(b) Theological Determinism.— The prob lem here is in principle identical with that of metaphysics, though stated in different terms and generated by a special interest. The theo logical doctrine is variously known as pre destination, foreordination, election, etc. (qq.v.). The whole course of history, both in its phys ical and moral aspects, is assumed to take place in accordance with the eternal decrees or purposes of God. The crucial problem is regarding man's ability to secure his own sal vation. Theological determinists maintain that God has "elected some to everlasting life," and that such election, as an act of frie grace, is the necessary condition of salvation. Thus Jonathan Edwards, in summing up his defense of Calvinism against the Arminians, claims: "If we put these things together, it will follow that God's assistance or influence must be de termining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of the event; and so that God gives virtue, holiness, and conversion to sinners by an influence which determines the i effect in such a manner that the effect will infallibly follow by a moral necessity, which is what Calvinists mean by efficacious and irresistible grace." ((On the Freedom of the Will,' Ch. XIV).
(c) Psychological Determinism.—Psychol ogy has to describe and explain the conscious processes which constitute mind; and, like all the sciences, is necessarily deterministic in standpoint. From the psychological point of view every mental process without exception finds its explanation in its relation, either to some other mental content, or (as some would maintain) to accompanying neural changes in the body. An uncaused or undetermined men tal event, as, e.g., an act of will which is not connected causally with other states of body or mind, is a contradiction from this point of view. Nor is the difficulty to be avoided by supposing that the volition is caused by a free act on the part of the ego, that the self intervenes to produce changes in the natural order of events at this point or that. For if the self is thus distinguished from its states, it is no longer a member of the mental series, and cannot be invoked as a cause of any particular event. To appeal to any such special agent is to abandon the scientific problem, which is to discover the causal relation of the phenomena that consti tute the mental life. As Kant in the 'Critique of Pure Reason' clearly shows, there is no possibility of freedom in a phenomenal series of mental events; since, as occurrences in time, these are subject without exception to the law of cause and effect. The oft-repeated attempts of defenders of free-will to overthrow de terminism while still assuming that the psy chological point of view is final are as con tradictory and fruitless as the analogous at tempts to vindicate teleology in the physical order by supposing that at times the natural order is interrupted by a miracle. If determin ism is to be avoided, there must be an advance to a new standpoint and principle of explana tion. This was perceived by Kant who, in his doctrine of man as belonging to a noumenal order of reality, passes beyond the psychological and causal point of view to the idea of self determination in accordance with ends. It is true that Kant did not regard this new category as one that is valid for knowledge, but de scribes it as a "postulate" of practical or moral reason. The result of his analysis, however, was to establish the fact that while the psy chological or phenomenal description of mind must employ everywhere the category of cause and effect, and can therefore only issue in determinism, yet from another point of view it is equally necessary, in order to do justice to the facts of moral experience, to introduce the idea of freedom, or determination in accordance with ends.
(d) Historical Determinism may be a de duction from theological determinism, by simply regarding all the events of history as determined by the will of God, who makes even the "wrath of man to praise him? But what is usually known by this name is the theory according to which historical events are to be explained by referring them to natural powers and circumstances as their causes. The demand that history shall be made a science in volves such an explanation of historical events by means of causes, and carries with it the assumption of determinism. To explain his torically is accordingly regarded by some writ ers as requiring exhibition of the various causes — geographical location, climatic conditions, ra cial and economic rivalries, etc.— which are to be taken as determining the course of events in the period with which they are dealing. Since,
however, historical events are determined by the volitions of men, the sphere of determina tion must be psychological, and the remarks made in the preceding paragraph will also have application here.
(e) Ethical Determinism.—It is because of the supposed ethical implications of Determin ism that the doctrine has been most vigorously opposed. If all human actions take place, like natural occurrences, in a strictly determined way, then it seems an immediate corollary that the sense of obligation is unmeaning and the feeling of responsibility an illusion. Conse quences of this character, which seem to the opponents of the doctrine to follow from it directly, are taken by them as involving the refutation of the theory of determinism. The advocates of freedom are often content with this "practical') disproof of the opposing doc trine, admitting that from the theoretical point of view it is unanswerable. Kant, e.g., bases the proof of freedom upon the demands of the moral consciousness. Without the "postulate' of freedom the fact of moral obligation would be illusory; the "ought' implies and presup poses the "can? On the other hand, the deter minists as a rule are not willing to admit that it is necessary to assume freedom in the sense of indeterminism in order to give significance to moral distinctions. In the first place they point out that determinism is by no means identical with fatalism: that the causes of an action are no compelling powers outside the individual, but his own motives and character. Moreover, as H. Sidgwick has remarked: "The determinist allows that, in a sense, the 'ought) implies 'can,' that a man is only morally bound to do what is 'in his power' and that only acts from which a man 'could have abstained' are proper subjects of punishment or moral condemnation. But he explains 'can' and
At the present time controversies regarding freedom and determinism do not occupy the same prominent place in ethical literature as formerly. Modern ethical writers tend to avoid the question as a metaphysical problem that may be left out of account in dealing with the facts and principles of the moral life. However unsatisfactory this avoidance of the problem may be, recent ethical theorizing may be said to take as its assumption a more con crete view of the nature of mind .than that af forded by atomistic psychology. It recognizes implicitly that the causal category in terms of which the discussion has hitherto been largely carried on, is inadequate to exhibit concretely the movements of history and of individual life, and that for ethics, at least, human conduct must be regarded as the process of realizing ends and purposes which are personal rather than natural forces. See ETHICS; ELECTION ; WILL; FREEW ILL; PREDESTINATION ; NECESSITARIANISM; HISTORY, LOGIC OF; PSY CHOLOGY.
Bibliography.— Bergson, H., 'Time and Freewill) (London 1910) ; Bosanquet, B.,