MEMORY is a name given to one of what are culled the faculties of the mind,—the faculty (an it is otherwise expressed) of remembering or recollecting. The word is used to denote at the same tiro the operation or act of remembering, the state of the mind when it exer cises the faculty, as distinguished from the faculty itself ; but this last is a derived and by far the rarer use of the word.
What ideas are, how they are first generated, and how afterwards reproduced, are matters the explanation of which belongs to other IDEA ; SENSATION.] But when an idea is in the mind by any of the ordinary modes of association, and there co-exists with this idea the idea of its having been before present in the mind, this complex state of mind is a case of memory. We are then said to remember the thing (whatever it may be), the idea of which is thus present to the mind. This is an exercise of the faculty of memory.
Mr. Stewart necks to make a distinction between the memory of events and the memory of things, on the ground that in the former case alone does the ides of past time form part of the complex state of mind. This does not seem to be correct. In all cases of memory, in the memory of things as well as of events, there is (as has been said) the idea of the idea which is now present to the mind having been present before. And thin ides is obviously a complex idea, of which the idea of the previous time and the idea of the interval between that and the present time are parts. The particular idea of past time, by means of which Mr. Stewart seeks to make his distinction, belongs to the event that is remembered, and has evidently nothing to do with the mental phenomenon of memory. It is the idea of the event having taken place at a past time, and not (which alone is con cerned with the mental phenomenon of memory) the idea of the idea of this event having been before present to the mind.
There is a distinction between remembering and recollecting, which, though not always observed in conversation, it is yet worth while to notice. The ideas that are remembered either come into the mind without any effort on the part of the person remembering, or with such effort. In the first case the person is more properly said to
remember; in the second to recollect. The effort of recollection may be generally described as consisting in seeking out for different ideas which are likely to recall, by any of the ordinary modes of association, the desired idea. What these modes of association are hasalready been fully explained in two previous articles--Aasoctsetoe and DRF.ASIS.
II will be seen that the thing which Is essential to the faculty of memory, and which distinguishes it from other faculties of the mind, that indeed which the faculty of memory may be said to be, is tho faculty of recognising an idea which has before been present to tho mind, as having been before present. But this faculty of recognition can never be exercised until the idea that is to be recognised has been introduced by one of the ordinary modes of association. Thus tho principle or as it may also be called) the faculty of association is neceseary to the exercise of the faculty of memory. Thin principle of association, which, though necessary to the exercise of the faculty of memory, in yet only accidentally connected with that faculty, becomes conacquently the basis of mnetnonlcs, or the art of recollection.
The principle of all systems of mnemonics, however much these may differ in complexity,is the same, and simple. It in to select a number of objects which, whether of themselves or by reason of the order of selection, are more cagily remembered than those which it Is our object to remember, and to associate in our minds each one of the latter set with some one of the former. Ono of the simplest systems of mnemonics is the plan %bleb used to be resorted to by the ancient orators, of con. netting in their minds the different pinta of a speech with different parts of the building In which it was delivered.The different systems of ' Nemesia Technlas 'which have been put forth In later times are more eemplex specimens of the art. Of these, or any one of thaw, it is unnecessary to give a details] account here. One of the best known if that of Dr. Grey (London, 1730); another Is that by Feinagle.