Defense.—The question of national de fense had long been a Imotty problem in Bel gium and it was not until 1913 — on the eve of the war — that Baron de Broqueville, the Prime Minister, carried an army bill through Parliament involving compulsory service. Al ready in 1890 the question of obligatory service had assumed an acute form, when the govern ment categorically refused to introduce that system, notwithstanding that it met with general favor from the Liberal party and the worlcing classes generally, and was, besides, strongly sup ported by all native competent authorities. At that time Lieutenant-General Van der Smissen, one of the ablest Belgian officers seized the first available opportunity to express openly and loudly his formal disapproval of the con duct of the Minister of War, General Pontus, on the subject of personal service. For this freedom of speech the general was promptly dismissed, a circumstance that was regarded as a great loss to the Belgian army. The bill of 1913 called all young Belgians who were physically fit to serve in the army, which would have doubled its nominal strength and raised the number of effectives to 300,000 men. But the measure arrived too late; the war clouds burst over the country before the reforms were carried out. The total available was 263,000, of which number nearly half were required to garrison the fortifications, leaving only 133,000 for service in the field. To bnng the latter force up to the necessary strength the govern ment had perforce to call up the old Civic National Guard. At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 the Belgian army was immediately placed on a war footing, and undoubtedly saved the country from once more being °the battle-field of Europe.D It is an open secret that the French, on the eve of Sedan, meditated a raid through Belgium; the Emperor Napoleon III was only prevented from talcing the step when one of his generals pointed out that it would mean 70,000 more enemies for France. Under the old law of 1902 the Belgian army was recruited by voluntary en listment augmented, in case of necessity, by annual levies of young men who had completed their I9th year. Anyone unwilling to serve might provide a substitute, for which, of course, he would have to pay. The period of service was fixed at eight years with the colors and five years in the reserve. About 14,000 men were required annually, while the war strength was calculated at 180,0013. While the new law of 1913 retains the same legal period of service, it drafts about half of the number of the total available. The men receive an excellent, all round training, having to serve in all the branches in rotation, viz., infantry, fortress artillery, engineers, field artillery and cavalry. Besides the standing army there is a garde ciinque, numbering close on 50,000 men in time of peace, in addition to which there were over 90,000 non-active men belonging to this force. Belgitun has no navy beyond a small flotilla of gunboats for river and c,oast service.
The principal means of defense to which the Belgians had long pinned their faith was the elaborate system of fortifications that guarded their frontiers. These forts were destined, in the early stage of the European War in 1914, to play a prominent and instruc tive part On the one hand, they stenuned the German invading avalanche for a week; on the other, they proved the utter uselessness of fortifications against modern artillery if the enemy is once permitted. to approach within range. Ever since Belgium had gained her independence, plans for fortified defenses had engaged the attention of her best military engi neers. The first proposal was laid before a military committee by General Chazel in 1f345. Besides a reorganization of the army, he advo cated .the demolition of existing defenses that were in the wrong places, and the establishment of powerful entrenchments at Antwerp. Years
later, when the plans were about to be put into execution, Napoleon III, who had climbed to power in the interim, vetoed the plan on the ground that he might some day be obliged to enter Belgium himself, in which case the forts it was proposed to demolish would be his last support. It was not till four years after the close of the Franco-Prussian War, when Brial mont became inspector-general of fortifica tions and Napoleon had fallen, that the task was begun. He had already fortified Antwerp in 1868; by 1892 he had completed the forts at Liege and Namur. In his designs he brolce aNyay from the old French star-shaped forts wtth bastioned ramparts and adopted the Ger man type of long front and detached forts. Before the advent of artillery, forts were high as castles; thereafter they were made as low as possible, burrowing underground, and show ing only. a mound hardly visible, cased and roofed tn concrete and covered with earth. The guns within were of the *disappearing* type, which were raised just high enough to (peep" over the level, fire and sink out of sight again. The sections between the forts were supposed to be provided with infantry and artillery trenches, but this most important point was apparently overlooked, and thus the passages between the forts were left unde fended against night attacks by infantry. Liege was defended by 12 forts, six main and six smaller ones, called fortins; between two of them lay an undefended gap of five or six miles, presenting an open entrance to the Dutch frontier.* Across the Meuse, to the south east, was Fort Barchon and Fortin Evegnee; farther south stood Fort Fleron, which com manded one of the railroad lines to Aix; the two forams Chaudfontaine and Embourg, on opposite banks of the Vesdre, controlled the line to Germany via Verviers; Fort Boncelles to the west commanded the elevated ground be tween the Meuse and the Ourthe; while north of Boncelles stood Forts Flemalle, Hollogne and Loncin, and between the latter and Pontisse lay two more foram, Lantin and Liers. This irregular circle around Liege was considered a safe, double line of defense; the forts being from 4,000 to 7,000 yards apart toward the Ger man frontier, an enemy would still be under fire from right and left even if a fort fell into his hands. As it happened in actual experience, in 1914, by the capture of Fort Loncin, a vital spot, by the Germans, the whole railway system of Belgium was laid open to the invading forces, and the fall of Namur and Antwerp (neither of which could hinder their progress to French territory after that), was only a question of time after the world had seen with what com parative ease the Liege forts had been demol ished. See ANTWERP; NAMUR.
But perhaps more than to her army and fortifications, Belgium trusted in the protective influence of international treaties among the Great Powers guaranteeing her independence and neutrality. The Treaties of 1831 and 1839 framed between Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia provided that Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state ;"' in 1867 the same powers, with the addi tion of Italy and Holland, collectively guaran teed the neutrality of Luxemburg. In 1870, on the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, Great Britain immediately made separate trea ties with both France and Prussia by which the neutrality of Belgium was specially guaran teed during the war. At the same time Great Britain pledged herself to co-operate against either of the two belligerents that might violate that neutrality. In addition, the Treaty of 1839 was positively reaffirmed. When Germany de clared war against France in 1914, Great Britain again called upon the two powers to forswear any violation of Belgian territory; France readily gave the desired promise, and Germany refused it.