In the latter part of 1808 Napoleon overran Spain with 200,000 men, and Sir John Moore, pursued by Soult, carried the British army to Coruna, where it embarked for England. Lis bon was still held by Sir John Cradock and a British force occupied Cadiz, when Wellesley was appointed to assume the chief command in the Peninsula. He arrived at Lisbon 22 April 1809. He advanced againt Sixth at Oporto and the French were thrown into con fusion and retreated precipitately. Souk now retired to Galicia, followed l by Wellesley to the frontiers of Portugal and harassed by the insurgent Portuguese. The Peninsula was at this time occupied by about 250,000 French troops; but after the departure of Napoleon the independence or insubordination of the French marshals prevented effective co-opera tion of the different armies, and the French command never extended beyond the districts occupied by their armies. the British com mander had a series of difficulties to contend with. First was the smallness of the armies on which he could rely. The numbers of the British were always comparatively insignificant and reinforcements were slowly and scantily supplied. Almost as formidable was the diffi culty of co-operating with his allies. Spain and Portugal were without regular governments. The Portuguese officers had mostly fled to Brazil, but the Portuguese troops, carefully drilled by Beres ford and placed under the com mand of British officers, soon became a tract able and efficient force. It was far otherwise with the Spaniards. The junta and the gen erals were alike ignorant, incompetent and self-conceited and with the raw levies which constituted the Spanish armies it was positively dangerous to co-operate. Even with the Portu guese government. Wellington (as he must now be called) had natural hut formidable difficul ties to contend with. The subs'stence of the armies was a constant source of danger and embarrassment both in Spain and Portugal. The resources of the country were oppressed by the armies of three nations. The French took all they wanted and wasted much more. The Spanish armies. numerous and inefficient, were a sufficient weight for the junta, which always supplied with reluctance the wants of the British who had commonly much greater difficulty in procuring provisions for money than either of the other armies had in seizing them. Through all these difficulties Wellington adhered with undeviating patience and con stancy to the strict principles of discipline he had laid down. He remonstrated with hercu lean labor, and with admirable spirit, as his dispatches show, with authorities of all kinds; but he never under the great temptation took, or suffered others to take, violent means to supply his most pressing wants.
By a misunderstanding between Soult, who held the command in the north of Spain, and Ncy, who was under him, Galicia was evacu ated by both marshals and never afterward re covered, a valuable result of Wellesley's first campaign. To co-operate with the Spanish armies, Wellesley had determined to advance into Spain, which he did in July by the north of the Tagus. Nearly every Important fortress in Spain was in the hands of the French.
The victory of Talavera, 27-28 July, earned Wellesley the titles of Baron Donro and Vis count Wellington. Next day the French re treated across the Alberche and broke up their army. The first invasion of Spain had resulted in nothing but a series of movements among the French troops. Wellington at this time surveyed the lines of Torres Vedras and formed his plan of fortifications for their defense. Anticipating that invasion would come from the north, he left General Hill to guard the Tagus and fixed his headquarters at Viseu.
The French in the meantime were largely reinforced. Soult was in Andalusia with 60,000 men threatening the south of Portugal, while in the north the army of Portugal was concentrat ing to the extent of 70,000 to 80,000, and the veteran Massina was appointed to command it. Wellington was able to bring into the field from 50,000 to 60,000 British and Portuguese troops. The French invested the Spanish fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo early in June and took it on 10 July. then advanced to the Coa, from which the British retired. Almeida was cap tured on 27 August. Wellington fell back on the valley of the Mondego. In the middle of September, Massena began his march down the right bank of the river. At the Sierra de Bu saco, a high ridge in front of Coimbra, Welling ton made a stand and repulsed the French. After the battle, Massena turned Wellington's rosition, who retreated to Leiria, where he halted two days. On 8 October he entered his lines.just as the autumnal rains were beginning to fall. A powerful fleet and a flotilla of gun boats on the Tagus contributed to their defense. Massena was wholly unprepared for his recep tion and after some vain demonstrations he retired from their front. The Portuguese parties had cut off his communications with Spain and sickness was rapidly diminishing his num bers. On 15 November he fell back to San
tarem.
Napoleon recommended to waste the English with continual engagements of advanced guards and sent Soult instructions to co-operate with Massena. But Soult, with the blockade of Cadiz and with the Spaniards on his hands. could ony spare a sufficient force to besiege Badajor In March 1811 Massena was com pelled to begin his retreat, which he conducted with great skill The French crossed the Agueda on 6 April. Wellington estimated their loss in the campaign at not less than 45,000. Wellington blockaded Almeida and cantoning his army between the Coa and the Agueda. re turned to Badajoz, which had been taken by Soult and invested by Beresford. He was speedily recalled by an aggressive movement of Massena to relieve Almeida. Wellington took up a position to cover the fortress at Fuentes de Onoro, where he was attacked by Massina with a superior force. In this battle he performed the exceedingly critical operation of changing his front in presence of the enemy. The maneuver was successful and Massina was repulsed. Almeida surrendered a few days after the battle and Massina was about the same time superseded by Marmont. Soult in the meantime had been defeated by Beresford at Albuera in an attempt to relieve Badajor. Wellington returned to prosecute the siege and Marmont also moved south to join SouIt, but afterward returned to Salamanca. This induced Wellington to push the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in preference to that of Badajoz and he re turned to the Agueda. Marmont, however, ad vanced with a superior force and he withdrew to the Coa. Marmont returned to Salamancas.
During the winter Wellington continued to occupy himself with preparations for this siege. collecting his stores at Almeida under pretext of repairing it. On 6 Jan. 1812, he moved his headquarters to Gallegos, invested Ciudad Rod rigo on the 8th and took it by assault on the 12th. An earldom, a pension and a Spanish dukedom awarded this achievement. Welling ton now went south with his principal force to take Badajoz; and Marmont, who had collected his forces to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, invaded Portugal by Sabugal and ravaged the country. Badajoz was taken on 6 April, with a heavy loss. Having secured the frontier for tresses, Wellington determined again to invade Spain. Leaving Hill on the southern frontier he moved north with his main army and on 17 June reached Salamanca, Marmont retiring to Toro. The French general, when he had con centrated his forces, attempted by a series of pretentious maturtivres to surprise the British commander, his ultimate object being to cut him off from his communications. With this pur pose he crossed the Tormcs, followed by NVell ington, who took up his position between the river and two hills called the Arapiles. Here Marment's overdisplay of tactics recoiled on himself. Having gained the outer .krapile. in extending his left to attack the British right. he gave Wellington the opportunity he had long desired of attacking him. Marmont was wounded and the French left and centre broken. Clause!, who attempted to re-form the army, was routed. Numerous prisoners were taken by the cavalry in pursuit and the French retired to Burgos. Wellington reached Valladolid on 31 July and turning on Joseph, who had ad vanced to support Marmont, followed him to Madrid. which he entered on 12 August Hill was now advancing to join Wellington and Joseph fell hack from Toledo to Almansa in Murcia. These compelled Soult to abandon Andalucia and an Anglo-Spanish force from Cadiz took Seville. Wellington's next movement was against the army he had defeated under Clause!, which bad been largely rein forced. He left Hill in Madrid (1 September) and advanced to Mimes, being joined on his sas 1 \ a body of Spaniards. The French re nred, leaving a garrison in the castle, which %%entrigton deemed it necessary to take before The siege, for want of proper artillery, occupied him till 21 October. In the meantime the northern army tinder Souham aas again advancing and Snub with a powerful army marching on Madrid, which Hill had aban doned to fall back on Salamanca. Wellington abandoned the siege and retreated, closely fol lowed by the French, who repeatedly attacked his rear. At Palencia he was joined by a brigade from England. At Tudela, Souham halted to wait for Soult and Wellington pro ceeded to the Tomes, where he was joined by Hilt and when the French crossed the Tormes force he took up his old position at the An s The united armies of Soult and Sou amounted to nearly 90,000 men. Welling ton's strength was over 50,000. The enemy, in stead of attacking, threatened his communi cations, upon which he retreated to the Agueda and established his headquarters at Ciudad Rodrigo The French, not being prepared to invade Portugal. withdrew their armies to cantonments in Castile. General Hill's corps continued to occupy Estrcmadura and the rest of the British were cantoned on the Portuguese frontier.