[STOITAOE IN THANSITU.] It is remarked by Savigny (' Das Hecht des Besitzers,' p. 185), "that in the whole theory of possession nothing seems easier to determine than the character of corporeal apprehension which is necessary to the acquisition of possession. By this fact all writers have understood an immediate touching of the corporeal thing, and have accordingly assumed that there are only two modes of apprehension : laying hold of a moveable thing with the hand; and entering with the foot on a piece of land. But as many cases occur in the Roman law in which possession is acquired by a corporeal act, without such immediate contact, these cases have been viewed as symbolical acts, which, through the medium of a juristical fiction, become the substitute for real apprehension." After showing that this is not the way in which the acquisition of possession is understood in the Homan law, and that there is no symbolical apprehension, but that the acquisition of posses sion may in all cases be referred to the same corporeal act, ho deter. mines what it is, in the following manner: " A man who holds a piece of gold in his hand is doubtless the ism essor of it ; and from this and other similar cases has been abstracted the notion of a corporeal contact generally as the essential thing in all acquisition of possession. But in the case put, there is something else which is only accidentally united with this corporeal contact, namely, the physical possibility to operate immediately on the thing, and to exclude all others from doing so. That both these
things concur in the case put, cannot be denied: that they are only accidentally connected with corporeal contact, follows from this, that the possibility can be imagined without the contact, and the contact without the possibility. As to the former case, he who can at any moment lay hold of a thing which lies before him, is doubtless as much uncontrolled master of it as if he actually had laid hold of it. As to the Latter, he who is bound with cords has iinniediato contact with them, and yet no might rather affirm that ho is possessod by than that he possesses them. This physical possibility then is that which as a fact must be contained in all acquisition of possession : corporeal contact is not contained in that notion, and there is no case in which a fictitious apprehension need be assumed." This clear exposition of a principle of Homan law to all systems of jurisprudence which have received any careful elabora tion, for the principle is in its nature general. It may be that the expounders of our law have not always clearly seen this principle, even when they have recognised it ; and it may be that they have not always acted upon it. Still it appears from various cases that the physical possibility of operating on a thing is the essential character of the acquisition of possession in English law.