COMPROMISE OF 1833, Henry Clay's tariff compromise, to prevent civil war on account of nullification by South Carolina. The tariff of 1828 was regarded by the South as injurious and inequitable, raising its expenses and reducing its income, and laying burdens upon it without compensating advantages. The tariff was borne in the hope that Jackson, a Southern man, would throw his influence against it, but when he signed the amended act of 1832, leaving the duties much as they were, South Carolina took the lead in revolt. On 19 Nov. 1832, a convention called by its legislature de clared the act of 1828 and its amendments null and void, forbade its enforcement in the State or appeal to the Supreme Court regarding it, and decreed secession in case the United States should attempt to use force. On 4 Dec. 1832, Jackson's annual message mildly criticised the tariff as overgrown and needing gradual re trenchment to a revenue basis, and apologized for the popular resistance, which he thought the laws adequate to suppress. The nullifiers and their opponents alike thought he had surren dered to the former as in the Cherokee case (see CHEROKEE NATION v. GEORGIA) ; but on the 10th, apparently from a sudden shift of emo tional feeling, he issued a powerful proclama tion against them, characterizing nullification as an absurdity "incompatible with the exist ence of the Union,° and declaring that it would be resisted by the entire national force. There was great enthusiasm throughout the North, and general approval even in the South, but South Carolina returned a defiant counter proclamation, and Calhoun resigned the Vice Presidency, to be immediately returned to the Senate as the champion of nullification. To re move the grievance the House Committee of Ways and Means on the 27th reported the Ver planck Bill, reducing the tariff within two years to the standard of 1816, the primitive basis. But the President, angered by the new South Carolina threat, asked for a bill to enforce the law by military power, and extend Federal jurisdiction over revenue cases — called by the people the Force Bill, and by the South Caro linians the "Bloody Bill." All parties were per plexed and unable to act. South Carolina had relied on Southern support, which was not forthcoming; the House could not agree on the Verplanck Bill nor the Senate on the Force Bill. On 12 February, 20 days before the final adjournment of the 22d Congress, Clay under took a compromise. He introduced a bill into the Senate which reduced the duties to a general 20 per cent by a sliding scale to end in 1842, enlarged the free list, etc. Clay's assigned motive was, that without some such measure the protective system was likely to be abolished altogether, but not before there had been civil war, in which the South would not let South Carolina stand alone. A further motive was,
that he dreaded to see Jackson made a virtual dictator with a large army in his hands, as none could tell what he might do with it. Cal houn struck hands with Clay, though the pend ing Verplanck Bill was a far greater relief to the South. But Calhoun was far more anxious for a triumph of nullification and the conse quent mastery by the South of her own des tinies, than, for mere lightening of material burdens, and the compromise bill would be notoriously a concession wrung from the North by the threat of nullification while the Ver planck Bill, even if passed (which was dubious), would be only a bill like any other. The compromise bill was referred to a select committee with Clay for chairman. The manu facturers' lobby insisted on amendments, of which the chief was very obnoxious to the South—that for computing ad valorem duties on the basis of valuation at the home ports. As they made this an ultimatum, Clay supported it in the Senate, while Calhoun denounced it as both oppressive to the South and unconstitu tional. Finally Clayton of Delaware, a strong Protectionist, threatened for his party to lay the whole on the table unless the Calhounists and their leader voted for the anaehelftlean, which they did. Meantime the Force Bill had passed the Senate; and Clay urged it to pass the com promise tariff bill also, so that the bill for vio lence should have that for harmony to coun teract it. The objection was raised that the bill was one to raise revenue, and could not originate .in the Senate. This was met by the shrewd device of moving the House to strike out all but the enacting clause of the Verplanck Bill and substitute Clay's bill, and send it to the Senate for concurrence,— which it did the next day, and the Senate adopted it. South Carolina, which had appointed 1 February for the nulli fication ordinance to go into effect, repealed it, and the country hailed it as a great deliverance. Clay himself later confessed, however, that he doubted whether he had done wisely. The nullifiers denied that they had abandoned a jot of their contention ; hailed the result as a proof that it was the only means by which the South could obtain justice; and professed to have postponed the date of its operation only out of friendship to Virginia, which sent a commis sioner to deprecate it. It is certain that the South won both the material and the moral fruits of the victory. Consult Schurz, 'Life of Henry Clay) (Vol. II, Chap. 14) ; also other lives of Clay and biographies of Jackson and Calhoun.