In attacks against artillery, the detachment of cavalry should be divided into three bodies one-fourth of the detachment being charged with carrying the guns, one-half to attack the supports of the battery and the remaining fourth acting as a reserve, to cover the parties in advance from an offensive movement against their flanks or rear. The party to se cure the guns make their attack in dispersed order, and endeavor to gain the flanks of the battery. When the battery has a fair sweep over the ground alone which they must ad vance, they should, by manoeuvring and false attacks, try to confuse the artillerists, and draw their fire before making their charge.
So far as concerns actual duties, heavy cavalry charge the enemy's cavalry and in fantry, attack the guns and cover a retreat: while the light cavalry make reconnaissances, carry dispatches and messages, maintain out posts, supply pickets, scour the country for forage, and the commissariat, pursue the enemy and try to screen the movements of the in fantry by their rapid manoeuvres on the front and flanks of their army. At the battle of Balaklava the heavy cavalry charge was within the reasonable duties of the troops, but that of the light cavalry was not; the former succeeded, the latter failed. Cavalry cannot wait to re ceive an attack like infantry; they must either pursue or retreat; and on this account it has been said, °Rest is incompatible with cavalry.* The infantry and artillery more frequently win the victory; but the cavalry prepare the way for doing this, capture prisoners and trophies, pursue the flying enemy, rapidly succor a menaced point and cover the retreat of infan try and artillery, if retreat be necessary.
If we the conditions of modern cavalry action, it is clearly seen that no one particular formation can be rigidly insisted upon for the mounted charge against cavalry. The development of long range firearms, their rapidity of fire and great accuracy, has made it possible for cavalry having time to dismount and form up to repel the attack of horsemen as effectively as can °unshaken infantry" By dismounting and using the rifle on foot the cavalry will be able to decimate the attacking force and throw it into utter confusion long before it reaches its objective. Dismounted ac tion in future wars will be the rule, mounted attack the exception.
The battle attacks of the cavalry of the First Empire were simplicity itself. Placed
close to the front, it was drawn up in succes sive lines of regiments or brigades, with the light cavalry in front, behind them the dra goons and in rear of all the cuirassiers. The lines thus placed one behind the other formed use colonne serrie. It attacked in successive lines of regiments or brigades at varying in tervals, according to the course of events. After the charge or the ?nigh the rally was to the flanks,.where column was rapidly formed in order, if necessary, to advance again by passing through the intervals of the supporting lines. There was little occasion for manoeuvre, owing to the proximity of the cavalry to the front, but all movements were executed at the trot, the gallop only being sounded for the last 100 or 150 yards. Practically the only manoeu vre attempted was to take ground to the right or left and form again to the front; the suc cess of the charge was due to the irresistible onset of the successive lines and the skill in the stelie of the individual swordsman, the whole constituting a moral factor of the first importance and value.
The question is asked: Why, cavalry having attained such super-excellence under Napoleon, has it come to pass that in none of the succeed ing wars from 1815 to 1870 is there any trace of the same emploi intensif f The same thing had already been noticed before in the Prussian cavalry of Frederick; in both cavalries there was a period of uniform success; in both of them when at their zenith the principles of organization were simple, the distribution sup ple and elastic, the commanders young and brilliant and the employment of the arm was the actual embodiment of the 'offensive spirit. Either cavalry attained its apogee, followed by a period of decadence; each in turn was con tent to rest upon its past fame, to rely merely upon tradition, until reverses and disaster led each in succession to examine into and correct the causes which had resulted in its overthrow. It is found that during long years of peace men fall back upon mere formula, trust to theory rather than to practice, consult schoolmen rather than leaders; that during peace time the natural tendency is to place undue reliance upon regulations, farm and dilettantisme tac Wins, while overlooking the factors of energy and overpowering moral force which, through all material changes in armament, must ever remain among the keenest weapons of cavalry.