MATERIALISM is a name applied to any philosophical system which denies the existence of a spiritual or immaterial principle in man, called the mind or Boni, distinct from matter, or which (changing the phrase) denies the immateriality of the soul. The name is applied to systems which differ very widely from one another, in respect of the consequences deduced from the denial of tho immateriality; and thus it comes to pass that the popular meaning of the word has become loose and incorrect, comprehending what are no better than accidental consequences of the pure and proper idea. Such accidental consequences are the denial of a future state and absolute atheism ; and it need not be said that atheism and materialism are treated in current conversation as convertible expressions.
The name materialism also is one of that sort for which Mr. Bentham has constructed the epithet dyslogistie. As applied in current conversa tion, it always carries with it censure. This arises, of course from the nature of the accidental consequences which have been indicated, and which mankind regard with horror ; but inasmuch as the name still continues to be applied to systems from which unchristian and atheistical consequences are expressly excluded, and even to some systems (such as that of Hartley) which admit the existence of a separate soul, but in whose method of explaining mental phenomena there is a dash of materialism, the censure that has come to be indissolubly associated with the name often falls with grievous injustice. Indeed there is hardly a single word in the whole range of philosophic termi nology better fitted to exemplify the evils of looseness of application, or of allowing feelings to tinge and discolour the notions conveyed by names.
The systems to which the name materialism is applied may be roughly distributed under a threefold division. First, it is applied (as has been already said) to a system like that of Hartley, which admits tho existence of a soul, but which, attempting to explain mental phe nomena physically or by movements arising out of the bodily organi sation, seems to imply materialism. Secondly, it is applied to the systems of Hobbes and I'riestley, and of the French school of writers, of which De la 3lettrie may be taken as a specimen, which distinctly deny the existence of a soul as a separate principle in man, but which do not deny either a God or a future state. In tho systems of these writers is evolved the pure and proper idea of materialism, divested of all unnecessary consequences. Thirdly and lastly, the name is applied to systems like that of the ancient Epicureans which deny both a future state of rewards and punishments and a l)ivine Creator, systems for which atheism would be the better name, inasmuch as materialism fails to denote their morn important and distinctive ingredients.
The following is a brief summary of the views of Dr. Priestley, who Las more formally than any other writer enunciated the principles of materialism in the pure and proper sense of the word. Ho denies the existence of a separate immaterial principle in man, called the mind or soul, because ho thinks that an immaterial principle could not exist in union with the material body, and because he thinks, further, that all mental phenomena (as they are called) may be explained by means of supposed movements arising out of the bodily organisation. The
method by which ho thus explains mental phenomena is that of Hartley. [HAUTLEY, in Bioo. Div.) Adopting this philosopher's hypothesis of medullary vibrations, he defines mental phenomena as medullary vibrations perceived; and lie contends, principally from the analogy of brutes, that bodily organisation is adequate to produce perception. Thus and by means of such hypothesis, does ho dispense with the hypothesis of a separate immaterial soul. But, denying the existence of a soul, separate from the body, and capable of surviving when the body perishes, he does not yet deny the immortality of man, and a future state of rewards and punishments. On the contrary, he distinctly affirms these on the authority of Scripture. It is needless to add that Dr. Priestley does not deny the existence of a God. [Pnresrter, in limo. Div.] One word more on the absurdity of coupling the denial of a future state with the denial of an immaterial soul, and of making atheism synonymous with materialism. To deny a material soul is necessarily to deny an immortal soul, but not therefore to deny an immortal man. And even to dc-»y the existence of everything lave natter In the universe, is net necessarily to deny a Divine principle, as is shown by many of the ancient schools of philosophy [Eisen° Pnit.osorirr), nor even to deny a moral governor, as is shown by the philosophy of Hobbes, who, denying in ono part of his writings the existence of all spirit, and in this respect carrying his views further than Dr. Priestley, yet makes Clod the cornerstone of moral and political science. [1 Tome s, in limo. Dry.) Hobbes distinctly says that there being nothing, in his opinion, but matter in the universe, it follows that God is matter.
But it is to be remarked, in opposition to materialism, even as it is put forth by Dr. Priestley, that it is devoid of philosophical foundation, and rests on a disregard of the limits of true philosophy. Its truth cannot be tested by observation. It rests altogether on hypothesis and conjecture. When we go beyond what are called the qualities of the mind, or of matter either, and speculate upon what it is itself, whether it is something else, or different from that something, whether it has or has not an existence, we have no help but in supposing and conjecturing and imagining. Such speculations may doubtless be interesting, and they may have their use too as an exorcise for the imagination, but we cannot calculate upon their results. Much mischief is done, moreover, by mixing up these results with the results of observation, by jumbling together conjecture and philosophy. The true philosopher, not despising, but setting aside AS irrelevant to his object, all speculations on the origin and nature of mind, or of matter either, will start from these as first principles, and will apply himself to observing their qualities and capabilities and laws; and the results will be sound psychology and sound physics.
The converse of the word materialism is immaterialism. This is used only as an abstract term, and even thus very seldom, spiritualism being generally used in its place.