe until in the early morning of the 27th it halted at Saint Quentin. That day help came from the French and the pur suit sladcened, so that the British arrived at the Oise River on the 28th, where they were in comparative safety.
The five days retreat from Mons was a bit ter experience for the British Expeditionary Force. They only barely escaped complete dis aster and kst heavily, but they fought with signal courage. General French was chagrined at his treatment by Lanzerac, who certainly should have communicated with him as soon as he fell back. He was also aggrieved by the failure of the French to send him support in the five bitter days of retreat. On the other hand, it is claimed that General French him self was nearest to von Kluck and should have Icnown first of the superior concentration on his own front, that he did not begin the retreat as promptly as he should have begun it, and that he did not recognize that the French were also bard pressed by the armies opposed to them. Lanzerac, it must be remembered, did not make a general retreat on the 22d, but only swung back his right to adjust it to the thrust of von Hansen, south of Namur. It was not until the 23d that von Hausen seized Dinant and forced the French army to fall back along the whole line. A few hours later Joffre gave his warning to the British commander. Of course, Lanzerac should have communicated both pieces of information to General French, whose safety was closely related to any changes on the French front; but it was only the second move that put the British force in dire peril, and in re gard to that movement the delay in communicat ing with General French was not great. The traditional distrust of the British soldier of the military efficiency of the French was not dis pelled until after the battle of the Marne, and General French, who had both the faults and virtues of his countrymen, felt that he was the victim of Gallic instability. However, he did not lose confidence in joffre and his book, 41914' bears a.bundant evidence of his friendly appreciation of the generous and tactful atti tude of the French generalissimo. Lanzerac
was removed at the end of the retreat, although he had fought magnificently on the retreat and inflicted on the Germans at Guise the heaviest defeat they experienced before the battle of the Marne.
The withdrawal of the British from Mons to the Oise was the most spectacular feature of the general retreat; but we must not forget that it was only a part of the general movement. Von Kluck made the most powerful demonstra tion of all the German generals, but east of him came in nun von Billow, von Hausen, the Duke of Wurttemberg, the crown prince of Germany and the crown prince of Bavaria, all of whom were in motion as far as Verdun in unison with the general German sweeping movement Facing them were the Allied armies in the fol lowing order: the British, Lanzerac, Langle de Cary, Ruffey and Castelnau. The French thrust across the border started a few days be fore the Germans began to swing their line for ward. The counterthrusts following that move ment svere really synchronized with von Kluck's, von Biilow's and von Hausen's movements. As von Kluck advanced and threatened to turn the left of the great line, it became necessary for the interior part of the French line to fall back. The Germans in front of it followed and fought when they could. It was thus that they crowded Lanzerac at Guise, whose retreat from Charleroi gave them the idea that he was shaken. His splendid reply, a bad defeat for his opponents, showed that his army was intact and left him opportunity to continue hts retro grade movement unhampered. The world was surprised to see what a small check the French fortresses gave to this advance. Between the 23d, when Namur fell, and the 28th, when the line reached the Oise, Longwy, Montmedy, Hir son, Mezieres and Lille, all the northern fort resses but Maubeuge, fell to the enemy. Mau beuge, with a garrison of 30,000 did not suc cumb to the 11-inch howitzers until 7 Septem ber.
A story was told in connection with the siege of this place that should be remembered as an illustration of the bad effects of illy-con sidered assertions. It was said that before the war a Belgian had built an engine factory at Lanieres, near Maubeuge, the real owners of which were the Krupps, of Essen, and that when the Germans arrived they uncovered con crete foundations at the factory on which they placed 16%-inch howitzers for use against the forts of Maubeuge. Investigation showed that they did not use guns of that calibre in this ac tion but 11-inch howitzers, fired on their own wheels. It was also recalled that Lanieres is southwest of Maubeuge, while the German guns attacked it from inside the Belgian fron tier and to the northeast. The stOry seems to have originated with a Paris newspaper. It was widely repeated and went far to give the Ger mans their reputation for unusual ability in espionage. It was responsible for a wave of hysterical searching for pre-arranged gun posi tions in London, which, in the end, proved to be mostly fancy.