MIRACLES. A man may acquire his knowledge of any event in either of two ways ; by his own observation, or by information from others. The knowledge of an event which a man obtains from his own observation is generally, to him, the highest degree of evidence and the surest ground of belief ; but not therefore the surest ground of a true opinion. The knowledge of an event which a man derives by information from others is not, to him, so high a degree of evidence as that which he obtains from his own observation; but it does not there fore follow that it is not so sure a ground of true opinion. All the knowledge which a man derives from his own observation may be called experience : all that he derives from the observation of others may, for the sake of distinction, be called evidence; it is the experience of others communicated to him, either orally or by writing.
Every event which has taken place, or is said to have taken place, may be the subject of evidence. A man who has witnessed an event himself entertains no doubt of its reality, unless he has some suspicion that a fraud was practised, or that for some reason or other the event of which he was a witness was not such an event as it appeared to him to be. An eye-witness therefore of an event has nothing to guard against, so far as concerns his own conviction, but deception by others, or mistake or misapprehension on his own part. When a man derives his knowledge of an event from the information of others, there is, in addition to the causes of error which may exist where he is an eye witness, the further cause of error which may arise from the witness whose evidence he receives being interested in deceiving him, or being, from whatever cause, disposed to deceive him. There is no supposable event which may not be the subject of evidence; and when all reason for supposing deception, mistake, or intention on the part of the witness to deceive, is removed, there is no event which, when wit nessed, does not thereby acquire some degree of probability. It must be admitted that the ascertaining that there is neither deception, mistake, nor intention to deceive, is generally the main matter in esti mating the value of evidence ; but the estimating the value of the evidence in any given case is a different thing from determining what tray be the subject of evidence, which is the matter that we are here considering.
Man is so constituted, that any event alleged to have taken place is at once placed by the mind either among events which are common or among events which are uncommon. In the former case, before any evidence is furnished as to the fact, there is a disposition to believe that it is trne; and oven the soundest judge of human events, though he will believe no alleged event without sufficient evidence, readily aceiniescee in the probability of an alleged event of a common kind being a true event. In the are of an uncommon event, the matter is different ; most persons are indisposed to consider it probable that the uncommon event has actually taken place, and many person,' at once assume its impossibility, or at least assume that it has not taken place. But there is no rational ground either Jot admitting the truth of a common event without sufficient evidence, or for refusing assent to an uncommon event supported by sufficient evidence. An event the most common in the course of human life, an event the probability and possibility of which no =II will deny, requires as much evidence in order to be proved as any event the most uncommon or any kind of thing or event that has never been heard of before. In both cases, the testimony of one eye-witness at least is required ; and supposing the absence of mendacity in the witness and of all reason for supposing him to be deceived, the uncommon event is proved as much as the common event. How much and what will be necessary in sither case to show the absence of mendacity or of deception, is a question that concerns the estimation of the value of the evidence in any given case, and cannot be determined generally.