Besides Germany and Austria, there were two other powers which claimed interests in the Balkans—Russia and Italy. Of the four, the claims of Austria vrere no doubt the most justifiable. She was the next-door _neighbor to the peninsula and her existence was threat ened. Italy's interest was centred upon Albania, and more particularly the fine harbor of Valona, on the eastern shore of the Strait of Otranto and less than 50 miles from the Italian Coast The first object of her policy was to prevent Austria from acquiring the port, while Austria strove to keep it out of Italian hands on ea mint of its strategic position at the entrance to the Adriatic. The two allies in the Triple Alliance worked actively against each other with the Albanian tribes, establishing rival edu cational institutions and medical raissicrns in the country and seeking to extend their influ ence over the local chieftains. This procedure resulted in a stalemate which was recognized in a mutual self-denying ordinance concluded in 1906, by which both powers agreed to ab stain .from any attempt to obtain political do minion over the coveted territory; the matter was hung up till a more propitious moment might arrive for one or the other. 'While Italy desired to see Serbia strong enough to be troublesome to Austria, she supported Austria in preventing Serbia from gaining an access to the Adriatic, and since 1912 her policy has been markedly anti-Serb. The interest of Russia in the Balkans was rather sentimental than practical. Beyond a portion of Rumania, which is not strictly a Balkan state, none of the Slav states touched her territory. But Russia had constituted herself the protector of the Balkan Slays, and had certainly contributed more than any other European power in liberating them from Turlcish rule and securing their inde pendence. While Austria vras concerned in keeping the Slays down and divided among themselves, Russia labored and intrigued to strengthen and tmite them — under her he gemony. In how far this was part and parcel of Russia's aitns on Constantinople tnay some day be revealed. Certain it is that the respec tive policies of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans were utterly irreconcilable; an ac cession of diplomatic !prestige)) for the one meant a setback or defeat for the other. Bis tnarck had. desired Austrian expansion toward the East, and was perhaps not ill content that her policy in the Orient should clash with that of Russia, for in this way Austria would have still snore need of Germany and would gradually fall into dependence on Berlin. The process by which this was accomplished was not continuous ; there were interludes of co-operation with Russia... as in the Macedonian quesrion between 1903 and 1908; but, throughout, the ties with Germany its the Triple Alliance tended to be dravrn closer, even before the final breach with Russia over the Mitrovitza Railway in 1908. The securing of this railroad passage by Austria involved the destruction of Serbia and the virtual in corporation of the western half of the Balkan Peninsula in the Monarchy, thereby opening a gate for the indefinite expansion of Germany eastward. For many years Austria employed methods of repression against Serbia. She had shut out the Serbs from the sea; it was her systematic policy to prevent any railways being built by Serbia, which might have provided outlets for her trade. In 1906 Serbia concluded a Zollverein (tariff or customs union) with Bulgaria. As soon as this was declared, Aus tria closed her frontier against Sertia and brolce off negotiations for the renewal of the Treaty of Commerce with Serbia. As 80 per cent of Serbian produce passed into Hungary, a deadlocic ensued and Serbian fanners were threatened with ruin ; in the end Serbia had to submit to the terms dictated by Austria, which compelled her to buy her chief imports, includ ing guns and ammunition, in the Austrian mar kets, and which made Serbia more than ever a vassal of Austria-Hungary, politically and economically. When the Serbians turned their attentions to Macedonia, they came into conj. sion with Bulgaria. In 1908 Austria violated the 'terms of the Berlin Treaty by the annexa tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina — a challenge to Russia to contest Austrian supremacy in the Balkans. Russia encouraged Serbia and Monte negro to resist this final separation from their fellow Serbs and war appeared imminent in 1909, when the intervention of Germany con finned Austria's action. The dreams of gran deur cherished by the Southern (Juguo) Slays were until then sdll vague and undrfi ed when the annescation transiated them into action. Austria's step was an act of defiance to Slav dom, for it thrust a wedge into the very heart of the lands whidi the Southern Slays regarded as their inheritauce, and seemed to dissipate forever their dream of phi:nage union. Russia, though diplomatically supeorted by France and Great Britain as signatories to the Berlin Treaty, retired from the controversy, perforce leaving Serbia and Montenegro to withdraw their claims. Austria and Germany had gained a great diplomatic victory; Russia had been driven from the field and Sabi= aspirations seemed finally shattered. The incident was ap parently closed; it emphasized the intention of Austria— supported by Germany— to allow no treaty obligations to interfere with her plans of aggrandizement Meanwhile, great changes had been taking place on the international chessboard. The Ger man emperor's demonstrative visit to Constan tinople and Palestine had led to valuable rail way concessions into Asia Ifinor and ultimately kto Mesopotamia. German military instruc tors, financiers and engineers were sent to Tur key, and Germany became the doctor to the Sick Man. In every crisis that set in— the Ar-• menian and Macedonian atrocities and the Cre tan insurrection — Gertnany stepped in and paralyzed European intervention. In 1897, while the hands of Abdul Hamed II still reeked with the blood of 200,000 Christians, the Cross and the Crescent were united in a strange alliance. The Bagdad Railway concession was granted at that tune. Farther afield, Gernian policy was active in the Far East The Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95 drew attention to the helpless.. ness or defenselessness of China. The sud den etnergence of Japan as an up-to-date naval and military power had alarmed Rus sort, who scented a possible obstacle to her Far Eastern poll . In framing the treaty of Shimonoseki, y joined with Rus si a and France in coercing japan to sur render the chief fruits of her victories in Man c.huria. Russia stepped in later and seized Port Arthur while Germany acquired ICiao-Chau and the Shantung Peninsula from China. At two intervals of 10 years each Japan reaped her revenge against both those powers. The Tsar Nicholas was skilfully encouraged to expend his resources in a struggle with Japan for the mas tery of the Far East (See Jararr--: Russo JAPANESE WAR). Other reecms fell within the perspective of Germany. Smith America par ticularly attracted the kaiser's attention. That wntinent contained a hrge German population, but official activity was impossible there on ac count of die Monroe Doctrine, unkss England could be embroiled with the United States and British naval power enlisted as an ally. Early in the Spanish-American War a German at tempt was made to organize a European coali tion against the United States, an effort that -was frustrated by Lord Salisbury in London, Lord Pauncefote in Washington, and Captain Chichester with a British squadron in Manila Bay. We have it on the unimpeachable testi. mony of Sir Valentine Chirol, who was ape. daily invited to Berlin by Prince von Billow at the time, that in October 1901 informal convex. sations were initiated in Berlin for a treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Germany, by which each party would have guaranteed to the other all their existing possesssons through.
out the world except in Asia. (There Gersnany had no intention of placing her sword at Eng+ land's disposal against Russia. . . . One of the most singular features of this proposal was Germany's insistence that the provisions of this alliance should extend to the American coati. neat, though neither in South nor in North America had Gerentuty herself any possessions to ibe safeguarded. The peculiar insistence of Germany on this point was, it was urged, a proof of her singular clisinterestedness. . . But the snare was laid in vain. It was too obvi ously an attempt to commit us (Great Britain) to unlimited liabilities which would have some day compelled us to toe the line in a Gennan campaign' against the Monroe Doctrine and thus fatally embroil us with the United States. • . . The wooing throughout was entirety on the German side; and, after listening to what Germany had to say, Great Britain very soon indicated that conversations on such lines were not to her taste? (Consult Quarterly Revival, October 1914, p. 415). The feverish restless. ness of German policy created a widespread sense of alarm aanong other powers, kdmed them to reconsider their mutual relations and to draw closer engether. The first move in this direction was the conclusion of a defensive treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan in 1902. In 1904 Great Britain and France composed their differences by the Anglo French Agreement, piopularly knawn as the Entente C.ordiale. The next year, while Russia was suffeting defeat in Manchuria and thus temporarily eliminated, Germsaty opened the Moroe.co controversy which led to the con ference at Algeciras, at which Germany se cured the recognitiou of her claim, but failed to shake Anglo-French friendship. In 1907 came the Anglo-Russian Agreement, thus form ing a cotmterpoise to the Triple Alliance. The immediate object of the so-called Triple En tente was a mutual insurance against German pretensions. The terms everning the alliance between France and Russia were unknoarn to the British government up to the outbreak of the European War. On the other hand, Great Britain was not bound to her partners in the Entente by any conditions whatever, (no secret engagement) as Sir Edward Grey told Parlia ment on 3 Aug. 1914. The Entente, in fact, was simply a diphanatic group, not a strict alliance. German statesmen quickly realized, however that this group meant the restriction of their 'ambitious intenuons. It henceforth be came their policy to break up —or break through— what they conceived to be an iron.
ring that had been forged around them. The Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis in 1908 brought war within measurable distance; from that stage it only remained a matter of tinte. In 1911 Italy declared vrar upon Turkey and annexed Tripoli and Cyrenaica, a move contemplated for many years. In the same year another Moroccan crisis darieened the political horizon. On this occasion Germany asserted that the French military occu pation of the Moorish Empire formed a new situ ation, and that without some sort of compensa tion she would be unable to tolerate the existing state of affairs. The German gunboat Panther and the cruiser Berlin were sent to the closed port of Agadlir, a manceuvre provocative to France. War again hung in the air, and Ger many was eventually bought off 'by the cession to her of,100,000 square miles of French Congo territory. This was the last German attempt to break up the Triple Entente.
While Turkey had the Italian War on her hands, the Balkan League suddenly declared WU on her and began hostilities in Octo ber 1912. Germany expected an easy vic tor her friends the Turics. They were dtlYeated, however, and the war was a crushing blow to bodt Austtia and Germany. Besides, a formidable, resurrected Serbia now stood in the way, and behind her loomed the substantial power of Russia, protector of the Slav nations. Three haunting prosccupations hovered in the minds of German statesmen—the (Slav PeriP (Russia), the (Yellow Peril* (Japan), and the (British Peril)) Of the three, they probably feared Russia the attest Her marvelous re. cteperative wer, increasing prosperity, sue. easeful Ba,- n policy and, above aU, her friendly relations with France and England, had firmly unpressed the German tnind that Slovenians and Germanentinn must sooner or later come into collision. On the other hand, if Germany feared Russia, as considerable evi dence seems to prove, it was nothing but fear of Germany that drove France, Great Britain and Russia into each other's arms. Undoubt edly, that group was a standing menace to Germany should she attempt to translate any ambitious projects into action. One by one Germany saw her avenues to expansion closing up around her. The Slav renascence had shut the door to the Near East; the proximity of japan made the Far East too dangerous; South America was hedged by the Monroe Doctrine; Africa was already parceled out, and in almoet every other part of the world there stood the emptre of Great Britain. Here, indeed, was an imPasse that could only be broken through by force. Germany's navy had reached a high stage of efficiency; she was already the strong est military power in the world, maintaining a peace army of nearly a 1,000,000 thoroughly trained men backed by millions more of equally efficient reserves. All these circumstances con spired to breed a conviction that war —some how or somewhere — was inevitable, and that the sooner it came the better. In Austria-Hun gary and Italy, furthermore, Germany had two powerful allies, while she also felt confident of the support of the Mohammedan world. The obstacles to be considered were France, Great Britain and Russia. Of these, France alone was presumably not a match against Germany; Russia had not sufficiently recovered from her war with Japan, while Great Britain, it was supposed, would not fight. The opinion had long prevailed arnong military experts in Europe that Gerrnany alone would be well equal to the task of dealing with France and Russia. The German plan of campaign in the event of a conflict with the Dual Alliance was well laiown years before the war. To take the route through Belgium, strike a decisive blow at France, dic tate terms in Paris, and then turn with full force to the East before Russian mobiliza tion could be completed. This was the essence of the strategy actually adopted, as it had fre quently been discussed in French, German and British military periodicals. Signor Giolitti re vealed in the Italian Chamber of Deputies crn 5 Dec. 1914 that during his premiership in August 1913, while the Balkan peace conference was sitting in Bucharest, Austria communicated to Germany and Italy her intention of taking action against Serbia as a gdefensiveg measure. Italy refused to consider the plan; Signor Giolitti, absent from Rome at the time, sent the following message to the Italian Foreign Minister: gIf Austria intervenes against Sen. bia it is clear that a cams fedens cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no ques tion of defence, as no one is thinking of at tacking her . . . and we must hope for ac. tion on the part of Germany to dissuade Aus tria from this most perilous adventure?" From this it is evident that Austria intended proceed ing against Serbia just a year before the war broke out Italy refused to countenaoce Aus trian aggression in 1913 and again in 1914, after war had been declared on Serbia, on the ground that it was an aggressive and not a defensive undataking. There tans also an understanding that Italy's obligation to the Triple Alliance should cease if the war in which Germany and Austria engaged should involve England as' an enemy.