In the first months of the war the American attitude was accepted in London and Paris as the natural coarse for the United States tp fol low. But as the magnitude of the conflict came home to the people of the Entente nations they began to turn their eyes to the United States. They had come to realize that it would tax their best energies to defeat Genriany and they wished the help of the western republic. By this time it was clear that Germany was fighting for world power. If she was successful she would impose crippling terms on her European oppo nents and gather strength for a new and more ambitious contest. As to liberal government, it would probably.pass into a state of subservi ency if a victonous German military autocracy placed its heel on the necks of the self-govern mg peoples of Europe. In view of these reflec tions the sorely pressed people of France and Great Britain easily came to believe that the United States had as great an interest in the defeat of Germany as any other free nation. British and French blood, said they, was being spilled as much for liberty on the Mississippi as on the Thames; and they- added that it was a discredit for the Americans to leave other peo ple to svin their battles for them. By the end of 1,916 many Americ.ans had come to hold this opinion. It was their war as much as Eu rope's, they thought, and they wished their gov ernment to take its place by the side of those who fought to suppress liberal governments In the mind of President Wilson another motive was forming, broader and more idealistic. To defeat one dangerous nation only to turn the seorld over to the play of farces which would soon bring up another who in turn would have to be defeated was a cheerless prospect to hint, as to many another man on each side of the At lantic. It became his purpose to try to get the world to adopt a league of nations to enforce peace by co-operation, and he announced in sev eral speeches that by virtue of the part neutrals would have to talce in readjusting world af fairs after the war, the LTnited States would have to take a part in keeping with their strength in arrangiug those parts of the peace which had so do with permanent international relations. When Germany issued her ruthless submarine decree on 31 Jan. 1917, he sev ered diplomatic relations and announced that the execution of the decree would be an act of war, which the nation must repel with force. ThuS the United States werat lute the war; but President Wilson, in his speech to Congress, 2 April 1917, declared tbat the object of the fighting was to make the world safe for de mocracy and to establish a system under which the horrors of war. on a grand scale would be abolished. There is notiung in the American constitution giving the President the authority to declare the object for which the nation fights ,• but the warm aW-oval given his speech of 2 April by political friend and foe seems to indi cate that his ideas were approved by the people of the United States.
The accession of the powerful western re public gave new courage to the exhausted states of the Entente alliance. Germany dis counted its significance, saying that money and supplies might be furnished to her enemies, but that it was physically impossible for the Ameri cans to send a great army across thc Atlantic. The assertion seemed but too true to many a Frenchman; and Joffrc, in Washington, in May 1917, urged that American troops, if only a division, be sent to France at once to reassure the French people and show them that American troops would fight by the side of the French poi/us. Thus it was that the first American division was sent to France in June and July 1917, and General Pershing was made com mander of all the forces sent by his government to fight in France.
During the remainder of the year 1917, active preparations proceeded for the transmission of American troops to France. Engineering forces went over in large numbers to construct depots for supplies, docks for unloading, and railroad tracks for the accommodation of the large number of locomotive and freight cars that were needed by an army of 2,000,000. Other pioneer
divisions followed. By the end of the year 195, 495 troops had been embarked, and at that time they were going at the rate of 48,000 a month. When the Germans opened the drive of 21 March it became evident that the success of the Allies demanded the arrival of much greater numbers of Americans, and Great Britain limited her own supplies of food in order to place ships at the disposal of the United States. Thus it was possible to transport 244,345 men in May, 297,000 in July and 283,000 in August. When the armistice was signed on 11 November the United States had embarked 2,045,169 men for service in the World War. About half of this number were available for service under General Foch when he opened his heavy drives on the German lines in August 1918.
To support this large number of men in France demanded the utmost exertion on the part of the United States, and the system of communications and depots that was created was one of .the notable achievements of their part in the war. When they came into the field they found the British were using the channel ports of France to the limit of capacity. If the Americans could have used them also it would have produced great confusion in trans portation to have given them control of rail roads crossing the areas behind the British lines. It was logical for them to take over Atlantic ports south of the channel, and four were as signed them: Brest, Saint Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeaux. With a lavish expenditure of ntoney and energy docks were built, railroad sictingy were constructed, warehouses were erected, balceries and other manufacturing plants that ministered to the needs of an army were established, and camps of instruction for the air service and for other arms were established. The American Service of Supply represented American business energy at its best, operating as it did with unlimited funds at its disposal. That it used a vast amount of money was evi dent to all but it obtained the desired results in an astonishingly brief dine.
Great doubt was felt in friendly as well as in hostile countries about the possibility of train ing the Americans into an efficient army. It was not until the battle of the Somme, two years after the -war began, that the British could be said to have converted their untrained men into modern soldiers. Could anything When the German offensive of 21 March 1918 broke on the British lines in front of Cambrai and Saint Quentin, four American divisions in France, numbering about 28,000 men each, were in such an advanced state of training that they could be used as combat troops.
On 28 March General Foch was made head of all the armies of the Entente in France. On the same day General Pershing visited him to place at his disposal the entire American force in France. The words he used in maldng the tender are worthy of repetition. (I come to say to you,D he said addressing General Foch, ((that the American people would hold it a great honor for our troops were they engaged in the present battle. I ask it of you in my name better be expected from the men of the United States? The doubters did not realize that the Americans had the advantage of knowing all the mistakes of the British. Also, they showed a great willingness to learn how the trick was done. When they arrived in France they made no objection to serving by battalions under French and British officers. American brigades were placed by the side of British brigades in the trenches. This docility in instruction made a deep impression on the European soldier, who was ever jealous of his nationalism. Under these conditions officers and privates learned the game of war thoroughly and waited patiently for the time when they should act as a distinct army with a distinct area of operations and distinct objectives.