LIBEL is a malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, or by signs, pictures, &c., tending either to blacken the memory of one who ie dead, or the reputation of one who ie alive, and thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. (Islawk. ' P. C.') This species of defamation ie termed written scandal, and from the considerations that the offence is committed upon greater deliberation than the mere utterance of words, which are frequently employed hastily and without thought, and that the effect of a writing continues longer and is propagated farther and wider than verbal defamation, it is generally treated as a more serious mode of defamation than slander. [DEFAMATION; SLANDER.] Whatever written words tend to render a man ridiculous or to lower him in the estimation of the world, amount to a libel; although the very same expressions, if spoken, would not have been slander or defamation in the legal sense of those words. [SLANDE4.] To com plete the offence, publication is necessary, that is, the communication of the libel to some person. The mere writing of defamatory matter without publication is not an offence punishable by law ; but if a libel in a man's handwriting is found, the proof is thrown upon him to show that he did not also publish it.
There are two modes in which libellers may be punished, by indict ment and by action.
The former mode is for the public offence, for every libel has a tendency to a breach of the peace by provoking the person libelled ; the latter, by civil action on the case, to recover damages by the party for the injury caused to him by the libel.
On the criminal prosecution it is, at common law, wholly immaterial whether the libel be true or false; inasmuch as it equally tends to a breach of the peace, and the provocation, not the falsehood, is the thing to be punished ; and therefore the defendant on an indictment for publishing a libel was not allowed to allege the truth of it by way of justification. But in a civil action the libel must appear to be false as well as scandalous, for the defendant may justify the truth of the facts, and show that the plaintiff has received no injury at all.
But altleewh the truth of a libel 14 no justification in a criminal pro sercuuce. eteept when pleaded under the recent statute, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 90, hereafter mentioned. yet it is so far considered an extenuation of the oftener, that the Court of Queen's Bench will not grant a criminal infor mation unless the prosecutor by affidavit distinctly and clearly denies the truth of the matters imputed to him, except in those cases where the prosecutor resides abroad, or where the imputations are so general and indefinite that they cannot be expressly contradicted, or where the libel is a charge spinet the prosecutor for language held by him in parliament. And it has been said that a grand jury should be governed by the like rule in finding an indictment for the offence.
A fair report of judicial proceedings does not amount to a libel, but a publication of ex-parte proceedings before a magistrate may be punished as such.
A petition, containing scandalous matter, presented to parliament or to a committee of either house, and legal proceedings of any scandalous the used may be do not amount to a libel. But if the petition were delivered to any one not being a member of parliament, or the legal proceedings were commenced in a court not having jurisdiction of the cause, they would not be privileged. Confi dentiAl communication reasonably called for by the occasion, as charges made by a muter in giving the character of his servant to a party inquiring after it, or a warning by a person to another with whom he is connected in business as to the credit or character of a third party about to deal with him, are considered as privileged communications, and are not deemed to be libels unless malice be proved, or the circum stances be such that malice may be inferred by the jury.