Every person understands what is meant by the laws of nature. The material world and the world of thought are subjected to certain general laws, or, to speak more accurately, the phenomena succeed one another in a certain order, which, as far as evidence extends backward, has been generally unaltered. We say, generally, for deviations from this order are alleged to have occurred at various times and in various places. Now deviations from those laws are supposed to present, and indeed do present, events which stagger the belief of many persons, and which are regarded by others as totally untrue. Some have gone so far as to say that such events are impossible; thereby destroying the very ground of all evidence, for we can never determine before hand the truth or falsehood of the matter offered to be proved ; unless, indeed the thing asserted and proposed to be proved should be a general proposition, and a man should be able by his own experience to contradict it in one or more particular instances : in such case, a man might beforehand deny the thing proposed to be proved. This is in fact Tillotson's argument against the -real presence, which Hume " flattered himself " was of "a like nature " with the argument that he " had discovered," Flume's definition of a miracle, at least the first part of it, appears unobjectionable : it is defined by him to be " a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent." The true notion of a miraculous event then is an event that was inconsistent with the course of nature, as known at the time when the event is alleged to have taken place, and would be inconsistent with it if it were to take place now ; and further, it must be such an event as by the supposition is inconsistent with and cannot take place by virtue of the laws of nature as established. If it is an event that happens by virtue of what is called a law of nature, known or unknown, it is not a miracle as the term is properly understood.
If the raising of Lazarus from the dead was an event which took place by virtue of a pre-established law or course of events, in which this one event, to us an apparent exception, was in fact a necessary consequence of this pre-established law or course of events, such event is not a miracle, nor such an event as is generally understood by the word miracle. Those men who would bring miracles within what are called the laws of nature, mistake the question. If the event of the raising of Lazarus from the dead, and all the attendant circumstances, took place in the course of things, agreeably to a general law unknown to us, such an event is as much an event consistent with what are called the laws of nature, as the event of any man's death ; but in that case, it is not the kind of event which the New Testament presents to us. Whether however it is the one kind of event or the other,
matters not as to the evidence of it, which is in no way concerned about the kind or quality of the event.
To take then the case of a man being raised from the dead ; can •the evidence of such a fact amount to proof ? It can amount to proof as strong as that which a man would derive from being an eye-witness of such an event, and having every opportunity of examining it. Whether, in a given inatance, the proof is so strong as this, must be ascertained by weighing the evidence, which is quite a different matter from the possibility of such an event being proved, which is all that is here insisted on. Whether the proof, when made as strong as we have supposed, will convince a man, is no longer a matter that iu any way belongs to tho general question of evidence. The judgment that a man will form on the report of others must be left to himself. As a man must always decide for himself whether he will trust his own senses, so he must also decide whether he can believe that which a credible witness says he has seen.
Other views of the nature of miracles, of their antecedent proba bility, historical character, and what is called evidential' value, differ ing more or less from what is set forth above, and, in their sceptical or critical point of view, from that of Hume, have, during the last few years, been repeatedly put forth and answered with great learning and logical acumen on the Continent (especially in Germany) and in our own country. The nature and extent of the controversy would however render it impracticable, even if it were desirable, to enter into it here, where all that has been attempted is to show the principle involved as a question of evidence and antecedent probability. The writings of Paula, Roseumfiller, Wegscheider, and De Wette in German, and of Theodore Parker, F. Newman, &e., in English, will show the various phases of the recent sceptical and rationalistic reasonings against tho credibility of miracles, whilst those of Archbishop Whatcly, Deans Lyell, and Trench, and Mr. Mansell will supply the arguments by which their objections have been met by what are regarded as the most orthodox authorities. With these may perhaps be compared the views of writers like Neander, Professor Jowett, and B. Powell.