The attack opened on 12 September, the fourth anniversary of the occupation of Saint Mihiel by the Germans. The enemy had re ceived intimation of what was coming and feel ing unable to reinforce the garrison in the angle had decided to withdraw. They began the movement about the 10th but proceeded in a leisurely' manner because they did liot expect the attack until the 15th. When the Americans advanced, the work of evacuation had not progressed very far, but the lines of defense were in an unstable condition. They yielded easily to the Americans who attained all their objective of the first day of the engagement. Late in the evening they learned that the Ger mans were escaping out of Saint Mihiel, and two regiments set out for Vigneulles in the night. They reached the place in the early morning and bagged a large number of the enemy who had gone far enough to feel secure. The Americans took more than 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. They readjusted their lines across the Woevre Plain in nearly a straight line from the northent defenses of Verdun to the Moselle River near Pont-i-Mousson. In some places it was within 20 miles of Metz and some persons thought it only remained to move on that position. But Saint Milliel was not directly a step toward Metz. The position as held by the Germans was an annoying salient thrust forward into the Allied territory and prevented an advance against Sedan, the truly vital part of the German lines in this part of France. It would have been iinpossible for the Americans to go forward up the Meuse with Saint Mihiel in German hands. Later we shall see how that movement was conducted.
3. Breaking a Weakened Line.— The fight ing just described by the Allied armies in Au gust and September accomplished two important things. It softened the German resistance and .prepared the way for a break through, and it removed the Saint Mihiel salient which was an obstacle in the way of further operations. With the course thus cleared Foch did not wait a day before putting his plans into operations for a great forward move. He followed his plan of striking all along the line, keeping the enemy engaged at many points; but his main efforts were made at two critical positions. If he could break through at them he would place the enemy's communications at his merw and force him to fall back in confusion with the prospects of capturing a large portion of his armies. The two places selected were opposite the strong road centres of Cambrai and Saint Quen tin and along the west bank of the Meuse to Sedan and Mezieres, on the great supply lines from Germany by way of Luxemburg and Metz. The first of these attacics, was left to the British, the second to the soldiers of the 'United States. General Ludendorff knew that he had lost the initiative, and did not expect Foch to give him any rcst. Although the laiew not where the blow would fall, he was ready to cover whatever place should be attacked so far as his straitened resources would permit His soldiers were also conscious of his difficult position. They had begun to doubt their even. tual success and their morale was broken to a notable extent The first of the two attacks was made by the Americans. As soon as the Saint Mihiel salient fell General Pershing moved his heavy artillery through Verdun, now safe from hos tile shells, to the region north of the town and between the Meuse and the western edge of the Argonne Forest. Then he drew off his best
trained divisions to the same region and took over 20 miles of trenches with a force which he organized as the 1st Army. The American lines on the east of the Meuse were held by the re mainder of his forces which he began to re organize into a 2d Army. At this time the 2d Army held the line from Port-sur-Seille to the Meuse, a distance of 42 miles. The 1st Army held the line from the Meuse to Vienne le-Chateau, a distance of 23 miles, the last eight of them being through the Argonne For est. To the west of the Americans was the French army under General Gouraud, holding the sector between the Argonne and Rheims. Foch's orders were for Pershing and Gouraud to advance simultaneously, but the forces un der the former were looked upon as the spear head of the movement. On 25 September both commanders were ready and a.heavy cannon ade was opened. It was especially intense in the sector of the 2d American Army, the de sign being to give the enemy the impression that a great attadk was about to be made against Lorraine, with its valuable coal mines. The ruse succeeded, since it induced the Germans to strengthen the defenses of Metz.
During the night the artillery fire was con centrated along the line between the Meuse and the Suippe, a &stance of 40 miles, and after three hours the infantry went forward at 5:30 on the morning of the 26th. Near the Meuse the Americans found weak resistance and went forward for seven miles. In the Argonne met stout opposition and barely advent= Just east of the forest they advanced about two miles. The next day they continued the strug gle, despite strong connterattacks, and took the fortified hill on which WAS the town of Mont faucon, from which the imperial crown prince was said to have viewed the battle of Verdian. It was Pershing's plan to hold back the line in the Argonne and flank the enemy out of the place; but the enthusiasm of the troops on the line that ran through it would not be stayed, and they began to work their way forward as the flanEng forces day after day ate into the strong defenses on their right. The Argonne had Fong been considered by the Germans an impregnable position, and it had been used as a place of recuperation for divisions that had been severely used in battle elsewhere. It con tained moving-picture theatres, barracks and excellent quarters for the officers. Its defenses were elaborate. The surface was brolcrai with ravines and outcropping stony ledges and it was covered with dense undergrowth. The roads and paths were well known to the Ger nrans who had mapped them accurately and held them under artillery range. The forest was full of machine-gun nests placed at the most advantageous pomts. Against this posi tion General Pershing sent his 77th and 28th divisions, the former being composed of drafted men chiefly from New York City. The persist ence with vihich these city-bred men stucic to their task was one of the surprises of the en gagement The 28th was a National Guard & vision from Pennsylvania.