After the war of 1870 it was generally be lieved that cavalry was no longer a weapon for the battle, that all that could be asked of it were certain vaguely defined duties of recon naissance; it was then recognised that oppos ing cavalries must meet and fight, and by both German and French authorities it was con ceded that the first duty of cavalry is to de feat the cavalry of the opponent, while many efforts were made to formulate a doctrine of profitable employment. This heroic age, when it seemed that cavalry should be employed again in masses and by shock, was followed by the Russo-Turkish, the South African and the Manchurian campaigns, where such methods were impracticable, and a reaction set in in favor of the employment of smaller units and of fire action.
The Franco-Prussian War put emphasis upon the reconnaissance duties of cavalry, be cause the German cavalry took advantage of the fact that the French cavalry mostly was kept concentrated and with the infantry to spread out far in front of the German armies for reconnaissance purposes; also because both cavalries disdained to fight on foot and, there fore, contented themselves with waiting for opportunities to make mounted attacks. 'These opportunities came but seldom, and in the majority of cases furnished examples of the failure of the mounted attack rather than the reverse.
Cavalry officers in all countries have felt for years that undue emphasis was being put on the reconnaissance duties of cavalry, and that cavalry should not consider itself an obsolete fighting arm merely because it cannot habitually use the sabre, any more than infantry should rule itself off the battlefield because it cannot habitually use the bayonet. These cavalry offi cers have welcomed the possibility of the aeroplane taking over the duties of reconnais sance from the cavalry, as that means the end of the period in which cavalry has been split up into small bodies, and the return to its use in large bodies under cavalry leaders. In other words, its use would be on a much larger scale but in the same manner in which Sheridan in the closing days of the Civil War cut off and destroyed Ewell, Lee's rear guard, and after ward stopped Lee until the infantry could arrive.
In the great European War cavalry was in dispensable and variously employed as a cavalry screen; in reconnaissance; in patrol duty; in protecting flanks of armies; in filling gaps between armies; in acting as advance and rear guards; in pursuing the enemy as inde pendent cavalry; escorting large bodies of in fantry and machine guns moving in automo biles; seizing and holding important positions until the infantry could come up; holding long stretches of trenches; and acting as a mobile reserve in rear of the trenches. As a result of
experience in the Boer War in 1901, in the British drill book the rifle was declared principal weapon of But later when a new drill book was issued in 1907, the policy changed, and the acme blanche was declared to be the cavalry's main reliance. The Boer War was the greatest demonstration of the value of the mounted rifleman the world has ever seen. It confirmed the experience of the American Civil War. But the lessons it taught Europe went unheeded and in 1914 the French, Austrian and Italian cavalry were armed with a carbine of little or no value, while in none of these armies was the cavalry properly or suf ficiently trained in marksmanship or in dis mounted action, and as a result, great masses of cavalry were obliged to stand helpless, useless and impotent spectators of fierce battles, whereas had they been trained to use the rifle, they could have moved with the speed of horse men and fought with determination of infantry.
Cavalry played a significant role on both sides in the Allied retreat and the German ad vance to the Manic. During the battle of the Manic, the German cavalry held the gap in the German line between von Kluck's flank guard north of Meaux and his main force on the right flank of the German line. When the Allies were endeavoring to extend their line to Antwerp, and the Germans were trying to reach the Belgian coast, the cavalry of both sides played an extremely important part in the region of Lille and Ypres; in fact, a large part of all the early engagements in this region were fought by cavalry. See Auxins:most; ARTILLERY ; INFANTRY.
Bibliography.— Audibert, (Etude sur le combat i1pied) (Paris 1911) ; Childers, Erskine, (War and the Anne Blanche) (London 1910); Id., (German Influence on British Cavalry) (ib. 1911) ; French, (Cavalry in Modern War? (London 1884); De Brack, (Cavalry Outpost Duties) (New York 1893) ; Roemer, (Cavalry: Its History, Management, and Uses in War) (ib. 1863) • Rimington, M. F., (Our Cavalry) (London 1912) ; The Journal of the Military Service Institution (Governor's Island, N. Y., 1885 et seq.) • Journal United States Cavalry Association (Leavenworth, Kan., 1890 et seq.) ; Von Pelet-Narbonne, (Role of Cavalry in Modern War' (London 1905) ; id., (Cavalry on Service) Ob. 1906) ; Von Bernhardi, (Cavalry in Future Wars) (London 1906) ; id., (Cavalry in War and Peace) (ib. 1910), and Brackett, (History of the United States Cavalry) (New York 1865).