DETERMINISM is the doctrine that everything that exists, as well as every event that happens, is absolutely fixed and necessary in the sense that it has been made what it is' by the action of some ground or cause. From this point of view there is accordingly no ele ment of chance or contingency in the world: nothing which is could possibly have been other wise. While this doctrine conceives of all of the parts of the world as determined, it derives its main interest and importance from its applica tion to the sphere of mind and the thoughts,: feelings, and actions of human beings. At the present day we have become accustomed to the conception of physical nature as a uniform series of events that happen in a fixed and neces-, sary way in accordance with uniform laws. The crucial question is whether the same mode of conception is to be extended to mind and its operations, or whether the view can be justified that mind occupies a unique place in nature and is characterized by real freedom. °Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct?) Spinoza tells us, °seem to be treat ing rather of matters outside of nature than of phenomena which follow nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom, for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions and is determined solely by As against such a view, Spinoza maintains the doctrine of determinism: "that nature's and ordinances whereby all things come to pass' and are changed from one form to another are everywhere and always the same? Hence sit' is impossible that man should not be a part of nature,' and subject, like everything else, to• nature's universal laws.
Determinism follows directly when substance and causality are employed as the ultimate prin..' ciples of explanation. From the point of of substance, the parts are viewed as deter-. mined by the nature of the whole. This whole, whether called God, or or °mat ter?) or °energy? is conceived as the one ulti mate reality, of which particular phenomena are °accidents?) or °modifications? The nature of the whole being given as a fixed datum or prior term, the nature of the parts, as its modes or modifications, are therefore also fixed and de termined. More frequently, however, the category is employed to support deterministic conclusions, either alone or in conjunction with that of substance. No part of the universe, it is argued, stands by itself : everything gets its constitution and nature through its connection with and dependence upon something other than itself. Universal causal relationship, then, im plies universal dependence, necessary determina tion. If the principle of cause and effect is valid throughout the whole field of reality—in the mental realm as • well as in the physical — determinism is the logical and inevitable conse quence. The adherents of determinism have
nevertheless maintained these principles with varying degrees of strictness so far as their applications to mental life are concerned. Many of those prnfessing determinism have given to the causal principle in its application to mind a meaning which they believe guarantees a rational view of freedom. Some of these posi tions will be referred to below under the various headings with reference to which the subject is to be further discussed. These headings, it will be noticed, indicate different aspects and appli cations of the problem as already outlined, and' not separate or exclusive doctrines.
(a) Metaphysical Determinism arrives at its conclusions from a consideration of the gen eral nature of the world and the universal form in which events happen. The determin ism of the will is simply one instance among others of the universal order and uniformity of all events. In strict monistic systems it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the nature of the one ultimate reality is that which de termines everything. This is true, as we have seen, whether that one substance is regarded as God, or as matter or energy. The opponents of determinism accordingly usually fall back upon pluralism, and emphasize the uniqueness and self-centred reality of humin personality. • But this position is confronted, on the other hand, with the task of accounting for the unity which experience shows actually to exist. How, if there is a plurality Of completely in dependent individuals, is it possible to think of the whole as forming a single world —a uni verse? It is clear that this world must be something more than a manifold, and that human beings least of all are mere points which exclude relation to others. This anti nomy is of course just one aspect of the fundamental metaphysical problem of the one and the many, and cannot receive a full dis cussion here. It is however obvious from what has already been said that a solution can be found only by adopting a metaphysical system that is at the same time both monistic and. pluralistic: that holds fast to the unity of things and also maintains the reality and pro vides for the possibility of self-determination on the part of finite individuals. Such a result is not possible for materialism, or any me chanical system of metaphysics. If, however, the view can be defended that the universe exists in its ultimate form as life and conscious ness,. freedom can still be maintained. For life• and consciousness are • principles of inclu sion, mot of exclusion, and at the same time they leave within their unity free place and scope for individual differences. From the metaphysical point of view, the solution of the apparent contradiction between freedom and determinism depends, therefore, upon the pos sibility of finding logical grounds for maintain ing a teleological and spiritual view of the world.