NOTICE is a term used in English law with reference to various kinds of transactions. That use of it which is most important, and which it is hero proposed to explain, has reference to contracts of buying and selling, and mainly so far as such contracts come under the cogni Bence of courts of equity. In this sense notice signifies the knowledge of a party to the contract of any fact which is connected with the contract, and may become a matter of dispute either between the parties to the contract, or between them or any of them and any other person not a party to that contract. The term notice is applied to buying and selling of land, or some interest in land, and the matter generally in dispute is, whether the interest of a person who is not a party to the contract is in any way to be affected by it.
Notice, in English law, is an ambiguous term, and has different meanings according as wo contemplate the giver or the receiver of what is called notice. To give notice is to communicate something to another person : the person who receives the communication is said to hare notice, and when it is proved that he has had such notice, lie is presumed to have knowledge of the thing communicated. Thus notice come.. to have the meaning of inowledue when applied to him who in the receiver of the notice ; and it is not always easy to avoid the ambiguity resulting from this double meaning of the word.
Notice of a fact (notice being here considered with reference to the receiver) may mean either knowledge of the fact itself, or knowledge of some other fact from which arises a legal presumption of knowledge of the fact itself. In both cases the knowledge must be proved by evidence, and the only difference in the evidence ie this ; in the former case a fact is to be proved, which fact, when proved, shall be considered knowledge ; and in the second case a fact is to be proved, which cannot be considered as knowledge, but is a fact the establishment of which leads to a legal presumption, that is, to an inference of some fact which is considered as knowledge. If a man receive a written communication from another person of a certain dein/trill upon him by such person, all that can be proved by evidence is that be did receive such communi cation; but that fact being established, all the world imputes to the receiver of such communication knowledge of the demand contained in it. The fact, in order to have any relation to the contract, must of course be such a fact as would affect the contract if it were expressly tondo part of it. A fact of this kind then being established, which is
either knowledge or legal presumption of knowledge, the legal conclu sion is, that the person who had such knowledge at the time of making the contract must be considered as having acquiesced in such fact; in other words, such fact must be considered to have the same effect as if it were expressed in and incorporated with the contract.
Notice has been divided by writers on English law into " actual " and " constructive." Of " actual notice," it is said that "to constitute a binding notice, it must bo given by a person interested in the pro. perty, and in the course of the treaty for the purchase. Vague reports from persons not interested in the property, will not affect the pur chaser's conscience ; nor will he be bound by notice in a previous trans action which he may have forgotten. (Lord St. Leonarda, ' Vendors and Perch:Leers,' 13th edit. p. 621.) The same author says of " con. atructive notice," that " in its nature it -is no more than evidence of notice, the presumptions of which are so violent, that the court will not allow oven of its being controverted; but courts of equity will not extend the doctrine to cases to which it has not hitherto been held applicable." The difference between the two kinds of notice seems to be rather in degree than in kind. In addition to what has been said on the general subject of knowledge, we may take an instance of what would be called actual notice in English law.. We will suppose this actual notice to be a statement in writing made by a person interested in a certain piece of laud and in the course of the treaty for the pur chase of it, and by him handed tsethe purchaser. Now it is obvious that all this, when proved, does not make the knowledge of the pur chaser; but these facts, when proved, are evidence, of knowledge," the presumptions of which are so violent" that the universal consent of mankind " will not allow even of its being controverted." There is then no further distinction between actual and constructive notice, considered as a matter belonging to the general subject of evidence, than what has been already stated ; and the only question which can arise in any system of law is, what facts, not capable of being con sidered as knowledge, shall be considered, when proved, as leading to a legal presumption of such facts as may be considered knowledge.