SUBLIMITY has two signification: one, that of the quality or circumstance in objects, which raises the emotion named sublimity; the other, that of the emotion itself. The nature of the sublime, that is, those conditions of objects which invariably excite in us certain emotions, to which we give the common name of sublimity, is a subject of great Interest and Importance in psychology, and has always been a favourite Subject of speculation. We shall briefly notice the more celebrated theories which have professed to embrace and explain all " those conditions which excite the emotions," and endeavour to point out their failures.
Longinus, whose work (11spl 4ous) is the most ancient, treats only of the sublime in writing. His treatise was meant as a supplement to the work of Crneilius on the ' in which he Stays Ciecilius brought a number of instances to show what is the sublime, as if every one did not know that well enough.
Burke's Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful' was the first attempt to give philosophical precision to our notions of the sublime. His theory is, that the essence of the sublime consists in terror operat ing either openly or latently ; and the delight which is ;caused by this terror is referred to those principles of human nature which he calls "passions of self-preservation;' and which turn on pain and danger. These passions "are simply painful when their causes immediately affect us; they are delightful when we have an Idea of pain and danger, without being actually in such circumstances : this delight I have not called pleasure, because it turns on pain, and because it is different enough from any Idea of positive pleasure—whatever excites this delight I call sublime." Inquiry,' part L, sect. 18.) "Whatever, there fore, is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublime too, whether this cause of terror be endued with greatness of dimensions or not." (lbid., part ii., sect. 2.) Nothing can be more explicit than these two pas sages, nor more accurately exhibit the truth and error of his theory. The error is glaring in the second passage. Terror is often one feeling, exciting, In conjunction with other feelings, the emotion of sublimity, but not always. The stars are sublime, yet there is no terror in the emotion they excite. On tho other hand there is a terror in a surgeon about to operate, or hi a pedagogue about to flog—but no sublimity. The gallows is very terrible, but not at all sublime. Yet Burke was so chained down by his theory of terror being the ruling principle of the sublime, as to write—" There are many animals who, though far from being large, are yet capable of raising ideas of the sublime, because they are considered as objects of terror—a.9 serpents and poisonous animals of all kinds." (Ibid., part ii., sect. 2.) Now, when
a man asserts that a serpent is sublime, because it is terrible, it is evident that he uses the Word sublime in a different sense from the rest of the world ; otherwise era say a serpent is in no case sublime.
That the terrible is often a constituent of the sublime there can be no doubt, and Burke's error consists in seizing this Occasional con stituent, and declaring It to be the "ruling principle." And further, we must observe, that whenever a feeling of terror is found to be a constituent of the sublime, there will also invariably be found another feeling of security, correcting this terror. Thus, when we stand beneath a rock, the terror consists in a natural apprehension of its falling down and crushing us, which apprehension is instantly checked by our feeling of security and confidence of its not falling. If this feeling of security did not momently cheek the feeling of terror, the effect would be terror only, and not sublimity, and we should escape front it as swiftly as possible. So universal Is this accompaniment of a feeling of security correcting the feeling of danger in every case of sublimity wherein terror is a constituent, that we are as much justi fied in asserting that "a feeling of security, either operating openly or latently, is the ruling principle of the sublime," as Burke was in his theory of terror. If terror had been found to be an invariable element of the sublime, the correct statement of the theory would have " The sublime is the effect of the concurrence of the two feelings of danger and security." But unfortunately there are many cases hn which no feeling of danger can be found to exist. Infinity and eternity are sublime; but although, as he says, "infinity has a tendency to fill the mind with that sort of delightful horror which is the most genuine effect and truest teat of the sublime," yet it does not necessarily fill the mind with horror; it may or may not, but in either ease it is sublime. Helvetius says, ^ When God said, ' Let there be light,' and there was light : this image is sublime. But should such an imago inspire fear? Yes; because it is necessarily ealaelsttal hi our inindi with the idea of the Creatot of such a prodigy ; and being then seized In an Involuntary with a dread of the author of light, we feel the sensation of a terror." (' On Man, vol. Ii.) Now we contend that although fear would arise from such a train of thought, yet this train of thought is by no Means a Aecesaary sequence to the linage—" God said, Let there be light, and there was light." It may or may not arise In the mind, but the sublimity produced by the image is not at all dependent upon it.